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This thesis set out to meet the following aim and objectives: Aim: Examine cognition and
personality of people who hold different types of supernatural belief. Objective 1: Create and
validate a new scale to measure supernatural belief. Objective 2: Create and test a new model
of supernatural belief  based on cognition and personality.  This would potentially test two
hypotheses:  the  Cognitive  Deficits  Hypothesis  and  the  Psychodynamics  Functions
Hypothesis. This was accomplished by conducting four studies. Studies one and two created
and validated the new Belief in the Supernatural Scale (BitSS),  a 44 item scale with the
following five factors: ‘mental and psychic phenomena’, ‘religious belief’, ‘psychokinesis’,
‘supernatural  entities’,  and  ‘common  paranormal  perceptions’.  Cognition  and  personality
would  be  looked  at  within  the  context  of  four  different  types  of  believer:  ‘believers’,
‘paranormal believers’, ‘sceptics’ and ‘religious believers’. Study three revealed two profiles
relating to cognition: ‘reflective thinkers’ and ‘intuitive believers’. The reflective profile was
more  likely  to  contain  ‘sceptics’ and ‘believers’,  and  least  likely  to  contain  ‘paranormal
believers’.  The  intuitive  group  was  more  likely  to  contain  ‘religious  believers’  and
‘believers’. The final study looked at personality alongside cognition and revealed ‘sensitive
and abstract thinkers’ and ‘reflective metacognitive dogmatists’ profiles. The ‘sensitive and
abstract thinkers’ were least likely to contain ‘sceptics’ and ‘religious believers’ and most
likely  to  contain  ‘believers’  and  ‘paranormal  believers’.  The  ‘reflective  metacognitive
dogmatists’ were most likely to contain ‘religious believers’ and ‘believers’ and least likely to
contain ‘paranormal believers’. Following this analysis, Structural Equation Modelling was
used to test seven different models of personality, cognition and belief. Studies one and two
indicated a clear separation of religious and paranormal belief within the new scale, and that
spiritual belief overlaps between the two. The scale developed was reliable and valid, and
accurately  reflected  the  concept  of  supernatural  belief  and  enabled  the  measurement  of
religious and paranormal belief,  where the overlaps were acknowledged whilst still  being
separate beliefs. Studies three and four found the ‘sceptics’ and ‘religious believers’ have
remarkably similar profiles, indicating that the religious beliefs themselves may have been
cognitively  ring-fenced  off  in  some  way.  The  ‘paranormal  believers’ however  were  not
reflective thinkers and were not metacognitively active, indicating that they were not aware
that they were not thinking critically or analytically. The Structural Equation Model showed
that  schizotypy  was  the  main  predictor  of  belief.  The  relationship  between  belief  and
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cognition was more complex; it was dependent on what type of belief was active. Paranormal
belief required a more intuitive thinking style to be present, whereas religious belief could
withstand a reflective mind set. This thesis develops a new scale that measures supernatural
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1 Chapter One - Introduction
‘A closed mind is the worst defence against the supernatural’
- Dr. John Markway, The Haunting (1963)
Supernatural beliefs play a large part in our day to day lives and are present across all human
culture and time  (Pyysianen & Hauser, 2010). Much like the evolution of humans, beliefs
have evolved and form an important part of our lives as social beings, and are a reflection of
our nature of self (Evans, 2001). However, what constitutes a supernatural belief and how it
is  defined  is  debateable  and  may  very  well  evolve  and  change  alongside  societal  and
individual needs (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). The effect that different types of belief have
on thought processes and personality is unclear. The question of whether we believe in certain
things because we think in a certain way or have certain personalities has not been answered.
Indeed, the relationship between belief, cognition and personality and the effect our beliefs
have on us, or if the beliefs are a product of our thoughts and personalities is also unclear.
How these beliefs are developed and maintained has also been debated, and different beliefs
may develop in different ways. Certain beliefs have been treated differently in the literature in
the past with religious, spiritual and paranormal beliefs providing mixed results and these
concepts have been seen to overlap.
It was the difference between types of belief – for example, the difference between religious
and paranormal belief  – and the type of thinking and personality  that  occur,  or influence
belief,  that  provided  the  inspiration  for  this  programme  of  research.  While  undertaking
research for this project it became clear that the terms used were not well defined and the
categorisation of what constitutes a paranormal belief  was not agreed upon; for example,
religious belief was classed as paranormal. Before cognition and personality could be studied,
it was important to define the terms that would be used; it became clear that a new scale that
would be able to measure religious, spiritual and paranormal belief, while keeping them as
separate concepts can also be used unidimensionally, was required. The development of the
scale itself would also help to establish better definitions of these terms and how they fit
together conceptually. The new scale, coupled with the understanding of how the beliefs fit
together, enables the study of cognition and personality and its relationship with belief. This
17
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thesis set out to do this, and to examine these beliefs and their relationship to cognition and
personality the following aims and objectives were set:
Aim: Examine cognition and personality of people who hold different types of supernatural
belief. 
Objective (a): Create and validate a new scale to measure supernatural belief.
Objective (b): Create and test a new model of supernatural belief based on cognitition and
personality.
In order to meet the main aim of the thesis four studies were conducted which involved the
development and testing of a new scale to measure supernatural belief; the examination of
cognition of people who hold different types of belief; the examination of the personalities of
people who hold different types of supernatural belief and finally the creation of a model of
cognition, personality and supernatural belief.
Chapter Two: Chapter two begins with definitions. Working definitions will be provided for
the terms belief, supernatural, religious, spiritual and paranormal. The definitions given will
be used throughout the thesis. This will then be followed by a literature review of the scales
that have been previously used to  measure religiosity,  spirituality and paranormality.  The
literature review will focus particularly on the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford,
1983) and the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004), provide a critique of the PBS
and rPBS’s factor structure and items, and discuss what an overall taxonomy of paranormal
belief is and what can feasibly be classed as a paranormal belief. This chapter ends with a
rationale for a new scale to measure supernatural belief.
 
Chapter Three:  Chapter three covers the methodology used to develop the new scale to
measure supernatural belief. This chapter will examine the nature of scale development and
discuss the generation of the item pool, the choice of item response measure, and how the
proposed item pool can be reduced before the analysis is conducted. This is followed by a
discussion  of  the  analysis  that  could  be  used,  such  as  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  and
Confirmatory  Factor  Analysis.  Issues  such  as  the  order  in  which  the  analysis  should  be
conducted and the sample size, as well as the procedure of each analysis will be discussed to
18
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achieve the optimum measure for belief in the supernatural. This will provide a method to
develop (chapter four) and test (chapter five) the new measure of supernatural belief.
Chapter Four: This is the first of four studies that will lead to the development and testing
of a new model of cognition, personality and belief. This chapter will cover the development
of  the  Belief  in  the  Supernatural  Scale.  It  will  establish  a  theoretical  base  for  placing
religious, spiritual and paranormal belief under the umbrella term of the supernatural. The
item pool  will  then  be  developed  systematically,  and  it  will  be  reduced systemically  by
looking at validity issues and using expert and novice reviewers. The final item pool will then
be analysed using an Exploratory Factor Analysis and a factor structure of the new scale will
be proposed. This chapter proposes the initial scale to be validated in chapter five.
 
Chapter Five: This chapter validates the scale that is developed in chapter four. The second
study  in  this  thesis  uses  a  new  set  of  participants  and  conducts  a  Confirmatory  Factor
Analysis  on  the  Belief  in  the  Supernatural  Scale  that  was  developed  in  chapter  four.
Convergent validity is assessed by comparing the new scale to previous measures, and test
retest reliability is also assessed using a three month follow up study retesting participants
who took part in the initial confirmation study. The confirmed belief in the supernatural scale
will then be used in chapter six to examine the cognition of different types of believer.
Chapter Six: Uses the Belief in the Supernatural Scale developed and validated in chapters
four and five to examine the cognitions of different types of believer. This chapter will begin
with a literature review of previous research into cognition and belief. This study looked at
cognitive  reflection,  implicit  belief,  covariance  detection  and  critical  thinking.  Initially  a
Cluster analysis was used to establish different groups of believer. Four were found and a
MANOVA was used to establish differences between the groups. This was followed by a
Discriminant  Functions  Analysis,  which  established  profiles  of  cognition  of  the  different
types of believer. The results then informed which of the measures of cognition should be
discussed in chapter seven and combined with personality measures to establish a new model
of supernatural belief.
Chapter  Seven:  The  penultimate  chapter  will  bring  together  the  scale  developed  and
validated  in  chapters  four  and  five,  the  pertinent  measures  from  chapter  six,  and  the
19
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personality measures of schizotypy, dogmatism and the 15FQ+ measure of personality which
is based on Cattell’s 16 Factors of Personality. This chapter will begin with a literature review
of personality and belief and look at previous models that have been used to explain belief.
As with chapter six, a Cluster analysis is used to identify the believer groups and a MANOVA
is used to identify if there are differences in cognition and personality between the groups. A
Discriminant  Functions  Analysis  is  then  used  to  establish  profiles  of  cognition  and
personality  that  relate  to  the  different  groups  of  believer.  The  strongest  measures  of
personality and cognition are then analysed using Structural Equation Modelling and several
models  are  tested  until  a  new model  of  supernatural  belief,  cognition  and personality  is
established.
Chapter Eight:  The final  chapter  of  the  thesis  reflects  the  journey taken to  achieve  the
overall  aim to  examine cognition  and  personality  of  people  who hold  different  types  of
supernatural belief. This chapter reflects on the findings of the four studies; the creation and
validation of the supernatural belief scale; the cognitions associated with different types of
belief,  the  personality  of  different  types  of  believer  and  the  creation  of  the  model.  The
implications of the findings are discussed and a summary of the overall program of research




1 Chapter Two – Defining Supernatural Belief and an
Examination of Previous Measures of Religiosity, Spirituality
and the Paranormal
Initially, a discussion of the definitions surrounding belief and the concepts of supernatural,
religious, spiritual and the paranormal will be used to establish working definitions. This will
be followed by a literature review of previous scales and an examination of their dimensions.
Finally a critique of the revised Paranormal Belief Scale (rPBS) will be presented and the
taxonomy of paranormal belief will be examined using the items of the rPBS for reference.
This chapter will provide a rationale for a new scale to measure supernatural belief.
1.1 Defining Belief
There has been little agreement on what belief is and how it should be defined (McKay &
Dennett, 2009). Definitions of belief differ. One early definition was that ‘belief, in its basic
sense of episodic, absolute belief, is the mental attitude of favour felt by a person qua person
towards a proposition when and in so far as that position is mentally asserted or judged by
him to be true’ (Campbell,  1967 p. 217). A simpler definition is that belief is a cognitive
component and concerns the status of an object's truth or falseness  (Zusne & Jones, 1982).
Belief  has  been  taken  to  mean  that  something  exists,  happened  or  the  current  state  of
something  (Gorsuch,  1984) or  that  belief  has  ‘…cognitive,  affective  and  (sometimes)
behavioural components; they are not an abstract value or statement of preference and they
are more durable than mere opinions’ (Irwin, 2009; p. 8). It has also been defined as follows:
‘A belief is a functional state of an organism that implements or embodies that organism’s
endorsement of a particular state of affairs as actual’ (McKay & Dennett, 2009). Belief has
been  framed  as  a  multi-faceted  problem  (Campbell,  1967).  Beliefs  are  not  episodic,  i.e.
occurring at a specific time point for example, but they are dispositional, relatively stable,
and might cause a person to act in a certain way, in a certain situation. That being said, there
must be a point at which a person accepts a belief and from that point is a believer, and that is
an episode but how beliefs are formed and maintained is still unclear.
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Intuitive beliefs are encountered in folk biology and psychology, and our beliefs on how the
world might react or turnout are taken from and shaped by these ideas and vice versa. Unlike
facts, these do not need an evidential base, but can overlap with facts (Van Leeuwen, 2014).
Factuality is classed as the first part of an attitude, the second being the affective. This refers
to if a person feels good or bad toward a particular idea or object. Another component is the
behavioural component: how a person might act based on their belief, and this also depends
on the affective component. The sceptic, for example, might not believe in ghosts but feel
negative about them and therefore would act in such a way, denouncing them publicly. An
opinion in this case, is what a person reveals about their beliefs, however, opinions can be
distorted by factors like social desirability. Campbell (1967) states that a ‘logical’ definition
of belief is not possible, and while we can have a rough idea of what belief and believing is
about, an attitude, a mental state for example, the instance of belief or believing would appear
to  be  no  more  than  a  synonym  for  something  else,  again,  an  undefined  concept.  One
definition  is  that  opinions  are  many,  attitudes  are  fewer  and  beliefs  are  scarcer  still
(Stephenson, 1965).
1.1.1 Working Definition of Belief
A working definition of belief must make a distinction between an evidence-based belief and
a faith-based belief, and further make reference to attitude, knowledge, opinion, and ideology.
Therefore, the definition is: Beliefs are both evidence-based and faith-based attitudes but are
more than having simple knowledge of a concept. They are a combination of attitude, affect,
and knowledge, but are less flexible than opinions.
1.2 Defining the Supernatural
According to Irwin (2007) supernatural beliefs include: beliefs surrounding superstition, ESP,
ghosts and God, to name a few. It has been noted that terms such as supernatural, paranormal,
superstition have been used in many different ways and have been used to describe very
different  types  of  phenomena  (Lindeman  &  Svedholm,  2012).  One  definition  of  the
supernatural  is  a  ‘ubiquitous  mental  model  that  depicts  one  or  more  sentient,  volitional
agencies that are independent of a biological substrate and understood to be the ultimate
cause  of  elements  of  physical  reality’  (Lohmann,  2003 p.175).  While  this  is  an  overly
complex  definition,  it  does  contain  one  element  that  is  generally  agreed  upon:  the
supernatural is metaphysical. However, other terms have been used. Lohman (2003) uses the
term ‘supernaturalism’ and Northcote (2007) the term ‘supranatural’.
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The  supernatural  refers  to  the  distinction  between  the  unnatural  and the  natural  (Bosco,
2003). One problem with this could be the notion of preternatural. Preternatural has been
defined as  lying  somewhere  in  between the  natural  and supernatural,  and mistakenly  so,
according to  Vermeir  (2004),  who describes  preternatural  more  as  an  uncommon natural
phenomenon. This is clearly not in between the natural and supernatural, and preternatural
and supernatural are often conflated. The term preternatural fell out of favour around the time
of the enlightenment as the preternatural was deemed to be natural  (Bräunlein, 2012). The
question of whether something can be considered supernatural today and natural tomorrow
(Lindeman  &  Svedholm,  2012) seems  logical  enough  in  light  of  previous  comments
surrounding the term preternatural. However, if that were the case and the supernatural were
just  natural phenomena waiting to be given a natural explanation,  then nothing would be
supernatural and the term would disappear. Therefore, the natural and supernatural continuum
is  a  paradox  and  the  supernatural  by  its  very  ‘nature’ should  have  an  element  of  the
metaphysical, but not necessarily in the sense of life after death. The term supernatural is also
problematic because something might be considered to be supernatural in one culture but not
viewed as such in another  (Dein, 2016). Bosco (2003) contends that the term can be used
cross culturally but states that the difference between natural and supernatural may be in
constant  flux.  While  the  boundaries  between  natural  and  supernatural  may  change,
'supernatural'  is  still  a  useful  term  that  conveys  the  correct  meaning  when  discussing
religious,  spiritual  and paranormal belief,  terms that  also have shifting boundaries within
them. This demonstrates that a lot of the problems with the definitions are related and often
anchored to other terms. The definition of one term will be dependent on how another term is
defined.  Religious  and  paranormal  beliefs  have  been  referred  to  as  different  ‘realms’ of
supernatural belief (Weeks, Weeks, & Daniel, 2008). While the term ‘supernatural’ fell out of
favour in the late part  of the last  century  (Irwin,  2009),  its  use since has been sporadic,
referring to both the religious and the paranormal. For example, scales that have measured the
supernatural have had items such as ‘There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God’
(Jong, Bluemke, & Halberstadt, 2013) that are religious, and ‘In spite of what many people
think, card reading, for example tarot cards, can tell a lot about a person and their future’ that
are  paranormal  (Randall  &  Desrosiers,  1980).  However,  a  simpler  definition  of  the
supernatural that refers to  the metaphysical would be sufficient  to then include religious,
spiritual and paranormal belief under it as an umbrella term.
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1.2.1 Working Definition of the Supernatural
The supernatural is defined as relating to phenomena that have an unknown cause or origin
and are metaphysical. This would include both the religious and paranormal.
1.3 Defining Religious and Spiritual
Since religious and spiritual are intertwined, this section will discuss and provide a working
definition of both. It is important to define these two concepts as accurately as possible as this
will lead to less duplication when it comes to scale development (Hill & Pargament, 2008).
Well’s  (1921) provides a basic definition of religion that is twofold: firstly, a supernatural
element that can have a ‘relationship’ with humans and secondly, a particular attitude to this
‘unseen power’ and participation in ‘acts’ to influence the aid or favour of such a power.
Koenig et al. (2012) define religion as a system that relates to an ultimate truth, transcendent,
higher power. This system relates to belief, feeling, thought, experience, behaviour and ritual.
Religion  and  spirituality  are  clearly  related  (Hill  et  al.,  2000),  but  care  is  needed  to
distinguish the two concepts while still maintaining the link between them. People might say
they are spiritual but what that actually means is still unclear (Kenneson, 2015) and religion
is  often  portrayed  as  being  bad  and  spirituality  good  (Hill  &  Pargament,  2008).  This
oversimplification of the two terms is often demonstrated by researcher bias when studying
these concepts (Krüger, 1982). While researchers have used the terms religious and spiritual
separately, it has been suggested that using these terms in a binary fashion is less than helpful
(Hill  et  al.,  2000).  However,  the  terms  religiosity  and  spirituality  are  often  used
interchangeably, the main differentiating factor between them seems to be commitment to a
certain institution or set of values often demonstrated by ritual and actions that demonstrate
faith in that particular religion (Moberg, 2005).
Various  ‘elements’  are  talked  about  when  discussing  religion.  One  argument  is  that
supernaturalistic belief is part of the religious experience and arguably must form part of the
definition  (Wells, 1921); or in the same vein that religious beliefs are supernatural beliefs
(Bering, 2006). The religious belief system influences all areas of a person life, from their
core beliefs to their behaviours  (Silberman, 2005). Religion has been used to refer to both
individual and institutional concepts (Hill & Pargament, 2008). Religion is the search for the
sacred and while spirituality has also been seen as this, the sacred element of these concepts
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is what distinguishes it from other concepts, for example, the paranormal (Hill & Pargament,
2008). Items that are used in religiosity scales reflect this, for example ‘I pray chiefly because
I have been taught to pray’ or ‘If I were to join a church group, I would prefer to join a Bible
study  group  rather  than  a  social  fellowship’  (Hills,  Francis,  &  Robbins,  2005) contain
wording referring to prayer or the Bible. The sacred element of religiosity is often what is
used to distinguish it from spirituality  (Zinnbauer et al., 1997). One problem with defining
religion is that people are increasingly more likely to self-identify,  with religion meaning
different  things  to  different  people  (Hood,  Hill,  &  Spilka,  2009).  Spirituality  has  been
described as ‘fuzzy’ (Zinnbauer et al., 1997), and difficult to define, however, it has often
been seen to be an aspect of religiosity, a more personal ‘intrinsic’ element (Hill et al., 2000).
Again, this can been seen in items used in spirituality scales; for example, ‘When I think of
the things that help me to grow and mature as a person, my spirituality is absolutely the most
important factor in my personal growth’ that specifically refers to personal growth.
 
While  the  link  between religion  and spirituality  appears  evident,  and  despite  researchers
calling for the two terms to be better integrated, the referring to oneself as spiritual rather
than religious has become increasingly popular  (Saucier & Skrzypinska, 2006). This is an
important development when examining religious and spiritual belief as it changes the way
these terms are defined and how they might relate to each other. While James (1916) stated
that the experience of religion was evidence of its truth, this has of course been debated and
religion is dependent on the existence of the belief and not dependent on the existence of the
phenomena itself (Wells, 1921). This is one of the many reasons why the study of belief is so
important.
1.3.1 Working Definitions of Religious and Spiritual
The religious is therefore defined as a metaphysical phenomenon that has an influence on
people’s lives, for example God. This would also have an element of the sacred, be connected
to an external institution, and include ritualistic behaviour. The spiritual is more difficult to
define, but would be more of a personal journey and involve a connection to something larger




1.4 Defining the Paranormal
A working  definition  of  paranormal  belief  is  complex  (Irwin,  2009) and  defining  the
paranormal in terms of a shared quality is difficult due to the wide range of phenomena that
are/have been classed as paranormal  (Northcote, 2007). ‘Para’ means ‘next to’ and is taken
from ancient Greek. So essentially paranormal means ‘next to normal’ (Goode, 2000). Earlier
definitions of these types of concepts referred to them as being ‘false’ (Irwin, 2009) or not
scientific  (Appleyard,  1992);  or  that  they  violate  the  basic  limiting  principles  of  science
(Broad,  1949) and are  unproven.  However,  absence  of  proof  is  not  a  good criterion  for
defining the paranormal  (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Other terms used in the past have
been  ‘paranormalism’  (Goode,  2000),  ‘paraphysical’  (Northcote,  2007) and  even  ‘para-
paranormal’ (Whittle, 2004).  Goode (2000) defines the term ‘paranormalism’ as ‘the non-
scientific approach to a scientifically implausible event believed to be literally true’, in this
case  the  phenomenon  being  examined  is  true.  The  example  used  by  Goode  is  an
hallucination,  which  is  not  a  paranormal  phenomenon  because  it  has  a  pharmacological
origin. However, the belief in the vision of the hallucination could constitute paranormalism.
This  definition  is  problematic  on  two  counts:  first,  does  a  phenomenon  cease  to  be
paranormal  if  it  is  explained?;  second,  if  it  is  still  paranormal,  if  a  person’s  experience
dictates  it,  can  the  status  of  paranormal  phenomenon  ever  be  verified?  Although  the
difference between belief and ‘involvement’ is seen as ‘tenuous’ by Northcote  (2007), the
difference  between  paranormal  belief,  behaviour  (involvement)  and  experience  is  an
important one, and should be treated in the same way as religiosity has intrinsic and extrinsic
orientation. Not making the same distinction for the paranormal (or paranormality if it were
to be used in the same way religiosity is) would be a serious mistake.
Lindeman  and  Svedholm  (2012) give  a  thorough  account  of  paranormal,  magical  and
supernatural beliefs and how they are defined and conclude that they are not particularly
different,  but  they  do  acknowledge  that  religious  belief  might  be  separate  from  the
paranormal. This is in line with more recent suggestions that the concepts of religious and
paranormal belief should be treated differently (Schofield, Baker, Staples, & Sheffield, 2016).
It has been noted that terms such as supernatural, paranormal, superstition have been used in
many different  ways  and have  been used  to  describe  very different  types  of  phenomena
(Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Lohman (2003) states that there is a multitude of variation
between different people's spirituality, and state that one uniting factor is that, for the most
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part, refer to a supernatural world. If spirituality really is a uniting feature of paranormal and
religious belief then it would make sense to have the term supernatural as an overarching
term to encompass both religious and paranormal belief. This would also have the advantage
of being able to treat them as being separate concepts. Culturally specific definitions are not
much more helpful. For example, the Loch Ness monster and the lucky number 13 that refer
to the British Isles  (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012).  Defining the paranormal in  terms of
shared quality is difficult due to the wide range of phenomena that are/have been classed as
paranormal  (Northcote, 2007). Some superstition scales do have cognitive and behavioural
elements to them (Zebb & Moore, 2003) and while Irwin (2007) does call for superstition to
be further examined as a component of paranormal belief, whether it should be classed as a
separate concept to the supernatural and/or paranormal is debateable (Lindeman & Svedholm,
2012).  Another  way to define the paranormal would be too look at  what  phenomena are
considered paranormal. For example, scales that measure paranormal belief have included
items such as ‘Witches do exist, or ‘Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic
powers, does exist’ (Tobacyk, 2004).
1.4.1 Working Definition of the Paranormal
The  paranormal  is  defined as  relating  to  phenomena  that  are  not  currently  explained by
science but are prevalent in society. They are sometimes metaphysical, but are not religious
phenomena. Such phenomena would include ghosts, and Extra Sensory Perception (ESP).
1.5 Religiosity, Spirituality and Paranormality
Religiosity is a well-stablished term but as will be seen, what falls under the remit of this
term is dependent on the researcher and what they are researching. Religiosity, spirituality,
and paranormality are generally catch-all terms that cover the multi-dimensionality of these
concepts. Religiosity can be both uni- and multi-dimensional (Gorsuch, 1984).   Allport and
Ross (1967) identified two dimensions of religiosity or religious orientation: intrinsic and
extrinsic orientation. Intrinsic being a more personal, almost spiritual way a person views
their self and how they see their religion, and extrinsic is how they ‘use’ their religion. Do
they  go  to  a  place  of  worship  and  how does  their  religion  affect  their  social  standing?
Intrinsic and extrinsic have been seen as being different from belief, as the idea of faith has
been seen as secondary to the measurement how a person lives their religion (Gorsuch, 1984).
It has been stated that the more a person pays attention to their religious practices and beliefs
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the  more  this  could  affect  their  cognitions  (for  example,  less  death  anxiety)
(Chaiwutikornwanich, 2014) and this implies that the cognition of a person with a higher
extrinsic orientation be affected more than that of an intrinsically oriented person. While this
is  linked with positive psychological well-being,  it  could be argued that a more extrinsic
orientation could interfere with rational thought processes. One problem is that intrinsic is
often seen as good and extrinsic as bad, which can be seen in Hunt and King’s (1971) use of
phrases such as ‘not self-centred’, ‘sincerely believing’ to describe intrinsic, and phrases like
‘unreflective’, ‘dogmatic’ for extrinsic, the toning of the phrases is evident in the way the
author wants them to be perceived. The dimensions of the scales for religiosity need revision
rather than there being a need for new scales (Gorsuch, 1984). This could be extended further
for  a  scale  of  supernatural  belief  by  using  items  from these  scales  to  create  a  scale  of
supernatural  belief.  The  dimensionality  issue  for  religiosity  seems  to  be  a  split  between
intrinsic and extrinsic. This split could be more or less analogous to the difference between
belief and behaviour. Unlike the dimensions that have been discussed regarding religiosity,
that fall around intrinsic, and extrinsic, generally for paranormal belief, it is concerned with
the phenomena that fall under its remit. 
To  further  see  how  these  concepts  are  defined,  the  dimensions  that  are  used  and  the
phenomena that fall beneath each concept, a review of some of the scales that have been used
over the years is required. This will be concluded with a review of the scale that is most
analogous to the scale proposed for development here, the revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(rPBS) (Tobacyk, 2004).
1.6 Measuring Supernatural, Religious, Spiritual and Paranormal Scales – A 
Literature Review.
The following is a review of the literature concerning scales that measure the supernatural,
religiosity, spirituality and the paranormal. It will further examine the different dimensions
concerned with these concepts and how different researchers address the multi-dimensional
issues  surrounding  religiosity,  spirituality  and  the  paranormal.  Then  a  taxonomy  of
paranormal belief will be examined and finally there will be a critique of one of the most





The term the supernatural has been used sporadically within the literature and has been used
in many different ways.  Sagan (1995) defines the supernatural as anything that is ‘beyond
natural’;  it  seems to fit  with current  understanding of  religious,  spiritual  and paranormal
belief.  However,  the term fell  out of favour with researchers during the 1970’s as it  was
deemed to be linked to the occult and it was felt to not be representative of religiosity in
general  (Irwin, 2009). There are a few scales that have supernatural in the title, and these
measure  different  concepts.  Jong,  Halberstadt,  and  Bluemke  (2012) developed  the
Supernatural Belief Scale to test the relationship between supernatural belief and the fear of
death. In this instance supernatural belief was religious belief. They developed a 10 item
scale  derived  from  supernatural  entities  and  events  identified  in  anthropological,
psychological and religious studies. The items had a mixture of supernatural entities, afterlife
related items and supernatural events, with positive, negative and neutral items. Items such
as: ‘There exists  an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God’, ‘there exists an evil  personal
spiritual being, whom we might call the Devil’ and ‘there exist good personal spiritual beings,
whom we might call angels’. The item response format itself is on a Likert scale minus 4 to
plus four. Minus four being atheist and plus four being confident belief. 0 would be agnostic.
The use of agnostic as a mid-point is a little contentious as the difference between knowing,
not knowing and not sure if you know, can be subtle and may be unquantifiable. All the items
loaded on to one factor and it does fulfil the criteria that the authors set out. It can be seen
from the items that they refer to ‘spiritual’ beings; this could lead to confusion and may lean
toward  a  more  spiritual  scale  than  religious.  Already,  this  could  be  seen  as  contentious.
However, it was clearly defined by the authors that supernatural in this case meant religious
belief. However, other scales have used supernatural to refer to paranormal.
The  Supernaturalism  Scale  (Randall  &  Desrosiers,  1980) was  developed  to  measure
supernatural belief, or the personality trait of ‘supernaturalism’, as the authors saw it, with a
view to looking at the relationship between supernatural causality and scientific explanation.
In this case the items were paranormal in basis. For example, ‘some people can contact the
dead’ and ‘cosmic forces, e.g. astrology, can influence our lives’. These items are different to
the items in the Supernatural Belief Scale; the items on that scale being of a religious theme.
The  items  for  the  scale  were  developed  using  opinions  sampled  from  different  areas:
astrology, faith healing,  ESP, plant  consciousness,  UFO’s and, magic and witchcraft.  The
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scale has 40 items, 32 of which were supernatural in nature and the remaining 8 were ‘buffer’
questions that dealt with religious belief, and were scored separately. They suggested that the
scale  had four  factors:  The first  was deemed to be  representative of  the  supernaturalism
construct;  the  second  was  occult  phenomena;  the  third  factor  was  people  who  favoured
astrology over the occult; and the fourth factor was concerned with UFOs. The first factor
seems arbitrary as the title of the scale suggests the construct of supernaturalism. However,
the authors identify the term supernatural or supernaturalism in this case, with areas that are
in their words ‘paranormal phenomena’. The use of the term supernatural within the context
of  religious,  spiritual  and  paranormal  belief  does  seem  to  depend  on  the  view  of  the
researcher concerned. If the study is based around the religious, then the term supernatural is
used  in  that  context  (J.  Jong  et  al.,  2012).  If  the  study  has  a  paranormal  theme,  then
supernatural is used in that way (Randall & Desrosiers, 1980). Moreover, they suggest that
‘supernaturalism’ is independent of religious attitudes. It is could be argued that the term
supernatural has been used in an arbitrary fashion, used more as an overall title to a scale that
might be measuring religious, spiritual or paranormal concepts or mixtures of all three. Even
a cursory glance at these concepts highlights the need for a clearer definition of the term
supernatural. Furthermore, the use of the term as an overarching label could go some way to
addressing the problems with measurement of concepts such as the paranormal.
1.6.2 Religiosity Scales
James (1916) was one of many scholars who looked into the concept of religious belief. He
thought  that  by looking at  religious  experience  one could  get  an  idea  of  an  individual’s
religious  belief.  James  also  made  a  connection  with  mysticism and  spiritual  awakening.
Although at this time these ideas were not empirically validated, the foundation was laid for
future research into religiosity. Religious belief is considered to be one facet of a person’s
overall religiosity and includes concepts such as religious experience, behaviour and faith;
generally  this  is  referred  to  as  ‘religiosity’.  Religiosity  has  been  defined  as  a  person’s
‘religiousness’, often self-reported or measured by how much an individual is involved with
the various facets that make up religiosity (Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013). However,
the term is widely used across many disciplines and although difficult to define it has been
acknowledged  to  have  different  dimensions  (Holdcroft,  2006).  Although  scales  were
available  previously  (Brown & Lowe,  1951;  Thouless,  1935),  Allport  and  Ross’s  (1967)
Religious Orientation Scale (ROS)  has been the bedrock of the majority of scales that have
followed  and featured  two subscales.  ‘Intrinsic’,  how a  person ‘lives’ their  religion,  and
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‘extrinsic’,  how a person ‘uses’ their  religion.  Intrinsic orientation being a person’s inner
thoughts on their religion; this is could be interpreted as a person’s religious belief and has
been shown to correlate with such measures  (Donahue, 1985). Furthermore, this has been
linked to the spiritual aspect of a person’s religiosity, with spirituality and intrinsic religiosity
being correlated (Zinnbauer et al., 1997). Extrinsic being an instrumental use of religion, for
example,  ‘how will  it  affect  social  standing attending church weekly?’ The items on this
particular subscale are more linked to religious behaviour than religious belief and this is
reinforced  by  the  extrinsic  subscale  not  correlating  with  other  measures  of  religiosity
(Donahue, 1985). Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) used the construct for their scale but rather
than referring to it as an ‘orientation’, they referred to it as ‘religiosity’. This demonstrates
the way these terms have been used and the difficulties that are encountered with definition.
The ROS has been used as a template for other scales such as the Religious Life Inventory
(RLI) (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991) and the Revised Religious Life Inventory (rRLI) (Hills et
al., 2005). These two scales added  Batson and Schoenrade's (1991) ‘quest’ subscale which
added  the  extra  dimension  that  examined  how people  used  religion  for  more  existential
means and how much they question their beliefs. Arguably this could be classed as belief.
Although intrinsic, extrinsic and quest have been viewed as separate dimensions, it has been
argued that there is overlap between them with items on the RLI loading on to more than one
factor and being inter-correlated (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). Hoge (1972) stated that the
intrinsic  and extrinsic  distinction has been problematic conceptually and that Allport  was
more  concerned  with  motivation  rather  than  behaviour.  From  early  on,  there  was
disagreement as to what the intrinsic and extrinsic measures were measuring conceptually.
The intrinsic subscale has been considered too ‘metaphysical’ and that only the extrinsic is
useful  (Hunt & King, 1971); this suggests an overlap between religious belief and spiritual
belief.  A similar criticism of the I E dichotomy is that there are many different concepts and
ideas attached to religiosity and that these two particular dimensions have been chosen and
labelled in arbitrary fashion with minimal empirical evidence  (Dittes, 1971). The extrinsic
scale could be considered a useful way to measure religious behaviour, but it is clear that the
definitions surrounding the intrinsic subscale need to be reviewed.
Extrinsic correlated also, but to a lesser extent, demonstrating that belief and behaviour may
not overlap as much, However, it could be argued that the overlap may be even less today,
with people identifying more as spiritual than religious (Marler & Hadaway, 2002). Intrinsic
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orientation also correlated with religious commitment and importance of religion, whereas
extrinsic less so. This suggests that measuring ‘religiousness’ and measuring ‘religious belief’
are potentially difficult areas to define. However, it is clear that extrinsic orientation does tap
into a different dimension from intrinsic, which appears to overlap with other aspects. Again,
the idea is present that intrinsic belief is just a mish mash of other ideas such as commitment
and experience  (Donahue, 1985). Also, it was found that for the most part intrinsic did not
correlate  with  dogmatism,  whereas  extrinsic  belief  did,  this  takes  the  argument  back  to
Allport  and  Ross’s  original  study that  had  to  do  with  prejudice.  Allport  (1963)  felt  that
intrinsic was linked to a more healthier outlook and extrinsic was more ‘neurotic’, this echoes
the 'religious belief, bad – spiritual belief, good' idea (Zinnbauer et al., 1997). This could lead
to a priori assumptions about groups that hold certain types of belief. Again, this argument
could be extended to believers in the paranormal. While the three subscales might be separate
dimensions, they might not be separate dimensions of religiousness (Donahue, 1985). It has
been  further  suggested  that  the  typologies  may  be  fourfold:  intrinsic,  extrinsic,
indiscriminates  and  non-religious  (Hood  Jr.,  1970).  Although  early  on  this  typology  of
religiousness lacked empirical evidence (Kahoe, 1976). However, the fourfold split could be
accomplished by a median split but this would need standardising  (Donahue, 1985). When
examining well-being, the intrinsic participants fared better than the extrinsic ones (Alker &
Gawin, 1978). Other scales have looked at different aspects of religiosity, such as faith.
The Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSoRF) (Plante & Boccaccini,
1997) is a ten item instrument that was developed to examine religious faith alongside mental
well-being. Rather than looking at religious commitment and devotion they decided to look at
faith.  Interestingly they do start  referring to  faith  in  the context  of  belief  and again this
demonstrates the interchangeable use of some of these terms. The assumption may be that
faith is a demonstration of belief. They also acknowledge the role of spirituality in their scale
and they could have used the word spirituality in their title. The scales main strength is that it
has cross-cultural validity. They used the score on the scale to divide participants into high
and low believers.  However,  this  does beg the question why the authors did not ask the
question ‘are you religious?’ The SCSoRF questionnaire is potentially a good source of items
for  the new scale.  The main issue is  what  they are accurately measuring using the term
‘faith’. The items of the scale could be modified to include the term ‘religious belief’ rather
than ‘faith’. This will focus the items to be measuring religious belief specifically. However,
caution  must  be  taken  as  a  high  score  on  the  scale  has  been positively  correlated  with,
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spirituality, and religious coping and behaviour (Freiheit, Sonstegard, Schmitt, & Vye, 2006).
This further offers support for the inclusion of some of these items in the newly proposed
scale. However, the authors do offer the note of caution that higher faith scorers may be
subject to bias and may be reporting themselves in a socially acceptable fashion. This is a
common fault  with  these  types  of  measures  particularly  when  measuring  these  types  of
beliefs, which could arguably be more prone to these types of biases.
Saroglou (2011) proposed four dimensions of religion that are both distinct and connected:
‘believing’,  ‘bonding’,  ‘behaviour’ and  ‘belonging’.  These  map  on  to  the  psychological
processes;  ‘cognitive’,  ‘emotional’,  ‘moral’ and ‘social’.  Saroglou called this the big four
religious dimensions model. They may differ in content when looked at cross-culturally but
these  four  are  stable  across  different  faiths.  This  psychologically  informed  attempt  at
breaking down the dimensions of religiosity was interesting but not arrived at empirically.
The dimensions themselves  do map on to intrinsic (believing and bonding)  and extrinsic
(behaviour  and belonging).  This  indicates  that  meaningful  dimension based on empirical
evidence abounds in the field of religiosity.
Since religiosity is difficult to define and seems to be a very general term that does not apply
exclusively to belief, the scale,  or subscale would need to be very clear about measuring
belief. Many of the scales have employed the intrinsic/extrinsic model of ‘orientation’ to get
to the differences with religiosity, and different scales employ different methods and claim
different results. The need to measure belief in this thesis is paramount and it would appear
that  intrinsic  and  elements  of  quest  dimensions  fulfil  this  criterion,  unlike  the  extrinsic
dimension that appears to measure behaviour. The number of scales available is ideal for
creating an item pool based on already established scales, but caution must be taken to select
the items that apply most to belief. This along with a subscale to measure spirituality would
help to further understand the links between religious and spiritual belief.
1.6.3 Spirituality Scales
Of the three concepts, spirituality is arguably the most difficult to define  (Zinnbauer et al.,
1997) and if spirituality is be treated separately from religiosity or if the link inextricable, is a
key issue (Hill & Pargament, 2008). While it has been argued that it is possible to be spiritual
without being religious (Marler & Hadaway, 2002), the opposite seems to be counterintuitive
but  has  been  reported  (Kenneson,  2015).  However,  going  back  to  Allport’s  extrinsic
33
Sensitivity: Internal
orientation, it seems that a measure of religious orientation without the spiritual or intrinsic is
possible but whether this is useful or not is debatable. However, with the upsurge of people
describing themselves as spiritual but not religious (Marler & Hadaway, 2002), it is important
to be able to delineate between these two groups. Again, as with religiosity, there are many
scales that measure different aspects of spirituality.  Kapuscinski and Masters (2010) note at
least 70 such scales with varying numbers of factors, some of these measures include factors
that have elements of religiosity, again blurring the lines between religiosity and spirituality.
This is a considerable problem when measuring spirituality and a way of teasing these two
concepts apart or consolidating the overlap without compromising the differences between
them is needed.
Previous  attempts  at  measuring spirituality  have  mainly  been focused within the  field  of
health  psychology and well-being.  For  example,  the  Spiritual  Well  Being Scale  (SWBS)
(Ellison, 1983) has two subscales (or factors), ‘religious well-being’ and ‘existential well-
being’.  Already it  can  be  seen  that  in  this  case  the  spiritual  title  is  used,  but  when the
subscales are considered, this scale measure both religiosity and spirituality. It is clear that
Ellison’s  definition  of  spiritual  does  include  religiosity,  which  once  again  points  to  the
problems between the two concepts and also could be explained by not only spirituality being
seen as a fuzzy concept  (Zinnbauer et al., 1997) but also religiosity becoming increasingly
fuzzy (Voas, 2009). Thus a clearer scale to measure both alongside each other is required. The
Spiritual Transcendence Scale (STS)  (Piedmont,  1999) is another example of a scale that
overlaps  with  religiosity.  It  has  three  subscales,  ‘universality’,  ‘prayer  fulfilment’  and
‘connectedness’.  ‘Universality’ and  ‘connectedness’ are  the  measures  that  are  closest  to
spiritualty and look at the purpose of life and the degree to which people feel connected to
other people respectively. This is a very general use of the term spirituality and arguably is
not a very accurate measure of the concept. The ‘prayer fulfilment’ subscale has the most
overlap with the religiosity concept and again demonstrates the large amount of overlap some
of these scale  tend to  have,  calling into to  question the labelling of  the scale  ‘spiritual’.
However, the Intrinsic Spirituality Scale (Hodge, 2003) has only six items and no subscales.
This scale accepts the overlap between religiosity and spirituality, but the face validity of the
items does seem to be a good measure of spirituality. As the title suggests, the scale reflects
the intrinsic concept but does not focus on religiosity. The scale could also be seen to be a
measure of spiritual belief and while the number of items could critiqued for being limited, it
could be useful as part of a larger measure of supernatural belief.
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The  Subjective  Measure  of  Spiritual  Well-Being  (SMSWB)  (Moberg,  1984) scale  was
developed primarily  for  a  clinical  population  and involves  religious  aspects,  taking them
under the umbrella of the spiritual. This is a further demonstration that the terms religious and
spiritual are not only interchangeable but that they have also been used as umbrella terms for
each other. They key purpose of this scale is to measure ‘well-being’. This derives from the
notion that ‘faith’ is a strong predictor of peopling feeling that their life is worthwhile. Again
this ties back to the idea that people who have faith or more importantly are the member of a
religious community have better health  (Seybold & Hill,  2001). This could be one of the
problems of conflating religious belief with spiritual belief: religious behaviour is actually the
variable that is contributing to better health rather than belief due to the individual having a
support group (George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002). The rationale for the well-being study in
this case is presented as a need for a clinical tool. The factor groups for the four subgroups
were similar and were ‘Christian faith’, self-satisfaction’, personal piety’, ‘subjective spiritual
well-being’, ‘optimism’, religious cynicism’ and ‘elitism’. This scale is pertinent because it
picks up on a wealth of different constructs, religious and spiritual belief but also features
items such as ‘I do not want a group residence or half-way house for ex-convicts, alcoholics,
drug addicts or mentally ill people near my home’, in the ‘elitist’ factor. Despite the claim of
having face validity, it is debatable as to whether they are measuring spiritual well-being. The
items' content is clearly problematic is this area.
 
It would appear to be intuitive to assume that items that have the word ‘God’ in them might
load on to different  factors within a  spirituality scale,  the concept  of God perhaps being
linked to traditional religious belief. However, responses do not differ when they have ‘God’
in them (Kim, Martin, & Nolty, 2015). Again, this highlights the definition problem and how
people are increasingly ‘self-identifying’ their own beliefs. Having a belief in God does not
have  the  same  religious  connotation  it  once  did,  with  people  describing  themselves  as
spiritual and as believers in God at the same time. In their study on the factor structure of the
Daily Spiritual Experiences Scale,  Underwood & Teresi (2002) debated the one versus two
factor structure. They explicitly set out to measure the spiritual experience, rather than belief
or behaviour. It has also been stated that to experience a particular phenomenon one must first
believe in it, so by association this measure is tapping into belief, but not directly. However, it
could be argued that some of the items that are used in their scale are actually measuring
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spiritual belief directly. They also noted that they did not use the word religious in the title of
their scale mainly due to their own definition of the difference between the two concepts,
despite acknowledging there is a great overlap between the two. It does raise the question of
what these types of scale are actually measuring. Arguably this scale has more religious items
according  to  their  own  definition  than  spiritual;  it  could  be  that  the  only  thing  that
differentiates between a religious and a spiritual scale is the title. Therefore it would seem
intuitive that spirituality is a single factor that could be incorporated in a scale that measures
supernatural belief. Then it could be taken as a measure of overall supernatural belief, to be
taken in isolation as a subscale or used in conjunction with a subscale that measures religious
belief.  It  appears  that  the  two  concepts  are  inextricably  linked  and  it  would  be  a  false
dichotomy to split the two entirely and more pragmatic to acknowledge the links and develop
a scale that takes this into account. However, the links between religious and spiritual belief,
and paranormal belief are less clear.
1.6.4 Paranormality Scales
Early paranormal belief scales were less multi-dimensional and would focus on things like
superstition (Nixon, 1925) and later on Extra Sensory Perception (Thalbourne & Haraldsson,
1980). The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS) treated paranormal belief as more multi-
dimensional and looked at factors such as ESP or life after death (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993).
While this  scale  only had two dimensions that classified people as sheep (believers who
accepted ESP) and goats (people who rejected ESP), other scales had been developed that
treated paranormal belief as multi-dimensional. The Belief in the Paranormal Scale (BPS)
(Jones, Russell & Nickel, 1977 cited in Irwin, 2009) has 25 items that cover precognition,
ESP, the occult, and other phenomena that the authors thought fell into the category of the
paranormal.  Analysis  of  the  scale  suggested  three  factors,  psychic  phenomena,  the
supernatural and a third factor that was deemed difficult to interpret, this contained things like
palmistry and the Loch Ness  Monster.  Interestingly the supernatural  in  this  instance is  a
subscale  rather  than  an  overarching  term  that  is  suggested  by  the  new  scale.  The  BPS
included more dimensions and changed the way paranormal belief was measured with the
inclusion of different dimensions (Irwin, 2009). However, arguably, this led to problems with
what is included under the remit of paranormal belief and over extended the definition of the
paranormal  particularly  when  used  in  a  parapsychological  context.  Another  multi-
dimensional scale and one of the most used within the field, is the Paranormal Belief Scale
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(PBS)  (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) that was later updated to the Revised Paranormal Belief
Scale (rPBS) (Tobacyk, 1988; 2004).
1.6.5 The Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS) (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) and the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (rPBS) (Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk, 1988)
The  PBS  was  originally  developed  by  Tobacyk  &  Milford  (1983) and  later  revised  by
Tobabcyk (1988)  but  not  actually  published until  2004.  The reason for  the  gap between
manuscript and eventual publication is unclear. However, the PBS and rPBS are undoubtedly
one of the most popular measures in the area of paranormal research. On Psychinfo, a search
for paranormal belief yielded 577 results, 45 of which used the rPBS and 30 using the PBS.
Google  Scholar  shows that  Tobacyk's  (2004) rPBS paper  has  been  cited  309 times,  and
Tobacyk & Milford's (1983) PBS paper has been cited 433 times. This does not include the
countless citations from Tobacyk's (1988) unpublished manuscript. It has been translated and
validated in several other languages. The scale takes a wider view of paranormal belief than
for  example  the  ASGS.  Whether  this  is  good  or  bad  is  a  debatable  topic.  Despite  its
popularity, there has been much debate surrounding the scale. Some of this surrounds the
number of factors (or subscales) that are in the scale, and other debate concentrates around
what constitutes a paranormal belief, or what is the taxonomy of paranormal belief. These
debates will be discussed along with reasons being given for the alleged problems with the
scale.
The studies that are carried out in the field of paranormal research are dependent on the
quality of the scale used to measure belief in the paranormal (Lawrence, 1995a). Part of the
debate surrounding scales that  measure this  type of construct  is  whether  the construct  is
unidimensional or multi-dimensional, and the PBS and rPBS are perfect examples of how this
debate has flourished.  Tobacyk and Milford (1983) took the step of not concentrating on a
narrow definition of paranormal belief,  and chose 61 items that covered a wide range of
phenomena. The definition they used was a vague one concerning the phenomena being only
‘explicably achieved only by a major revision of the basic limiting principles of science’
(Broad, 1949). Using a five point Likert scale, oblique rotation (assuming factor correlation)
was unsuccessful, however using an orthogonal rotation (assuming factors are uncorrelated) a
13 factors solution was obtained.  Due to  some of the factors only having two items,  13
factors was abandoned, and a seven factor solution was settled on due to it increasing the
stability of the factors. This resulted in a 26 item scale with seven factors. The revisions that
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eventually produced the rPBS included: the Likert Scale being increased from five points to
seven, adding one item and changing three, one of the extraordinary life forms items was
replaced and finally, two of the witchcraft items were changed.
1.6.5.1 Factor Structures
It is erroneous to think that there might be a correct number of factors; one should rather
focus on the factors being an accurate measure of a person's belief and whether they are able
to  distinguish  between  a  person's  score  who  holds  a  different  belief  (Tobacyk,  1995).
However,  Lawrence (1995b) contends that this is simply an argument that does not address
methodological flaws in the factor structure of the rPBS.
1.6.5.2 Oblique five versus the orthogonal seven
Lawrence  (1995) investigated and critiqued the PBS and the RPBS mainly focusing on the
proposed factor structure. The PBS proposed a 13 factor solution initially and then of these,
used  seven  factors.  The  RPBS  also  had  a  seven  factor  solution,  however,  Lawrence’s
subsequent  analysis  of  the  PBS found only  four  factors.  Lawrence  also  noted  that  these
factors  were oblique in nature and not orthogonal as suggested by Tobacyk (2004). Also, 26
items to measure seven latent variables may be lacking in validity (Lawrence, 1995a). Part of
the problem identified by Lawrence was poor validity in both construct and face value. Many
of the factors suffered from too few items and some of those items may have been poorly
named.  Lawrence,  also  attributed  part  of  the  problem  to  the  difficulties  with  defining
paranormal belief.  Tobacyk (1995) replied conceding that there may be problems with the
scale but disagreed on issues regarding the definition, analysis and issues on whether some of
the factors were even paranormal beliefs. In a later paper Lawrence  (1995b) defended his
position and in two further studies supported an oblique five factor solution  (Lawrence &
Cicco, 1997;  Lawrence, Roe, & Kani, 1997) and another supported an oblique seven factor
solution  (Tobacyk  &  Thomas,  1997).  Lange,  Irwin,  and  Houran  (2000) carried  out  a
replication and confirmed the existence of seven factors, however, their later Rasch Analysis
related  to  age  and  gender  showed  two  factors  of  ‘new age  philosophy’ and  ‘traditional
paranormal  beliefs’.  This  does  indicate  that  the  type  of  analysis  used  can  influence  the
number  of  factors  and  their  labelling.  This  confirms  the  existence  of  a  more  general
paranormal belief factor but one problem with this two factor solution is that it used only 16
of  the  26  items  ignoring  items  from  the  ‘traditional  religious  belief’,  ‘witchcraft’ and
‘extraordinary lifeform’ subscales. Using fewer items will inevitably reduce the complexity
of the factors, particularly when excluding problematic items from the ‘traditional religious
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belief’ and ‘witchcraft’ subscales.  Dagnall,  Parker,  Munley,  and Drinkwater  (2010) more
recently combined the RPBS and other scales to create an item pool of 124 and subsequent
analysis of this revealed a 9 factor solution. This demonstrates that it is the definitions of
paranormal belief that should be sharpened and then more consensus on the number of factors
can be reached. However, for the purposes for this replication, the number of factors will
have no bearing on the different clusters achieved. It can also be argued that the seven factor
solution is a measure of paranormal belief, it is just the definition of paranormal belief that is
in question. Whatever the factor solution employed, the same number of clusters would be
arrived  at.  While  arguments  and  discussions  on  methodological  issues  surrounding  scale
development are important, it  is of upmost importance to establish which phenomena are
considered to be paranormal and which are not. This can be best established by considering a
taxonomy of paranormal belief.
1.6.5.3 A Taxonomy of Paranormal Belief
Figure  2.1. Examples  Of  ‘Mysteries’  And  ‘Weird’  Things.  Reprinted  from  Mysteries,
In XKCD, N.D., Retrieved August 15, 2016, From Https://Xkcd.Com/1501/. Copyright by
Randall Munroe.
Zusne and Jones (1982) state that to class something as paranormal it should involve the
following: information or energy transmission, and that this takes place within the person or
agent involved in the phenomenon or between an external body and person. The examples
39
Sensitivity: Internal
they  give  are  faith  healing,  yogic  feats  and  poltergeists  to  name  a  few.  However,  the
classification of what phenomenon is classed as paranormal is a difficult one. The XKCD
diagram in Figure  2 .1 neatly conveys this problem. Classed as ‘mysteries’ in this case, the
Loch Ness Monster is classed by the rPBS as being paranormal. This will be discussed later,
but phenomena such as the Oak Island Money Pit (Fanthorpe & Fanthorpe, 1995) may have
an  explanation  that  is  natural  but  yet  to  be  found,  but  people  have  given  paranormal
explanations for it. For the most part, the examples in the diagram would not be classified as
paranormal, but paranormal explanations may exist for some, however speculative. However,
some phenomena are just  forgotten or not  as prevalent  as they once were.  The Bermuda
Triangle is a prime example of this with mentionings of it in popular culture being high in the
70’s  and 80’s,  and contemporary references  to  it  being  sparse.  Paranormal  belief  is  ever
changing and with the added prevalence of conspiracy theories and paranormal belief now
being more accepted in mainstream popular culture it could be considered as no longer being
a niche interest.  To further develop the idea of a taxonomy of the paranormal coupled with
the definitions that have been outlined previously the factors and items of the rPBS will be
evaluated.
1.6.5.4 Taxonomy of the rPBS: An Overall Assessment
1.6.5.4.1 Traditional Religious Belief (four items)
The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
There is a devil.
I believe in God.
There is a heaven and a hell.
This subscale is reasonably solid in itself but it does not have enough items. One could argue
that the item ‘The soul continues to exist though the body may die’ is more spiritual than
traditional,  but  on  the  whole  the  four  items  are  reasonably  valid.   However,  the  major
problem with  this  subscale  is  the  classification  of  religious  belief  as  paranormal  belief.
Cluster analyses have shown that some people who hold religious beliefs might not hold
paranormal  beliefs  and vice  versa  (Schofield  et  al.,  2016).  Therefore,  when treated  as  a
unidimensional scale, giving someone a score based on their religious belief might be giving
them a level of paranormal belief when they clearly do not have one.
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1.6.5.4.2 Psi (four items)
Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
Mind reading is not possible.
Psi has been defined as the process that is the cause of psychic phenomena. This includes
telepathy, pre- and retro-cognition, psychokinesis and mind over matter. It has been seen to
be a key component of paranormal belief (Irwin, 2009). Three of the items on this subscale
measure psychokinesis, indicating that it is a PK scale, rather than a psi scale  (Lawrence,
1995a). The remaining item that purports to measure ESP is reverse scored and it could be
argued that just having one item related to ESP and the other three related to PK simply does
not offer enough to measure psi.
1.6.5.4.3 Witchcraft (four items)
Black magic really exists.
Witches do exist.
Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons.
There are actual cases of witchcraft.
Witchcraft has been seen to form a category of an ‘esoteric system of magic’ (Irwin, 2009)
and often deal with charms, spells and potions and changes to the natural world via ritual
(Hutton, 2001). It is arguably one of the most problematic factors of the rPBS.  The term
witchcraft could be linked with Wicca, arguably a religious term (Taira, 2010). It could also
overlap with the superstition subscale. This could also be considered an outdated term to do
with  mainly  occult  types  of  behaviour.  Again,  this  highlights  religious  links  rather  than
paranormal.  The wording of  the  items  themselves  is  somewhat  problematic.  ‘Witches  do
exist’ does not necessarily reflect a belief in spell casting, it could mean that a person believes
that there are people who call themselves witches (Irwin, 2009). The same problem applies to
‘There are actual cases of witchcraft’, there could be an actual case of someone performing
witchcraft as a ritual but that does not mean they have an effect other than placebo. This
leaves two items on an already less than satisfactory four item subscale.
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1.6.5.4.4 Superstition (three items)
Black cats can bring bad luck.
If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
The number “13” is unlucky.
Superstitions are generally related to good or bad luck, and are omens or predictive (Irwin,
2009). The superstition subscale is one of the two three item subscales and is weak as a result
of the number of items. The items referring to black cats and lucky numbers and even to a
certain extent mirror, are not valid seeing as whether black cats bring good or bad luck can
vary  between the  regions  of  the  UK,  for  example  (Clark,  1975).  Better  scales  exist  that
measure superstition alone (e.g. Wiseman & Watt, 2004) and the inclusion of superstition in a
paranormal  scale  is  debatable  as  the  subscale  does  not  bring  much to  the  factor  and an
individual can be superstitious without believing in the paranormal per se.
 
1.6.5.4.5 Spiritualism (four items)
Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
Reincarnation does occur.
It is possible to communicate with the dead.
Irwin (2009) equates Spiritualism with Spiritism. In that Spiritism deals with contacting the
spirits  of  the  dead  via  mediumship.  However,  Spiritualism  is  the  ‘religion’  aspect  of
Spiritism. The items themselves do not present a problem within this particular subscale.
However,  the use of the Spiritualism title  for the subscale  might  be misplaced.  The title
relates  to  religious  movement  in  itself,  and  this  could  overlap  with  ‘traditional  religious
belief’.  Referring  to  astral  projection,  reincarnation  and mediumship  here,  they  could  be
classed again, within a more general paranormal concepts category.  Also, in the past this
subscale has been confused with spirituality (M. S. Wilson, Bulbulia, & Sibley, 2014), on this
basis alone, the subscale is not a strong one. Also, the subscale could have been labelled
‘Spiritism’ and included items related to ghosts and poltergeists; this would have made the
subscale less confusing and more relatable.
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1.6.5.4.6 Extraordinary Life Forms (three items)
The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
There is life on other planets.
This subscale covers the concepts of extra-terrestrial life forms and cryptozoology. It is the
second three item subscale and it has been criticised for being weak due to lack of items and
lack of validity ( Lawrence, 1995a). The main focus of criticism is the ‘there is life on other
planets’ item. The majority of people currently would agree that there is life on other planets,
as Lawrence (1995a) points out and does not measure UFO types of belief. A more pertinent
question might be:  ‘Has intelligent life visited our planet?’ This item also supposes that UFO
type beliefs are still classed as paranormal. There is debate surrounding this and some think
that  UFO’s  should  now  be  classed  more  within  the  realms  of  conspiracy  type  theories
(Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011). The remaining two items have also been criticised for
lacking in cultural validity (Lawrence, 1995a). While the Loch Ness Monster still appears in
the news, the abominable snowman item is quite dated and arguably, these two item are not
paranormal, they are more cryptozoological and if the creatures do exist, then they are not
metaphysical, just species that have not been discovered.
1.6.5.4.7 Precognition (four items)
 
Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future.
Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
Precognition falls under Irwin’s (2009) category of ‘divinatory arts’ which covers astrology,
tarot cards and general fortune telling. Tobacyk modified this factor for the rPBS due to the
items'  validity  directly  to  precognition.  There is  debate as  to  whether  this  was achieved.
Lawrence (1995a) points out that this subscale might just be measuring belief in astrology
and that this factor should have loaded on to the psi factor.  Making the case for a more
general paranormal belief factor. Again, subscales and items such as these demonstrate that
the concepts dealt with when looking at paranormal belief do overlap and are general oblique
and that is how they should be treated when analysing them.
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While  it  would  seem  that  the  rPBS  may  have  been  misused  as  a  unidimensional  scale
(Lawrence,  1995a),  one  way  to  combat  this  would  be  to  use  a  term that  is  wider  than
paranormal. Also, certain items of the rPBS are outdated and some terms may have shifted to
conspiracy theory. However, while receiving much criticism it has to be said that the rPBS
still remains a valuable tool for measuring paranormal belief.
 
1.6.6 Rationale for a New Scale
The discussion surrounding factors highlights the need for a redefining of paranormal belief,
particularly when discussed alongside religious and spiritual belief. The PBS and rPBS have
a ‘Traditional Religious Belief’ subscale, but whether religious belief is a paranormal belief is
a matter of debate and while religious belief is as a strong predictor of paranormal belief
(Orenstein, 2002) this is still unclear. Traditional religious belief has been seen as a separate
factor in the PBS and rPBS scales throughout the debates over the number of factors and in
empirical  studies  that  looked at  the clustering of  people into groups,  traditional  religious
belief was a separate group  (Irwin, 1997; Schofield et al., 2016). There is also theoretical
justification  for  the  separation  of  religious  belief  from  paranormal  belief.  Metaphysical
Chauvinism  (Beck  & Miller,  2001) means  that  even  when  two  beliefs  may  have  equal
validity, a person may believe in one over the other based on other reasons, for example a
religious  belief  (angels)  over  a  paranormal  belief  (apparitions).  An angel  may indeed be
classed as an apparition, but it is a person’s belief that will ascribe meaning to that apparition.
The ‘traditional religious belief’ subscale on the PBS and rPBS could be falsely giving people
a level of paranormal belief when they do not have one. Therefore, it may be more useful to
classify religion and paranormal belief as being different from each other (but acknowledging
overlap) and group them under the umbrella term of supernatural belief.
1.7 Chapter Summary
The problems inherent in these types of scale are the definitions of the terms used when
making the scales, and when defining the terms it is also important to consider whether belief
or experience are being measured. The various theories regarding the concepts of religiosity,
spirituality and paranormal belief have been stated and while there has been much debate
regarding different dimensions of religiosity (intrinsic and extrinsic for example). The extent
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to which spirituality overlaps with religiosity or whether it is a part of it, and how these two
concepts fit with notions of the supernatural and the paranormal, a uni-dimensional scale that
overarches  religious,  spiritual  and  paranormal  belief  would  be  potentially  useful.  It  is
proposed that a scale will be developed using items from previous scales to develop a scale
that will measure the concept of supernatural belief. This will incorporate religious, spiritual
and paranormal belief as its dimensions. At item pool will be developed that takes items from




2 Chapter Three – Scale Development: Methodology
This  chapter  will  cover  the  methodology  used  for  the  first  objective  of  this  thesis:  the
development of a new scale to measure supernatural belief. This chapter will examine the
development of the item pool and the choices of the item response measure. Following this,
how the item pool can be reduced before the final item pool can be analysed.  The various
methods  of  analysis  will  be  examined,  looking  at  factor  analysis  methods  including
Exploratory Factor Analysis and Confirmatory Analysis. Also, techniques used for examining
the validity and reliability of the proposed scale will be considered. This chapter aims to give
an overview and rationale for the method used for the development of the scale.
2.1 Item Pool Generation
Item pool generation can be accomplished in several different ways. The researcher can come
up with their own items, which is not recommended due to it being prone to researcher bias,
or focus groups and other qualitative methods can be employed to develop items based on
people’s ideas of what the concept that is being studied means to them (DeVellis, 2003). An
inductive approach can be taken if little theory regarding the concept exists or a deductive
approach can be used if theory or definitions of the concept exist (Clark & Watson, 1995). In
this case, a deductive approach would be most appropriate because there are many scales that
measure religiosity, spirituality and paranormality. Despite this, issues still abound regarding
the existing scales addressed in the previous chapter and therefore this new scale to measure
supernatural belief’s item pool will be primarily constructed from previous scales. The next
step is to establish the criteria for the items that will be selected to populate the item pool.
Clark and Watson (1995) state that a broad formal description of the concept for which the
scale  is  built  is  needed to  begin  the  process.  The theory  must  underpin  the  whole  scale
development  process.  In  this  case,  the  items  must  relate  to  the  supernatural  (religious,
spiritual and paranormal). Also, the items must relate to the construct of belief and not to
experience or behaviour, for example. This is based on the definitions set out in the previous
chapter.  Construct  validity  of  a  scale  is  of  utmost  importance  and  involves  several
procedures. Cronbach and Meehl (1955) suggest that a set of theoretical concepts should be
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proposed along with  how they interact.  The measurement  for  these  theories  needs  to  be
developed and the method for measurement needs to be fully tested. If the item pool is not
optimum,  this  could  lead  to  problems later  in  the  process  that  cannot  be  rectified  using
statistical  analysis  (Clark & Watson, 1995). When examining the items for the item pool
several issues need to be considered before they can be accepted, such as validity (face and
cross-cultural).  Initially  face  validity  must  be  established.  Face  validity  will  be  used
throughout  this  process  until  the  initial  pool  is  reached.  It  will  be  employed in  the  first
instance to establish if the item measures what it claims to measure, in this instance, the
attitude of the participant toward belief in a certain concept (religious, spiritual or paranormal
belief). After the initial item pool has been established a panel of experts and novices will rate
the pool for validity. However, other forms of validity need to be considered.
Cross-cultural  problems  have  been  acknowledged  with  scales  that  measure  religiosity,
spirituality and paranormality. For example, some of the scales that measure religiosity are
mainly  aimed  at  western  Christian  participants  (e.g.  Connors,  Tonigan,  &  Miller,  1996;
Ghorbani, Watson, & Shahmohamadi, 2008; Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; Martin & Nichols,
1962),  although  scales  have  been  developed  for  other  religious  participants  (Ghorbani,
Watson, Ghramaleki, Morris, & Hood Jr, 2000). These are nonetheless problematic for the
same reasons. Also, paranormality scales have proven to have items that may not translate to
other cultures: the rPBS has an item concerning the Loch Ness Monster, for example.  The
definition of culture in this instance is best described by Hofstede  (2003 p.10): ‘the aggregate
of common traits that influence the human group response to its environment’; this represents
what the individual may have experienced through their culture and has led to the shaping of
their beliefs.  Sperber and Claidière (2008) offer a definition that suggests differing mental
states too. This must be considered when developing the item pool and items that are not
cross-culturally applicable must be either eliminated or modified. However, it is impossible
to have a scale that completely tackles cross-cultural validity and there will always be an
element of this when trying to measure concepts such as belief. This must be kept in mind
when developing the scale so it reflects these beliefs and concepts in the best way possible.
Then the item response measure that best fits with the items should be selected.
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2.2 Item Response Measure
A further consideration when measuring belief is examining what it is about the belief in
question that requires measurement. Not only must the items be valid (i.e. measuring belief
and not experience), the Item Response Measure (IRM) itself must be a valid measure of the
participant’s attitude to belief. Therefore, while selecting an item pool, by whatever method,
it must be kept in mind what type of IRM will be employed. Many scales are available and
have been widely used in research into paranormal and religious belief. However, it is unclear
as to how much of the research selected the IRM. For example, in some studies the way in
which a person’s religious belief was determined was a simple ‘Do you believe in God?’ the
available answers being a simple yes or no. A measure of unidimensionality is provided by
Guttman’s Scalogram. This scale placed the items in order of difficulty, in other words, the
order would be how likely the participants would be to accept a statement; the aim being if a
participant accepts a statement with a high level, they must also accept all the statements
below. However, this can be limiting and has the assumption that the participant accepts all
the statements (DeVellis, 2003). 
A further scale that has been more widely used in both personality and social psychology is
the Semantic Differential Scale (SDS). The intent of this scale is to gauge people's attitude to
a topic by using adjectives such as good or bad, useful or not-useful, on either end of a seven-
point scale  (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955).  Again, this approach has its place but can be
limited and is  better  suited to  gauge attitude toward something or  preference rather  than
belief. The Likert Scale is arguably the most popular scale used in research. This could be
because it is simple to create compared to other methods. The format of the scale is suited to
a statement such as ‘I believe in life after death’, followed by different levels of agreement
that can be on a 4 to 10 or more, point scale. This scale is usually strongly agree, agree, no
opinion, disagree and strongly disagree. The scale will then be scored accordingly; if the item
pool consists of both positive and negative items, the positive items are scored 1 to 7 (on a 7-
point scale) and the negative items have a reversed scoring system; 1=7, 2=6, 3=5, etc. These
scores can be summed to give an overall  score to measure a participant’s attitude.  Items
analysis is conducted on the items to establish that the scale is measuring the desired attitude
(DeVellis, 2003). Problems with the Likert scale include different patterns of answer yielding
the same score and an inability to differentiate between different scores. Also, it relies heavily
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on well-written items, so it is prudent to have a large pool of items initially. These can be
reduced to give an optimum item pool before analysis.
2.3 Recruitment and Sampling Strategy
The choice of recruitment method can depend on many different factors, including: time,
cost, and the need of access to a particular demographic of the population. When recruiting
people who have potentially niche beliefs, it is important to consider the strategy that would
maximise  the  chance  of  getting  the  desired  participants.  Various  types  of  sampling  are
available such as: snowball,  chain referral,  targeted, time location, and respondent-driven;
these  particular  methods  are  generally  employed  within  a  quantitative  context  (Hoving,
Mudde, & de Vries, 2007). For qualitative studies, an even more stringent sampling method
could  be  employed  when  very  specific  target  groups  are  required,  such  as  purposeful
sampling (Palinkas et al., 2015). However, this may only be of concern when trying to access
very specific groups; for example smokers for interventions trails (Stamler, Vaccaro, Neaton,
Wentworth, & Group, 1993). 
Whilst consideration should be taken to try and recruit using participants that might have the
desired attributes (people who believe in the religious or paranormal in this case) benefits of
online sampling, one of the benefits of hosting a study online is that these groups can be more
easily targeted via online communities or forums (Baltar & Brunet, 2012). Therefore, while
one should be mindful of sampling strategies when recruiting, casting ones net wide when
distributing the study can be as important as targeting specific groups. It has also been noted
that different groups should be recruited in different ways, and a different approach could
yield  better  results,  depending  on  the  group  being  targeted  (Sugden  & Moulson,  2015).
Bornstein,  Jager,  and  Putnick  (2013) examined  four  different  recruitment  strategies.
Population probability based sampling that range from ‘simple’ random sampling of certain
populations to complex strategies based on cluster and stratified sampling. For example, a
population maybe be dived into ‘strata’ such as ethic groups and the random sample would be
drawn  from  each.  The  cluster  variant  of  this  would  draw  the  sample  from  geographic
location. When carried out properly this method can yield representative and generalizable
results, however, this can be time consuming, complex and a potentiality expensive method
that is best used when to access a particular population that can be easily identified is needed.
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Other methods of sampling are based on non-probability, such as convenience sampling. This
is  where participants  are  sampled based on accessibility  and proximity to  the researcher.
While this an arguably easy method, it can be quite limiting in terms of the breadth of profile
of  the  participant  recruited.  Alternatively,  quota  sampling  involves  recruiting  a  certain
amount of people from a specific target group, for example, people from a particular ethnic
group. However, this is only useful if your target group has a specific profile, with regard to
belief this is not often the case. Also, it is a potentially more expensive method and has been
shown to be no more effective that convenience sampling  (Bornstein et al., 2013). Finally,
homogeneous  sampling  could  be  used,  and  this  would  entail  the  sociodemographically
homogenous selection of participants, for example, an all-male group. The main advantage of
this  method is  that  it  reduces ‘noise’ within the sample;  the amount of not  relevant  data
collected.  Again,  the  main  problem is  that  this  method is  not  applicable for  all  research
questions,  and when the concept being studied is  not discrete important  participant input
could be missed. One solution to this problem is reporting of demographics that relate to the
research,  and  this  could  help  to  assess  the  overall  generalisability  of  the  research.  For
example,  in  a  study looking at  religious  belief,  the religious  affiliation of the participant
would be useful to know. While Bornstein et al. (2013) recommend population sampling out
of the four discussed, this could lead to the omission of particular groups that might be of
interest.  People who identify as having a  belief  of ‘none’  (Singleton,  2015) illustrate  the
importance of not relying on a self-reported belief  measure.
2.4 Strengths and weaknesses of using an online platform
One way of accessing hard to reach groups is by using an online recruitment strategy. The use
of social media has unlocked access to many of these groups, for example, Facebook has
been often used to target groups through their Facebook groups (Ramo, Rodriguez, Chavez,
Sommer,  & Prochaska,  2014).  This  has  been seen  as  a  low cost  way of  accessing large
numbers of participants within specific groups (Kayrouz, Dear, Karin, & Titov, 2016). Online
recruitment could also solve problems of the majority of psychology studies being carried out
using psychology undergraduates, significantly skewing the results in studies (Henrich et al.,
2010). The online option, being more able to reach a cross section of people who are not
psychology students and who represent more general accepts of the population. However, the
use  of  social  media  does  not  guarantee  the  researchers  larger  numbers  of  participants
(Kayrouz et al., 2016). The main problem with internet based research is the potential for the
lack  of  attention  on  the  part  of  the  participant  (Ramsey,  Thompson,  McKenzie,  &
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Rosenbaum, 2016). The lack of the presence of a researcher means a heavier reliance on
instructions  that  may  or  may  not  be  read.  Crowd  sourcing  services  such  as  Amazons
Mechanical Turk have become increasing popular but the criticisms for this (they are paid
and practice effects)  could also be levelled at  studies  that  use only psychology students.
While poor attention to instructions is provable, online research should take this into account
and  provide  as  robust  a  method as  possible  for  collecting  data  online,  although there  is
considerable  support  for  web  based  recruitment  strategies,  with  the  inevitable  caveats
(Ramsey et al., 2016).
2.5 Ethical Issues 
When conducting research into belief, is it important that such research is mindful of ethical
issues  due  to  the  potential  sensitivity  of  the subject  (Johnson,  Ridley,  & Nielsen,  2000).
Online studies can present ethical issues such participants not being supported if they have an
emotional reaction to questions or data being held insecurely (Kraut et al., 2004). To address
such  ethical  issues,  the  following  methodological  steps  should  be  considered  (British
Psychological Society, 2006): A consent form should be provided at the start of the online
survey (see appendix 2) containing a summary of the study and what was involved. This will
inform the participants that there would be questions regarding their religious, spiritual, and
paranormal beliefs and enable them to provide informed consent. Secondly, in both the brief
and throughout each of the questionnaires it was reiterated that there were ‘no right or wrong
answers’;  vital  for questions regarding belief.  Thirdly,  a debrief  at  the end of the survey
providing further details on the study’s aims and objectives,  particularly pertaining to the
investigation  of  beliefs.  Support,  advice  and further  contact  details  were  provided in  the
debrief.  Fourthly,  participants should be advised in  the brief  and debrief  of their  right to
withdraw from the study at any time. Instructions were given in the debrief of the time limit
for withdrawing their data. In addition, the participants should be made aware in the brief and
the debrief that they can ask for advice at any time. The researcher should not give advice
beyond  their  area,  and  if  necessary,  refer  participants  to  an  appropriate  medical  health
professional. Finally, the data should be stored confidentially, securely (password protected,
secure HTTP) and anonymously using a participant generated unique ID code.
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2.6 Item Pool Reduction
Prior to the statistical analysis several methods can be employed to reduce the initial item
pool. The item pool can be distributed to experts and novices who can assess the items and
propose which can be retained and recommend items for removal. The experts and novices
must be given strict guidelines regarding the concept or concepts regarding the items and
what they represent. The experts should use this and their own knowledge to recommend the
retention or removal  of the items  (DeVellis,  2003;  Worthington & Whittaker,  2006).  The
novices  will  be  instructed  to  rate  items  based  on  their  own  idea  of  the  concept.  The
recommendations should then be analysed using inter-rater reliability to determine the final
item pool. Cronbach’s Alpha should then be used to test the scales internal reliability. Items
that have an item-total correlation of r<.02 should be considered for removal (Velicer & Fava,
1998).  Finally,  the  correlation  matrix  of  the  items  should  be  reviewed;  items  showing a
correlation > .8 and therefore showing multicollinearity should be considered for removal.
This would indicate the items were measuring the same thing  (Rockwell, 1975). Following
these steps,  the remaining item pool should be subjected to  further  statistical  analysis  to
establish latent variables and further reduce the number of items. 
2.7 Analysis of the Proposed Scale
After  the  initial  item  pool  has  been  distributed  to  participants  to  collect  data,  the  data
collected will need to be analysed. There is debate surrounding best practice.  The debate
extends  to  in  which  order  different  types  of  analyses  should  ideally  be  carried  out
(Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The three main analyses that are employed are Principal
Components Analysis (PCA), Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA) (using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). However, other methods are
available,  such  as  Rasch  Analysis.  The  following  will  lay  an  overview  of  the  analyses
followed by a more in-depth look at EFA and CFA.
2.7.1 EFA and CFA
One of the main aims of Factor Analysis is to take large groups of variables and to determine
underlying groups or latent constructs. Generally, these techniques are used to assess scales
when they are being developed. This can also aid with the assessment of the validity of the
scale,  and determine the number of factors that underlie a particular set  of variables and
establish the nature of these factors or dimensions  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). There
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are two categories of Factor Analysis that are part of Classical Measurement Theory; these
are Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Generally,
EFA is  conducted  before  CFA as  it  looks  at  the  validity  of  a  proposed  scale  during  its
inception. So, for a large set of variables, EFA can help establish these underlying dimensions
and look at the various items and assess them. This way items that are ‘poorly behaved’ or
that are measuring the same concept, for example, can be assessed, and if needed, eliminated.
This can help streamline the instrument. This leads to running and re-running of the analysis
to eventually  determine the optimum set  of  items and their  underlying factors.  This also
involves  the  researcher  using  their  knowledge  of  the  theory  alongside  the  analysis  to
determine the result. CFA is generally performed after EFA and is meant to ‘confirm’ the
factor structure that has been proposed by EFA. However, it has been stated that the CFA is
not an optimum method for confirming, and that another EFA should be run on a different
sample as confirmation (DeVellis, 2003). For a CFA, the researcher needs to know how many
factors there are and the extent to which the factors correlate. The method will determine the
extent  to  which the new data  maps onto the researchers  proposed model  of factors.  The
favoured method for this is to use Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). This technique will
allow greater control over the factors to allow the researcher to ‘test’ the hypothesised model.
This  can  later  be  used  to  compare  against  competing  proposed  models  (Worthington  &
Whittaker, 2006).
Aside from Classical Measure Theory there are Item Response Theory (IRT) approaches.
While  discussion of  this  is  beyond the scope of this  thesis,  IRT has  different  techniques
associated  with  it.  One  such  technique  is  Rasch  Analysis  (Rasch,  1960).  While  Rasch
Analysis is an increasingly popular technique, it is mostly used when the items used are not
strong  and  may  require  modification  or  deletion  at  the  validation  (after  the  EFA)  stage
(Tennant & Conaghan, 2007). Therefore, while it was considered, Rasch Analysis was not
deemed appropriate for this thesis due to the item pool selection process ensuring a high






One concern when conducting an EFA is having an adequate sample size.  It  is  generally
thought that larger sample sizes lead to the best outcomes in scale development research
(Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Comrey (1973) recommends at least 300 participants, and
further states that 50 is a ‘very poor’ sample size and 1,000 is ‘excellent’.  Other researchers
have recommended a certain number of participants per item, for example, Gorsuch (1983)
recommends 5:1 or 10:1. However, these are just general guidelines. The larger the sample
size,  the  more  stable  the  correlations  will  be,  and it  can  also  lead  to  replicability  being
possible  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006), whereas smaller samples sizes lead to a lack of
stability  of  the  correlations  and  the  sample  may  not  be  representative  of  the  general
population  (DeVellis,  2003).  Rather  than  picking arbitrary  numbers,  a  popular  viewpoint
states that it is important to consider the number of items per factor and the communalities
between each factor;  the lower they are the more participants are needed to establish the
stability of the factor  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). However,  Guadagnoli and Velicer
(1988) dispute this and claim that absolute sample size is more important.  Worthington &
Whittaker (2006) offer guidelines for sample sizes: 150 to 200 participants are adequate if the
ratio is 10:1 items per factor with the loading being 1.4 or the communalities being at least .5;
smaller  than  this  would  require  4:1  items  per  factor  with  1.6  loading  or  a  minimum .6
communality;  less  than  100  participants  or  participant/  item  ratios  of  less  than  3:1  are
generally inadequate;  overall,  sample sizes of 300 and over are adequate.  It  is also good
practice  to  set  the  required  number  of  participants  at  the  outset  and the  outcome of  the
analysis may require further participant recruitment. Overall, samples sizes over 200 would
be optimum. Along with sample size another consideration is the correlation matrix.
2.7.2.2 Factorability of the Data
The ‘factorability’ of a set of data can also be determined by the size of the correlations
between  the  variables  (in  this  case,  the  items  in  the  proposed  scale)  (Worthington  &
Whittaker, 2006). There are two ways of doing this: one way is using Bartlett’s (1950) test of
sphericity and the other way is to look at the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)  (Kaiser,  1970)
measure  of  sampling  adequacy.  Bartlett’s  test  is  concerned  with  the  probability  of  0
correlation  in  the  matrix;  if  Barlett’s  test  is  significant  then  the  matrix  correlations  are
different from 0 and therefore factorable. Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind (2007) urge caution
and state that significance can still be seen if the sample size is large despite there being a
small  correlation.  Zwick & Velicer  (1982) point  out  that  if  the  sample  size  is  too  large
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Bartlett’s  test  becomes  effectively  meaningless  and  Worthington  and  Whittaker  (2006)
recommend only using this test if there are fewer than 5 participants per variable, anything
higher than 5:1 should have an additional measure of the scales'  factorability. This is the
opposite  of  multicollinearity  when  variables  are  too  highly  correlated,  or  even  perfectly
correlated  (essentially  this  would  mean  they are  measuring  the  same concept).  Anything
above a certain amount (r >.08) could lead the researcher to eliminate one of the variables
(Field, 2013). However, this might not get to the root cause and caution should be exercised
when  eliminating  variables  based  on  these  assumptions.  The  KMO  measure  is  another
potentially  useful  way  of  establishing  if  the  correlation  matrix  is  factorable.  The  KMO
establishes if the matrix contains factors or just chance correlations. It does this by giving a
value of between 0 and 1. Values greater than .06 are recommended by  Tabachnick et al.
(2007). Kaiser (1974) states that if the statistic is .05 or less, then additional data may need to
be collected and/or the item pool may need to be reconsidered. Following these tests of the
correlation matrix the factor extraction method should be selected.
2.7.2.3 Factor extraction
There has been debate over which method should be selected for the factor extraction; the
two  methods  that  dominate  this  debate  are  PCA and  FA  (Gorsuch,  1983).  However,
researchers have posited that there is little difference in the outcomes when adopting one of
the two methods  (Velicer & Jackson, 1990). It has been suggested that the method chosen
often depends on which one is the default in the statistical package being used; clearly this is
not  the  best  method  of  selection  (Costello  &  Osborne,  2005).  These  are  essentially
multivariate methods that deal with large sets of variables and aim to find dimensions or
factors that underlie these data sets. The two methods examine the variance and covariance in
these sets or variables  (Harlow, 2014). PCA can be used to take a set of already correlated
variables and transform them into a set of ‘components’. The components will still retain the
original variance of the variables but will be orthogonal (not related to) the other components.
PCA does not take unique variance into account or measure latent variables. It is simply a
data reduction technique that retains as much information as it can about the variance of the
variables at the various stages of determining components (Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, &
Strahan, 1999). One advantage of PCA that has become increasingly pointless is that it takes
less computing power. Because PCA uses the total variance across all the components, it is
possible that any left-over items that have not been marked as a component will go into a
component of their own (simply because they share the remaining variance) and this is when
the  differences  between  the  two  methods  appear  (Widaman,  1993).  While  this  is
55
Sensitivity: Internal
mathematically sound within the idea of PCA and data reduction, if the researcher is looking
for underlying properties based on theoretical assumptions and the left-over items do not
match  the  theoretical  assumption,  then  the  new component  is  meaningless.  Under  a  FA,
because not all the variance is assumed within the model a margin of error is allowed and
these items would not be loaded onto a separate factor. PCA by its very nature is not subject
to multicollinearity  (Field, 2013). It is useful to know why both PCA and FA might not be
applicable to all types of research and the differences between them should be considered.
This will enable the researcher to make use of the best method for their research question. A
clear concept at the outset of the theoretical underpinning that justifies the development of
that scale will aid in avoiding the possible pitfalls of selecting the incorrect methods that are
highlighted above.
If FA is deemed to be suitable,  then there are many different techniques to choose from.
Generally, it has been accepted that Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) and Maximum Likelihood
(ML) are the main methods. Other methods do exist but are generally not used (Worthington
& Whittaker, 2006). ML has been used quite extensively with FA but when assumptions of
multivariate normality have been violated, caution must be exercised (Curran, West, & Finch,
1996; Floyd & Widaman, 1995). However, both EFA and CFA are robust against normality
violations (Gorsuch, 1983), but when other problems occur alongside the normality variation
(small sample size for example), this may affect the confirmatory solution (Hu, M, & Kano,
1992).  Also,  it  has  been  suggested  that  ML is  too  unstable  and  the  number  of  factors
suggested by the technique can be either too high or too low (Zwick & Velicer, 1986). If the
data is not normal, using ML might give rise to an ‘improper solution’; if this was the case,
this might indicate a more serious problem within the data (Brown, 2015).  The use of PAF as
an alternative to ML would seem a better prospect, as it deals with non-normal data more
effectively. However, this technique (sometimes referred to as ‘Principal Factors’), as with
PCA, seeks to use the variance over subsequent iterations, and the goal is for an orthogonal
solution (the factors being unrelated) (Tabachnick et al., 2007). Therefore this method would
only be appropriate if the data was sufficiently violated. However, Winter and Dodou (2012)
state  that  there is  little  documented difference between the two methods based on factor
patterns and sample sizes. If the ML method is used, this can help determine the number of





This part of the analysis is seen to be the most important stage of the process. An incorrect
decision at  this  stage can lead to problems with the validity of the proposed model.  The
model could be ‘underfactored’ (too few factors) or ‘overfactored’ (too many factors selected)
(Brown, 2015). The researcher should be careful at this point to not just rely on the statistical
analysis and make sure that the factors make sense and are interpretable in line with theory
(Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The factors also need to be strong, in that they have more
than two or three items that load onto them (Kline, 2014). There are several ways to identify
the number of factors using statistical analysis.
The EFA produces eigenvalues that are based on the correlation matrix by the analysis. These
eigenvalues are related to the amount of variance that the model explains (Brown, 2015) and
therefore the two methods that are most used to determine the number of factors are based on
eigenvalues, however, other methods are available: The Kaiser-Guttman rule and the Scree
test. The Kaiser-Guttman rule is simple; the number of eigenvalues derived from the input
correlation matrix that are greater than one equal the number of factors present. If the factor
has an eigenvalue of less than one, then it explains the variance of less than one item and is
therefore of no use because the factor is  less than one indicator.  However,  this  model is
sensitive to sampling error and can lead to overfactoring and underfactoring (Brown, 2015).
The Scree test (Cattell, 1966), is another popular method adopted by researchers and is again
based on eigenvalues.  The Eigen values  are  taken from the  input  or  reduced correlation
matrix and plotted on a graph; eigenvalues on the vertical axis and factor numbers on the
horizontal axis. The slope is then eyeballed and the number of factors is determined as being
the point of levelling off, or the ‘elbow’ of the slope (see Figure  3 .2). This method performs
well with an appropriately large sample sizes and when the factors are well defined with
multiple items (DeVellis, 2003). One problem with this method is that the ‘elbow’ point on
the slope might not be immediately obvious and is open to interpretation. After the number of
factors is decided upon, the factors are then rotated to achieve the ‘simplest’ model.
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Figure 3.2. Graph Showing the Eigen Values and Factor Numbers.
2.7.2.5 Factor Rotation
Factor rotation is an inherently difficult concept to explain. In essence, factor rotation takes
the factors on an axis and places items on those factors rotating them to their best position,
i.e. where the items load onto a particular factor optimally, values usually between .3 and .9.
Factor rotation seeks to achieve the ‘simplest’ model available from an infinite amount of
possible solutions of a model with two or more factors (Brown, 2015). The two main types of
factor  rotation are oblique and orthogonal.  Oblique rotation is  used when the factors are
expected to be correlated and an orthogonal rotation is to be used when the factors are not
expected to be correlated (Comrey & Lee, 2013). This is usually based on theory but if the
theory  suggests  an  oblique  relationship  when  the  data  analysis  suggests  an  orthogonal
relationship,  it  is  recommended an oblique rotation be used  (Gorsuch, 1983).  While both
methods of rotation may yield the same results, caution should be taken. If an orthogonal
rotation is used when the factor actually correlate, it can lead to inflated loading of items onto
factors, the model might be a misrepresentation of the data and lead to problems with data fit
in a CFA (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).
There are  various  methods of  running an orthogonal  and oblique rotation,  examples  are:
Varimax and quartimax which are orthogonal methods, and direct oblimin and promax which
are  oblique.  Varimax  takes  small  loading  variables  and  reduces  them  further  while  the
variables  that  have  high  loadings  are  minimized on each factor  (Yong & Pearce,  2013).
Quartimax involves reducing the number of factors to explain each variable (Gorsuch, 1983).
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Direct oblimin aims to make the structure easier and simplify the maths  (Yong & Pearce,
2013). Promax again, aims to simplify the structure by raising the correlations and is useful
for large data sets (Gorsuch, 1983). Due to most psychology constructs being correlated, it is
recommended a direct oblimin oblique rotation be used, a promax being selected if large data
sets are used. When the model has been chosen the factors then need to be interpreted.
2.7.2.6 Factor Interpretation and Solution Evaluation
When the above methods have been selected, the pattern matrix will show which items load
onto which factor and by how much. This will give the researcher an opportunity to identify
poorly defined factors. These could have too few items loading onto them or have too many
items that are cross loading (loading onto more than one factor), or not fit with prior theory
(Brown, 2015). If this is the case, then the number of factors should be re-evaluated. Also, the
items themselves should be evaluated. ‘Poorly behaved items’, items that load to highly on
more than one factor,  or that have a small  loading across two or more factors should be
examined (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). As stated above, ideally the items should load
onto one factor,  have loading of between .3 and .9 and the factors themselves should be
meaningful within the context of the theory  (DiStefano & Zhu, 2009). Once this has been
done,  the  analysis  should be run again.  However,  rerunning the analysis  can reveal  new
problems with both factors and items. It is up to the researcher, guided by theory, to establish
a stopping point for this part of the process  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The model
proposed by the EFA is then ideally tested using CFA.
2.7.3 CFA and SEM
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) has been seen by some to be a superior method to EFA
and PCA because it is based on hypothesis testing (Kline, 2014). Generally, CFA ‘confirms’
the more exploratory findings of an EFA or PCA.  However, many researchers use CFA to
test a model that has been posited by EFA or PCA. Although there have been suggestions that
CFA should be done first, the argument being if the proposed model does not fit, then an EFA
would have to be conducted regardless (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The goal of CFA is
to test if the data that are derived from the sample fit the hypothesized model. In other words,
are the latent factors and the way they load (correlate) onto the individual items remain at an
acceptable level (Harlow, 2014). Testing the model solution can be achieved in several ways,
but  there  are  problems inherent  with  some of  these  methods.  This  could  lead  to  testing
multiple models because rejection of the wrong model does not necessarily mean that the
correct model has been identified (Kline, 2014). CFA has different uses; in this case, it will be
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used to validate the scale that was developed using EFA in the initial study of this thesis.
Other uses for CFA include: Assessing ‘item parcels’, analysis of ‘multitrait-multimethod’
designs, analysis of ‘hierarchical factor models’, the evaluation of invariance of measurement
models, structured mean of latent variables and looking at longitudinal measurements over
specific time points (Harlow, 2014). However, these are beyond the scope of this thesis and
only the scale validation will be discussed in depth. As with the EFA, it is important to have a
strong theoretical justification for the model, so a familiarity with the research in the area is
essential.  Also,  collecting  data  using  other  constructs  to  validate  this  proposed  scale  is
advised (Harlow, 2014). Initially, the assumptions of the data must be investigated. Maximum
Likelihood relies heavily on the data being normally distributed (Brown, 2015). If this is not
the case it can lead to problems using the chi-square method of testing the model fit (Curran
et al., 1996). A Type I error in the case of non-normality could lead to unnecessary model
modification  (MacCallum, 1990; MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). Alternatives
were in the past hampered by placing higher demand on computing power. With the advent of
more powerful processing speeds, however, this is no longer an issue. The first step of CFA is
to justify the theoretical model.
2.7.3.1 Justify the Theoretical Model
When conducting a CFA, justification for the theoretical model that is being tested is required
(Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). In the case of CFA being used to ‘confirm’ a
model derived from an EFA, theoretical justification should already have been established.
On occasion this is not possible and caution must be taken when model testing in this case, as
conducting a CFA on a model hypothesised with little or no theoretical justification could
lead to a misrepresented model  (Harlow, 2014). The skipping of EFA could lead to saving
time on participant recruitment, but overall, conducting an EFA prior to a CFA provides a
stronger theoretical underpinning and leads to a more stable model to test under CFA, and
that model should theoretically be less open to the need for modification at the CFA stage
(Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). From this EFA, the parameters of the model can be gained.
2.7.3.2 What are the parameters of the model?
The  parameters  of  the  proposed  model  also  need  to  be  stated.  These  would  ideally  be
established from an EFA. The parameters should take the form on the number of items on the
scale, the number of factors and the items that are theorised to load onto each factor (Brown,
2015). This is the model that is to be tested; however, different numbers of factors and items
on each factor can be tested during a CFA, in order to compare and contrast different model
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solutions.  This  should  also  contain  a  visual  representation  of  the  hypothesised  model  or
models, see Figure  3 .3. 
The hypothesised factors should show the loadings onto the respective items and the error
variance  (variance  not  explained  by  the  hypothesised  factor)  should  be  displayed  also
indicating toward the respective item. Once the parameters have been decided this can inform
the sample size needed.
Figure 3.3. Example of a Visual Representation of Hypothesised Three Factor Model. 
2.7.3.3 Sample size
As with EFA, sample size guidelines for CFA vary. When using SEM, some favour larger
sample sizes to indicate that a particular model is stable  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006).
Minimum sample  size  recommendations  generally  fall  between 100 and 200 participants
(Kline, 2014); further recommendations are based around the parameters of the model. Some
recommend 5 to 10 participants per parameter (Bentler & Chou, 1987) or the same amount
per variable (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995). Worthington and Whittaker (2006) state that, because
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sample size is linked to model complexity there should be at least a 5:1 ratio of participants
and parameters with 10:1 being the optimum sample size and the absolute minimum sample
size being 100. The latent variables also need to be scaled.
2.7.3.4 Scaling latent variables
By their  very  nature,  latent  variables  have  no  metric  and  therefore  must  be  set  by  the
researcher. The two methods that are generally used to accomplish this are to: set the metric
of  the latent  variables  to  one  of  the indicators  (unstandardized)  or  set  the  metric  to  one
(standardized) (Brown, 2015). While both provide the same model fit, the unstandardized can
also  provide  a  standardised  solution  that  can  be  used  for  reliability  tests.  The  correct
conditions  for  model  identification  need  to  be  assessed  otherwise  the  model  could  be
underidentified.  
2.7.3.5 Underidentified models
Another  consideration when estimating the model parameters  is  checking if  the model is
underidentified. This is where the number of freely estimated parameters exceeds the number
of pieces of information in the correlation matrix based on the known items (Brown, 2015).
For example, if a model has one latent variable that loads onto two items, the correlation
matrix of those two items will have three parameters. However, the free parameters (in this
case,  factor  loading  and  error  variances)  that  are  not  known  equal  four  (two  pieces  of
information per variable). Because the information not known is greater than the information
known, the degrees of freedom (df) will  be a minus number and the model is classed as
underidentifed and the model is not solvable. If the model has an equal set of parameters is it
classed as being ‘just identified’ and therefore solvable as the df equals zero. And, naturally,
when the knowns outnumber the knows the df is positive and the model is overidentified and
solvable.
One  of  the  items  within  a  factor  needs  to  be  set  at  a  value  of  one  to  scale  the  factor
(Matsunaga, 2010). That is the ‘scaling rule’ and it is applied to each latent variable in a SEM
and while this is needed, this cannot be the only method of identification (Bollen & Davis,
2009). A further rule of identification is the t rule; t refers to the number of free parameters
within a model (Bollen & Davis, 2009). Again, this should not be the only method used but it
involves making sure the non-redundant variances and covariances are not exceeded by the
free parameters. 
Brown (2015) offers some basic guidelines for model identification: all latent variables must
be scaled either by using a marker indicator or fixing the variance of the factor; variances and
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covariance in the input matrix (known information) must exceed the freely estimated model
parameters; one factor models need a minimum of three indicators; and if a model contains
two or more factors with two items per factor it could be susceptible to underidentification
and is not recommended. This will lead to the estimator being chosen.
2.7.3.6 What estimator will be used? 
The majority of statistical packages have Maximum Likelihood (ML) as the default setting,
however, as has been pointed out previously, this does not mean that is the best estimator to
use  (Brown, 2015). Other methods are available and are considered below, however these
should only be considered if the variables are severely non-normal or nominal for example
(Kline, 2011). Fully Weighted Least Squares (WLS) can be used in such a circumstance, for
example, Mean and Variance Weight Least Squares (WLSMV) when the number of variables
is small or the sample size is relatively small  (Muthén, Du Toit, & Spisic, 1997). Brown  
(2015), states that WLSMV performs well with the smaller sample sizes and recommends the
use of Monte Carlo routines to establish the required sample size. However, WLSMV has
been seen to perform as well as ML even with small sample size, but the effect of model
misspecification is still unknown (Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006). The estimation method has
been seen to be similar to the factor extraction method in EFA (Matsunaga, 2010). The model
then needs to be assessed for its fit to the data gathered.
2.7.3.7 Fit indices
Typically the majority of researchers use the chi-square test as an indication of the model's
overall fit  (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). However, there are issues with using this test
regarding sample size influencing the outcome. The use of large sample sizes (even over 100)
with the chi-square statistic can lead to a model being rejected (Gerbing & Anderson, 1985)
and even a modest sample size (50) can lead to a significant outcome which would indicate
that a particular model should be rejected (Iacobucci, 2010). Other methods to establish the
model  fit  alongside  the  overall  fit  include  incremental  (or  comparative),  absolute  and
predictive (Kline, 2011). These should be used alongside the overall fit statistics. However,
the fit indices themselves may fall under more than one method (Kline, 2011), what follows
is a brief description of each method and example of the fit indices that typically fall into that
category. 
2.7.3.7.1 Incremental
These fit indices compare the chi-square to the null or independence and each indices within
this family generally give similar results. These tests effectively test the model against the
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worst possible model outcome. The worst possible outcome being an r2 of zero in contrast to
the best outcome; an  r2 of 1. These fit indices do not suffer from the sample size problem
associated with the overall test statistics, which makes them useful to test alongside other
statistics  (Miles  & Shevlin,  2007).  These measures  of fit  include:  Comparative Fit  Index
(CFI) Normed Fit Index (NFI), Non- Normed Fit Index (NNFI) (or the Tucker Lewis Index
(TLI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Parsimony Comparative Fit Index (PCFI) and Relative
Noncentrality Index (RNI). 
2.7.3.7.2 Absolute
These look at the model on an absolute level, the covariance’s, and how much of these are
explained by the model. This is better understood by looking the r2 statistic; if it is .90, then
the model explains 90% of the variance. Similarly, the absolute measure represents a level of
statistical explanation of the model, however, just because they explain a high percentage of
the model, it does not necessarily translate into a good model  (Kline, 2011). Measures of
absolute  fit  include,  Chi-square/df  ratio,  Root  Mean-Square  Error  of  Approximation
(RMSEA),  Gamma hat,  Hoelter  N,  Goodness-of-Fit  Index  (GFI),  McDonald’s  Centrality
Index (MCI), Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR)
and Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR) (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). 
2.7.3.7.3 Predictive
These look at the model fit from a hypothetical replication sample that is taken from the same
population as the sample used to test the original model. Using these hypothetical samples the
statistic looks at how much the model is estimated to fit and thus predicted  (Kline, 2011).
Examples of predictive fit model are, Consistent AIC (CAIC), Akaike’s Information Criteria
(AIC), Baysian Information Criterion (BIC) and Expected Cross-Validation Index (ECVI)
(Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). 
Model fit should never be established just from one measure and be established from indices
from a range of families, and be taken alongside sample size, estimated reliability and the
complexity  of  the  model  (Miles  & Shevlin,  2007).  While  several  studies  use  Χ2/df as  a
measure of fit,  due to the nature of chi-square not being reliable due to sample size, this
measure should be avoided (Brown, 2015). For the recommended values of various fit indices
see  Table   3  .1.  The  fit  indices  should  then  be  stated  before  standardised  residuals  and
localised areas of strain are examined.
64
Sensitivity: Internal
Table 3.1.Table Showing the Fit Indices, Recommended Values and Sources.
Fit Index Recommended Value Source
X2/df ≤ 3.00 Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000
GFI ≥ 0.90 Hoyle, 1995
CFI ≥ 0.95 Hu & Bentler, 1999
NFI ≥ 0.95 Hu & Bentler, 1999
RMSEA ≤ 0.06 Hu & Bentler, 1999
SRMR ≤ 0.08 Hu & Bentler, 1999
NNFI (TLI) ≥ 0.90 Bagozzi & Youjae Yi, 1988
2.7.3.8 Standardised Residuals and Localised Areas of Strain
The correlation residual is the difference between the correlation that the proposed model
should have and the actual observed values. The residuals should not have correlation values
> .10. The problem is there is no agreement as to how many values > .10 is permissible
(Kline, 2011). Harlow (2014), states that only correlations > .2 are problematic and advises
caution with larger samples. For these correlation residuals to be significant their values in
the Z correlation table must be significant (>1.96. for a significance level of .05 and >2.58 for
a significance level of 0.01). Two tables will be generated by the relevant software: one with
residual correlations and one with the z correlations. These two tables should be used together
to  identify  where  localised  areas  of  strain  appear.  While  the  fit  indices  described  above
provide an ‘overall’ look at the model, the standard residuals and other measures of areas of
ill fit should be examined to identify any areas of localised strain. While the fit indices might
indicate a problem with the model they will not tell the researcher where the problem lies.
Items that are problematic can be identified by examining the residuals (Brown, 2015).  If the
standardised residuals are greater than 1.96 for a p <.05 or 2.58 for p<.01  (Harrington, 2008)
then  this  might  be  problematic  and  should  be  investigated.  Positive  values  indicate  an
underestimated  model  (more  of  a  relationship  between the  items than indicated)  while  a
negative  standardised  residual  would  indicate  an  overestimated  relationship  (less  of  a
relationship between the items than indicated). It should be noted that residuals are affected
by sample size. A larger sample size will result in a larger residual and caution must therefore
be taken when reporting (Brown, 2015). However, the identification of these areas does not
indicate what should be done to improve the model, however, modification indices can reveal
items that are potentially problematic. Once this has been completed the factor solution can
be assessed for validity. 
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2.7.3.9 Assessing the validity of the factor solution
When looking at the validity of a factor solution, it is important to consider the construct
validity  of  the  scale  that  is  being  confirmed.  Two  aspects  of  construct  validity  can  be
examined here: convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity refers to
the amount the items on the scale are related to each other (DeVellis, 2003). The reverse is
also  needed.  Discriminant  validity  is  the  amount  items are not  related to  each other,  for
example, items on different subscales measuring different factors should not correlate highly.
Factors loadings > .80 would show poor discriminant validity. However, items that do not
crossload and have strong factor  loading (> .60) show good convergent  validity  (Brown,
2015). Along with validity, the solution should be assessed for reliability.
2.7.3.10 Reliability Measures
Measures of reliability should also be employed to assess whether the scale can measure
accurately over  time:  Composite  relatability,  Cronbach’s  alpha and Raykov’s Rho can be
used. Also, other measures that theoretically measure the similar constructs can be used to
test  reliability  and a  test  restest  of the proposed scale  after  a certain time period is  also
recommended (DeVellis, 2003). Multicollinearity can also be an issue, while  Brown (2015)
states that there needs to be a similarity between items in the same factor they generally
should not correlate above .90, as this can be a sign of an unstable model. If the model does
appear  unstable  or  misidentified,  modification  indices  could  indicate  the  need  for
respecification.
2.7.3.11 Modification indices and model respecification
The model may occasionally have to be respecified. This can be due to several issues such as:
the model is a bad fit, is not an adequate replication of the proposed model from EFA or the
parameter estimates cannot be interpreted satisfactorily (Brown, 2015). To establish this, the
modification indices that are provided by the analysis can be examined, but other factors can
be at work when model misspecification is a problem. While respecification is possible it
needs strong theoretical justification and this ideally should have been provided for by the
EFA. Since CFA is ‘confirming’ the model it stands to reason that the justification should
already have been provided for the original model. However, model building is rarely that





2.7.3.12 Heywood Cases, Model Complexity and Sample Size Problems
When a solution is inadmissible, it is usually due to values that are illogical; these are called
Heywood cases (Heywood, 1931). Generally these cases will contain values such as negative
errors variances, and correlation or factor loadings that are greater than one, or the estimated
parameter is so large that it cannot be interpreted (Kline, 2011). Heywood cases can be due
to: errors in specification, nonidentification of the model, outliers, inadequate sample size
coupled with too few items per factor (two) (Chen, Bollen, Paxton, Curran, & Kirby, 2001).
The Heywood case when used with ML indicates that the item has been ‘forced’ into the
model even though it will not fit. Ideally, the source of the problem should be located before
the model is deemed admissible (Kline, 2011). Model complexity can also be a problem for
CFA (Hu & Bentler, 1998) as can sample size, which can affect the chi-square statistic and
also have a bearing on other fit indices (Marsh, Balla, & McDonald, 1988). Therefore, a wide
range of fit statistics should be obtained, and cut-off thresholds should be treated as rules of
thumb, rather than cut-off values.
2.8 Chapter Summary
The above provides a robust methodology for the development and analysis of an item pool
to meet the aim of examining cognitive and personality differences of supernatural belief.




3 Chapter Four – Study One – The Creation of the Belief in the
Supernatural Scale.
This chapter aims to create a new scale that incorporates religious, spiritual and paranormal
belief under the umbrella term of supernatural belief. The new scale is informed by theory
and previous empirical  research while  being mindful  of the issues regarding the existing
scales. An item pool was created by taking items from previous scales that measure religious,
spiritual and paranormal belief. The item pool was then reduced and the number of factors
were assessed.  This informed the relationship between religious,  spiritual and paranormal
belief within the larger context of supernatural belief. This chapter will meet the first part of
the first  objective of this thesis: Create and validate a new scale to measure supernatural
belief.
3.1 Introduction
The  Paranormal  Belief  Scale  (PBS)  and  revised  Paranormal  Belief  Scale  (rPBS)  have
dominated  research into the  paranormal and parapsychology since  their  first  inception in
1983  (Irwin,  2009).  However,  since then,  many problems have been highlighted with the
number of factors, the items and the nature of the factors included  (Lawrence, 1995a), for
example the inclusion of religious belief as a paranormal belief (Irwin, 2009). The inclusion
of  religious  belief  as  a  paranormal  belief  is  controversial  when  measuring  the
unidimensionality  of  paranormal  belief.  The  root  of  some of  these  problems  is  the  way
paranormal belief has changed and has been defined in the past  (Lindeman & Svedholm,
2012).  This  chapter  proposes  a  new measure of  belief  that  uses the term supernatural  to
encompass religious, spiritual and paranormal belief to resolve the issues with the PBS/rPBS,
and also to use the development of a  new scale to  address the issues of the relationship
between religious, spiritual and paranormal belief.
Scales that measure the supernatural often use the term interchangeably to refer to religious
or  paranormal,  depending on what  the  researcher  is  studying  (J.  Jong et  al.,  2012).  The
definition of the term supernatural has been debated (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012), with one
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definition  being anything that  is  beyond nature  (Sagan,  1995).  The paranormal  has  been
defined as ‘violating the basic limiting principles of science’ (Broad, 1949 p. 291); religious
has been defined as something that relates to an ultimate truth and higher power  (Koenig,
2012) and  spiritual  has  been defined as  a  more  personal  form of  belief  but  it  has  been
described as very difficult  to define  (Zinnbauer et  al.,  1997). A new scale must take into
account  these  definitions  while  acknowledging  the  overlaps  between  them.  Furthermore,
theory  and  empirical  evidence  must  be  used  in  the  development  of  the  new  scale  to
distinguish the possible  different  facets  of supernatural  belief.  A scale  that  acknowledges
people believe in either the religious or the paranormal or both is badly needed. A new scale
that takes this into account will be a more effective measurement tool and accepts the nuances
of individual differences in belief.
One theory that suggests that people believe differently is Metaphysical Chauvinism (Beck &
Miller, 2001). This theory posits that people maybe believe in one phenomenon while not
believing in another, when both are actually similar in nature. For example, one person might
believe in ghosts and not believe in angels. The distinction here is that one is a religious
phenomenon, and the other is more paranormal.  This indicates that a distinction between
religious  and paranormal  belief  is  needed.  This  is  also  supported  by  empirical  evidence.
Several studies have been carried out that group people into different types of believer and
generally  found that  four  groups  emerge  (Aarnio  & Lindeman,  2007;  Irwin,  1997;  Rice,
2003;  Schofield  et  al.,  2016).  Schofield  et  al.  (2016) named  these  groups  ‘believers’,
‘paranormal believers’, ‘sceptics’ and ‘religious believers’. These groups clearly indicate that
some people only hold religious beliefs and others only paranormal beliefs. Research that
examined the links between religious and paranormal belief  have provided mixed results,
with  some  finding  they  are  similar  (Goode,  2000;  Haraldsson  &  Houtkooper,  1996;
Orenstein, 2002) and others reporting differences (MacDonald, 2000; Rice, 2003). This could
indicate a problem with the measurement of these concepts and that the interplay between
religious  and  paranormal  belief  is  complex.  Current  measures  of  religious,  spiritual  and
paranormal belief do not take this into account and have further problems that need resolving.
Current measures that employ the title of ‘supernatural’ refer to either paranormal (Randall &
Desrosiers, 1980) or religious (Jong et al., 2012) concepts and are dependent upon what the
researcher is investigating. An acknowledgment of what the term supernatural refers to would
go a long way to alleviating some of these ambiguities with the definition of the supernatural.
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Scales that measure ‘religiosity’ number in the hundreds  (Hill & Hood Jr., 1999) and some
tend to examine dimensions such as those originally  posited by  (Allport  & Ross,  1967).
‘Intrinsic’, a more personal idea of what a person believes, and ‘extrinsic’, what a person
does for their religion, whether they attend church, for example. A further dimension was
added that  looked at  how a person might  question  their  belief  which  was  called  ‘quest’
(Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). Variations of these dimensions have been used but they are
often criticised for being too arbitrary (Gorsuch, 1984). Unlike scales like paranormal scales
that tend to use phenomena as their dimensions, religiosity scales will look at constructs akin
to belief, behaviour and experience. One of the major problems with religiosity scales is the
overlap between religiosity and spirituality.  Many scales also exist  to measure spirituality
(Kapuscinski & Masters, 2010), but the term itself is used in an arbitrary fashion. Items on
these scales may refer to religious ideas, God for example and again, whether the scale is
labelled religious or spiritual might depend on what the researcher is studying  (Kim et al.,
2015). While the link between spirituality and religiosity has been acknowledged  (Hill  &
Pargament, 2008) and might seem obvious, how they fit together within a scale is unclear and
in need of further investigation. The link becomes even more complex with the introduction
of the paranormal to the proposed scale.
Scales  that  measure  paranormal  constructs  are  less  plentiful  than  scales  that  measure
religiosity,  but  many  do  exist.  One  of  the  main  differences  between  religiosity  and
paranormal  scales  is  the  factors.  While  a  religiosity  scale  will  measure  factors  such  as
intrinsic and extrinsic, the factors on paranormal scales will tend to look at different types of
phenomena, such as superstition (Nixon, 1925), ESP (Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; Michael A.
Thalbourne  &  Haraldsson,  1980),  paranormal  belief  (Jones,  Russell,  &  Nickel,  1977;
Tobacyk & Milford,  1983; Tobacyk,  2004) and experience  (Kumar,  Pekala,  & Gallagher,
1994). However, the main scale in the research of paranormal belief is the Paranormal Belief
Scale  (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), which later became the revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(Tobacyk, 2004). The rPBS has seven factors, while researchers since then have identified
five factors  (Lawrence,  1995a; Lawrence & Cicco, 1997; Lawrence et  al.,  1997),  or two
factors (Lange et al., 2000). The items included in the scale have been criticised, for example,
the item ‘witches do exist’ might not mean a belief in witches or a belief in anything magical,
just the acknowledgment that there are people who call themselves witches  (Irwin, 2009).
Alongside these two problems the definition of paranormal belief should also be taken into
account. Initially, an overall definition of what is classed as a paranormal belief should be
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considered,  particularly  the  status  of  religious  belief.  If  religious  belief  is  classed  as
paranormal,  it  may  affect  how  people  score  when  using  the  scale  unidimensionally.
Furthermore, the use of only 26 items to measure five factors was also called into question
(Lawrence, 1995a). When the problems with definitions are addressed, the items used can be
appropriately scrutinised and a stronger item pool can be developed. This will have the effect
of making stronger factors that are based on solid theory.
The problems inherent with these types of scale are the definitions of the terms used when
making the scales. When defining the terms it is also important to consider what concept is to
be  measured.  The  various  theories  regarding  the  concepts  of  religiosity,  spirituality  and
paranormal belief have been stated and while there has been much debate regarding different
dimension of  religiosity  (intrinsic  and extrinsic  for  example).  To what  extent  spirituality
overlaps with religiosity or whether it is a part of it, and how these two concepts fit with
notions  of the supernatural  and the paranormal,  a unidimensional  scale  that  encompasses
religious, spiritual and paranormal belief would be potentially useful. It is proposed that a
scale to measure the concept of supernatural belief should be developed using items from
previous scales. This will incorporate religious, spiritual and paranormal belief. An item pool
will  be  developed  that  takes  items  from  multiple  scales  and  this  pool  will  be  used  to
determine the various factors that are associated with supernatural belief.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
Sample  size  for  an  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  requirements  vary  but  Worthington  and
Whittaker (2006) indicate that at least 300 participants are required. Therefore, a sample size
of 382 was deemed to be adequate for the 71 items in the proposed scale. The participants (n=
382) were recruited from the University of Derby, both on campus and online students. Also
using  opportunity  sampling,  recruitment  was  carried  out  via  social  media  (Twitter  and
Facebook).  The  British  Psychological  Society  was  also  contacted  for  recruitment.  The
participants’ ages  ranged  from  18  to  79.  (mean=  34.85,  SD=12.81).  The  gender  of  the
participants was as follows: Male=104 (27.2%), female=276 (72.3%) and 2 (.5%) preferred
not to say. Of the participants 287 (75.1%) were students 8 (2.1%) in college or other post-
secondary education, 211 (55.2%) on undergraduate degrees and 68 (17.8%) in postgraduate
study. The level of education attainment of those that were not currently students was: 7
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(1.83%)  a  primary  or  secondary  education,  16  (4.2%)  college  or  other  post-secondary
education, 32 (8.4%) undergraduate degrees and 40 (10.5%) postgraduate study.  A total of
450 participants started to fill out the survey with 382 completing all the questions. This
indicated a completion rate of 84.9%.
3.2.2 Materials
The  materials  required  were  a  set  of  items  for  the  development  of  the  Belief  in  the
Supernatural Scale and an online survey tool.
3.2.2.1 Item Pool Generation for the Belief in the Supernatural Scale
There were three stages in the process of selecting items for the item pool; stage one was the
initial search for scales to draw items from; stage two was an evaluation of the scales from
the initial search; the third and final stage was the evaluation and possible modification of the
items taken from the scales.
3.2.2.2 Validity and Item Pool Selection
Clark and Watson (1995) state that a broad formal description of the concept that the scale is
being built for is needed to begin with.  The theory must underpin the whole of the scale
development process, and one way of establishing this is by addressing the issue of validity.
This needs to be carried out because if the item pool is poor then this cannot be rectified at a
later point using statistical  analysis. When examining the items for the item pool several
things need to be considered before they can be accepted such as face and cross cultural
validity. Face validity will be employed to establish if the item measures what it claims to
measure, in this instance, the attitude of the participant toward belief in a certain concept
(religious, spiritual or paranormal belief). After the initial item pool has been established, face
validity will be used again, and a panel of experts will rate the scale. However, other forms of
validity need to be examined, such as cross cultural validity.
Cross-  cultural  problems  have  been  acknowledged  with  scales  that  measure  religious,
spiritual and paranormal belief. The definition of culture is this instance is best described by
Hofstede (1981) ‘the aggregate of common traits that influence the human group response to
its  environment.’;  this represents what the individual may have experienced through their
culture and has led to the shaping of their  beliefs.   Sperber and Claidière (2008) have a
definition that suggests differing mental states too. Some of the scales that measure religious
belief are mainly aimed at western Christian participants  (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010). Also, paranormal belief scales have items that may not translate to other cultures, for
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example, the RPBS having the Loch Ness Monster in one of its items.  This must be taken
into account when developing the item pool and items that are not cross culturally applicable
must be either eliminated or modified.  However, it has been suggested that it is impossible to
have a scale that is completely cross-culturally valid and there will always be an element of
this when trying to measure concepts such as belief (Skevington, 2002). The researcher must
make an effort to develop the best scale they can to reflect these beliefs and concepts in the
best way possible. These forms of validity can also be confirmed by the use of independent
reviewers of the item pool. These reviewers can be experts  in the field,  or novices,  or a
combination of both.
3.2.2.3 Expert and Non-Expert Reviewers
Experts have been frequently used to evaluate items that are under development, but there are
few studies that empirically evaluate their value to the process (Olson, 2010). Olson (2010)
found that despite a low reliability in their judgement, expert reviews consistently identified
items that had higher non-response rates (this indicates that the respondent may have had a
problem understanding the item). Expert reviewer’s roles often seen as twofold: to expose
survey problems before it goes out in the field, and to indicate if particular items are likely to
cause problems. It is that latter in this case that the experts will be used for in this thesis. The
experts will  be use to examine the different types of validity,  and it  had been stated that
experts should be used to judge face validity (Hardesty & Bearden, 2004) as it is a fast and
inexpensive method for checking a scale (Presser & Blair, 1994). This will then be followed
by the use of novices to assess the items. This will ensure that the items can be appreciate by
a ‘lay’ audience as well as experts in the field. This will add an extra layer of testing before
the items are used to collect data.
3.2.2.3.1 Stage One – The Search for Scales
The scales used needed to be associated with belief. However, if the items could be modified
to fit  that  category or  another  term has  been used interchangeably with belief  (faith,  for
example), then inclusion in the final list of scales was deemed acceptable. Exclusion criteria
at the initial stage included: scales that were not cross-cultural and that did not have face
validity. The initial search was conducted using Hill and Hood Jr.'s (1999) book that contains
over 100 measures of religiosity; religious and spiritual belief scales were searched using this
source. To search for paranormal belief scales, Irwin's (2009) book was consulted as 14 scales
are featured in the appendix of this publication. The religious, spiritual and paranormal scales
were checked and chosen based on the above criteria. At this point it must be understood that
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the scales may be measuring different variants of religiosity, spirituality and paranormality or
all of those concepts (in the case of the rPBS [Tobacyk, 2004], for example) but they are split
this way for ease of searching. Using the books as initial searches, also helped establish key
search terms. The terms ‘religious belief scale’, ‘spiritual belief scale’ and ‘paranormal belief
scale’ were initially used. The following search engines were used: Elsevier Science Direct,
Psychinfo and Google Scholar.  For  a  breakdown of the number of  hits  from the various
combinations of the search terms, see Table  4 .2.
While several scales were identified from these searches, it became clear that this method of
searching  was  unwieldy  and  would  not  provide  a  comprehensive  list  of  scales.  Within
Psycinfo,  it  is  possible  to  generate  a  list  of  the  scales  used  by studies  identified  after  a
particular search. It was established that using the search term ‘beliefs’ rather than ‘belief’
generated a more comprehensive list of studies. For the results of these searches see Table  4 .
2.  Table  Showing  Search  Results  for  Beliefs  in  Google  Scholar,  Psycinfo  And  Elsevier
Science Direct. For a breakdown of the results generated for each search term, see Figure  4 .
4, Figure  4 .5, and Figure  4 .6. Using this method it was possible to see the most popular
scales used by studies that looked at the religious, spiritual and paranormal. The scales found
by this method were integrated with the previous lists, duplicates were noted and removed.
The advantage of this method was that it allowed the scales to be rated on their popularity.
Table 4.2. Table Showing Search Results for Beliefs in Google Scholar, Psycinfo And Elsevier
Science Direct.
Boolean Search with AND Google Scholar PsycINFO Elsevier Science Direct
Paranormal beliefs 20,800 703 779
Religious beliefs 1,680,000 15,625 42,317
Spiritual beliefs 1,080,000 4,266 17,797
Supernatural beliefs 147,000 629 3,791
Anomalous beliefs 73,800 203 9,679
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Figure 4.4. Graph Showing 10 Most Popular
Scales Used for Religious Belief According 
to Psycinfo (Number of Studies Using the 
Scale, Percentage of Total).
 
Figure 4.5. Graph Showing 10 Most 
Popular Scales Used for Spiritual Belief 
According to Psycinfo (Number of Studies 
Using the Scale, Percentage of Total).
 
Figure 4.6. Graph Showing Seven Most 
Popular Scales Used for Paranormal Belief 
According to Psycinfo (Number Of Studies 
Using the Scale, Percentage of Total).
 
Figure 4.7. Graph Showing 10 Most 
Popular Scales Used for Anomalous Belief 
According to Psycinfo (Number Of Studies 
Using the Scale, Percentage of Total).
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Figure 4.8. Graph Showing 10 Most Popular Scales Used for Supernatural Belief 
According to Psycinfo (Number of Studies Using the Scale, Percentage of Total).
Further  search  terms  identified  and  used  were  supernatural  and  anomalistic.  The  above
process was repeated with these search terms. For the number of hits see Table  4 .2. Table
Showing Search Results for Beliefs in Google Scholar, Psycinfo And Elsevier Science Direct.,
 and for the breakdown of the popularity of the scales, see Figure  4 .7 and Figure  4 .8. See
Figure  4 .9 for a flowchart examining the overall process of stage one. Once the final list of
scales was complete, stage two was started.
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Figure 4.9. Flow Chart Showing Stage One: The Search for Scales.
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3.2.2.3.2 Stage Two – Reducing the Scales
Once a full list of scales was established, the next stage involved going through the scales
individually  and  assessing  them.  Although  stage  one  did  involve  a  certain  amount  of
assessment,  stage  two involved looking at  the  items  within  the  scale  in  more  depth  and
assessing  what  the  scales  had  been  used  for  previously.  So  again,  the  scales  needed  to
measure belief, i.e. have face validity, they needed to have cross-cultural validity and they
needed to be available. Also, it is worth noting at this point that some of the scales were
developed as clinical tools (particularly some of the spiritual belief scales) and were therefore
not appropriate. Despite this some of the clinical scales had elements of one or more of the
previous exclusion criteria but some of the items could be used or some of the items could be
used with modification.  Also,  the studies  were checked to see if  further  scales  could  be
identified for use. No further scales were identified. This left 49 scales remaining. See Figure
 4 .10 for details. Stage 3 involved selecting items from the scales.
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Figure 4.10. Flowchart Showing Stage Two – Reducing the Scales
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3.2.2.3.3 Stage Three – Reducing the Items
The items were taken from the scales selected in stage two. The pool of items numbered 639
initially. The first pass looked for duplicates, and then at face validity, checking the items
measuring religious, spiritual or paranormal belief.  The next step was to check for cross-
cultural validity. Finally the items were examined to see if they could be answered by people
who were non-believers. If the items could be altered to address the above issues then this
was carried out. See Figure  4 .11. This process resulted in a final item pool of 204.
3.2.2.3.4 Reviewing the Items
This item pool was then sent to three expert reviewers (R1, R2 and R3) to remove further
items from the pool. A set of instructions was issued to clarify what was needed, this involved
a  clarification of  what  concepts  were being measured  (religious  spiritual  and paranormal
belief), the issues of face validity and cross-cultural validity, and finally the item response
measure used (Likert Scale). R1, R2 and R3 were asked to respond with a mark in either the
yes or no column. Please see Table  4 .4. for their responses. One reviewer did respond with a




Figure 4.11. Flow Chart Showing Stage Three – Reducing the Items.
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Inter rater reliability (IRR) was established next. Several methods of IRR are available, such
as  Intraclass  Correlation  Coefficient,  Concordance  Correlation  Coefficient  and  Kohen’s
Kappa. However, since there were more than two raters and the data was nominal, Fliess’
Kappa was selected and there was ‘fair agreement’ (k =.366) between the 3 reviewers. Also,
Cohen’s Kappa revealed fair agreement between R1 and R2, moderate agreement between R1
and R3, and fair agreement between R2 and R3 (See  Table  4 .3)  (Landis & Koch, 1977).
However, it has been noted that the agreement can be effected by the number of items being
reviewed, therefore the actual agreement rate may be higher (Powers, 2012). Items that were
rejected included: ‘I believe I have personally exerted PK on at least one occasion’ and ‘I
have had at least one experience of telepathy between myself and another person’. The initial
item pool was 204. Items were kept if at least two or all three reviewers gave ‘yes’ answers,
otherwise the item was rejected, for frequencies and percentages see Table  4 .4. This left an
item pool of 71.

























Table 4.4. Table Showing the Frequency and Percentages of Reviewer 1, 2, and 3’s rating of 
the Initial 204 Items.










Yes 87 (42.6) 115 (56.4) 61 (29.9) 263 (43)
No 116 (56.9) 89 (43.6) 143 (70.1) 348 (56.9)
? 1 (.5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (.1)
Total 204 (100) 204 (100) 204 (100) 612 (100)
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The 71 remaining items were then sent to a further two reviewers. These two reviewers were
classed as ‘normal’. They should not be academics or have a research background in religion
or the paranormal. However, they should be able to identify the types of items that are related
to religious, spiritual and paranormal belief and give a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to each item based
on whether they considered it to be a measure of that particular concept. One male and one
female were selected and they were given a link to a survey on Qualtrics, which contained a
set of instructions and the item pool.
Table 4.5. Table Showing the Frequency and Percentages of Reviewer 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5’s 
Ratings of the Final 71 Items.













Yes 65 (91.5) 66 (93) 58 (81.7) 67 (94.4) 67 (94.4) 323 (91)
No 6 (8.5) 5 (7) 13 (18.3) 4 (5.6) 4 (5.6) 32 (9)
Total 71 (100) 71 (100) 71 (100) 71 (100) 71 (100) 355 (100)
Again, inter rater reliability was examined; in this instance, all five reviewers (three experts, 
two novices) were compared on their rating of the 71 items decided on by the initial reviewer 
process. For frequencies and percentages see Table  4 .5.
Table 4.6. Table Showing Inter Rate Reliability of the 71 Items Between Individual 
Reviewers.
Cohen's Kappa (Percentage)
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
R1 1 -.08 (84.5) -.13 (73.2) -.07 (85.9) -.07 (85.9)
R2 -.08 (84.5) 1 -.14 (74.6) -.07 (87.3) .18 (90.1)
R3 -.13 (73.2) -.14 (74.6) 1 .03 (78.9) .03 (78.9)
R4 -.07 (85.9) -.07 (87.3) .03 (78.9) 1 .47 (94.4)
R5 .07 (85.9) .18 (90.1) .03 (78.9) .47 (94.4) 1
Fliess’ Kappa was used and was found to be very low with no agreement being indicated
(k=-.013),  however,  the  pairwise  average  of  the  samples  indicated  an  83.4% agreement
overall, with an average Cohen's Kappa of k=.02 indicating slight agreement. Cohen’s Kappa
was also carried out on all five reviewers and their rating of the 71 items and cross-compared
them with each other (see Table  4 .6.). The majority showed no agreement (R1, R2, R3, R4)
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when compared with each other. R4 and R3 did show a slight agreement, however, as did R5,
who showed slight agreement with R1, R2 and R3. R5 and R4 showed the highest with a fair
agreement (Landis & Koch, 1977). Again, a note of caution should be added. Despite the low
Kappa scores, the percentage of agreement is relatively high; the high number of items and
raters could pose a problem for the use of the Kappa measurement (Powers, 2012). Only two
items were rejected by both novices and not by the experts, these were ‘Every human being is
a member of the cosmos' and ‘god is the cosmic mind’ and ‘There is a great deal we have yet
to understand about the mind of man, so it is likely that many phenomena (such as ESP) will
one day be proven to exist’. Despite the low Kappa scores, this shows a reasonable amount of
agreement between the experts and the novices and establishes that the items the experts
chose have a reasonable amount of face validity when reviewed by novices.
3.2.2.3.5 Item Response format
A seven point Likert scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree)
including  a  midpoint  of  four  (uncertain)  was  selected  due  to  previous  use  on  the  rPBS
(Tobacyk, 2004). The inclusion of the midpoint can be problematic, however, the differences
are seen to be negligible (Armstrong, 1987); in this case indication of a relatively high level
of belief when a participant is supposed to be ‘uncertain’. Also, the midpoint can be useful in
terms of item assessment. If the item scores high on ‘uncertain’ over a number of participants,
then it could indicate a problem with the item.
3.2.2.4 Procedure
Once the participants had been recruited, they were either emailed the link to the survey or
they were provided with the link via Twitter of Facebook. The survey was hosted on Qualtrics
provided by the University of Derby’s Psychology Department. On the survey's landing page,
the participants were briefed, and asked questions regarding consent and a series of questions
regarding demographics. The final page of the survey debriefed the participant.
3.2.2.5 Ethics
When conducting research into belief, is it important that such research is mindful of ethical
issues due to the potential sensitivity of the subject (Johnson, Ridley, & Nielsen, 2000) and
online studies can present further issues such participants not being supported if they have an
emotional reaction to questions  (Kraut et al., 2004). In order to address such ethical issues
British Psychological Society (2006) guidelines were followed regarding:  consent, a form
was provided at the start of the online survey containing a summary of the study enabling
them to provide informed consent. Secondly, in both the brief and throughout each of the
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questionnaires it was reiterated that there were ‘no right or wrong answers’. Thirdly, a debrief
was  given  at  the  end  of  the  survey  providing  further  details  on  the  study’s  aims  and
objectives, and further support, advice and contact details if needed. Fourthly, participants
were advised in the brief and debrief of their right to withdraw from the study at any time. In
addition, the participants were made aware in the brief and the debrief that they could ask for
advice at any time. The researcher did not give advice beyond their area and was prepared to
refer participants to an appropriate medical health professional if necessary. Finally, data was
stored confidentially, securely (password protected, secure HTTP) and anonymously by the
use of the participant generated unique ID code.
Ethical  approval  for  this  study  was  received  from  the  University  of  Derby  Psychology
Research Ethics Committee.
3.2.2.6 Analysis
An Exploratory Factor Analysis was run on the 71 items that were generated to establish item
redundancy and initial factor groupings in the proposed scale.
3.2.3 Results
3.2.3.1 Data normality 
An  Exploratory  Factor  Analysis  was  conducted  on  71  items  to  establish  a  measure  of
supernatural belief. Initially the data was examined for the factorability of the correlation
matrix, normality and sampling adequacy. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure demonstrated a
marvellous (Field, 2013; Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) sampling adequacy for the analysis
(KMO=.975). Also, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (Χ2  (2485) = 31644.398, p < .
001) showing that the correlations in the matrix were significantly different form zero and
therefore factorable. Despite there being a slightly greater ratio of 5:1 participants to items as
recommended by (Gorsuch, 1983) the combination of the two measures shows that the data
are highly factorable. Due to the factorability of the data, the sampling being adequate and
the lack of violation to the data Factor Analysis using the Maximum Likelihood technique
was  selected.  This  method  allows  for  correlations  between  factors,  an  oblique  rotation
method (Direct Oblimin) was selected for the same reason. This revealed an eight factor
solution based on Kaiser’s criterion of Eigenvalues > 1 and a three factor solution based on a
scree plot. Before further interpretation was attempted, items were chosen for removal.
3.2.3.2 Item Reduction
Cronbach’s Alpha was used initially to test the scale's internal reliability. This was classed as
good internal consistency with  α=.981. Items that had an Item-Total Correlation of  r < .2
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were considered for  removal  (Velicer  & Fava,  1998).  However,  analysis  showed that  the
lowest value was r = .396. No items were removed at this stage. The communalities on three
items were low with an r < .4 and should be considered for removal (Velicer & Fava, 1998).
One item was below .2 (r=.164), ‘The existence of an afterlife can never be scientifically
demonstrated, for it is impossible to...’; also, this item did not load onto any of the eight
factors and was deleted. Two items had values of .294 and .25, respectively: ‘As a general
rule, a fortune teller's predictions which come true are the result of coincidence’ and ‘Mind
reading is not possible’. These two items were carried over to the next stage of the analysis.
Further  items  were  considered  for  reduction  using  the  correlation  matrix.  The  initial
correlation  matrix  was  examined  for  multicollinearity.  Correlations  greater  than  .8  were
marked and 29 items were examined to establish which could be deleted based on repetition
(Rockwell, 1975). For example, the item ‘The soul continues to exist though the body may
die’ and ‘Everyone has an immortal soul’ had a correlation of  .816; the former item was
deleted due to the later item being considered to be a better measurement of the concept. In
total 20 items were deleted; leaving 51 items.
3.2.3.3 Main Analysis
The  Factor  Analysis  was  re-run  on  51  items.  Again  the  sampling  adequacy  was  good
(KMO=.971) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (Χ2 (1275) = 18437.582, p < .0001)
showing  that  the  correlations  in  the  matrix  were  significantly  different  from  zero  and
therefore factorable. Again, Factor Analysis using the Maximum Likelihood technique was
selected using the Direct Oblimin oblique rotation method. Cronbach’s Alpha showed good
internal  consistency (α=.973)  with  no items requiring  further  scrutiny  and communalities
were all > .2. However, the pattern matrix after rotation, suggested that further items should
be removed. Six items had loadings of < .4, not loading onto any factor and were removed,
for example ‘I believe that mind can control matter’ had a loading of .36. Also, the item ‘I
think about how my life is part of a larger spiritual force’ cross-loaded onto factors one and
two, and was also deleted. Altogether this led to a further seven items being deleted.
 
The  Factor  Analysis  was  run  again  on  44  items,  the  sampling  adequacy  was  good
(KMO=.969) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was significant (Χ2 (946) =16003.949, p < .0001)
showing  that  the  correlations  in  the  matrix  were  significantly  different  from  zero  and
therefore factorable. Again, Factor Analysis using the Maximum Likelihood technique was
selected using the Direct Oblimin oblique rotation method. Cronbach’s Alpha showed good
internal  consistency (α=.972)  with  no items requiring  further  scrutiny  and communalities
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were all > .2. The ‘Everyone has an immortal soul’ item loading dropped to .394 but being
just below .4 threshold and having strong theoretical importance, it was retained.
Kaiser’s criterion for Eigenvalues presented a five factor solution, whilst the scree plot (see
Figure  4 .12) suggested a three factor solution. Three, four and five factor solutions were run
but items mostly loaded onto the first two factors indicating the models were under factored.
Based on the Eigenvalues and previous research that suggested for example that the rPBS has
as many as seven factors, the five factor solution was favoured and forced. See  for the factor
loading after rotation. The five factors are interpreted as follows: Factor one – ‘mental and
psychic phenomena’; factor two – ‘religious belief’; factor three – ‘psychokinesis’; factor
four – ‘supernatural entities’ and factor five – ‘common paranormal perceptions’.
Figure 4.12. Scree Plot Showing Eigenvalues and Factor Numbers.
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I believe that it is possible to send a ‘mental message to
another  person,  or  in  some  way  influence  them  at  a
distance,  by  means  other  than  the  normal  channels  of
communication.
.793     
There is a great deal we have yet to understand about the
mind, so it is likely that many phenomena (such as Extra
Sensory  Perception  (ESP)  will  one  day  be  proven  to
exist.
.723     
There  is  such  a  thing  as  telepathy  (communication
directly from mind to mind).
.720     
I  am convinced that  thought  transference actually does
work.
.696     
Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) is an unusual gift  that
many persons have and should not be confused with the
elaborate trick of entertainers.
.669     
Every  person  has  an  aura  (a  mysterious  energy  field,
usually invisible, surrounding the body).
.653     
There  is  both  a  spiritual  as  well  as  a  natural  side  to
reality.
.579     
I  believe that a person's  deeds are stored in his or her
'‘karma'.
.553     
There  are  some  objects  or  places  that  have  a  special
spiritual  meaning,  for  instance  being  surrounded  by  a
certain type of energy.
.518     
Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the
future.
.515    
Reincarnation does occur. .487     
I  believe  psychic  phenomena  are  real  and  should  be
studied scientifically.
.476     
Some  people  have  a  mysterious  ability  to  accurately
predict such things as natural disasters, election results,
political assassinations etc.
.454    
During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit
can leave the body.
.434     
There is a spiritual realm besides the physical one. .425    
Everyone has an immortal soul. .394    
Religion gives meaning to my life.  .958    
My religious belief is an important part of who I am as a
person.
 .833    
Religious  belief  is  better  than  logic  for  solving  life's
important problems.
 .806    
In my life, I experience the presence of the divine.  .781    
I believe in God.  .660   
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My spiritual belief affects absolutely every aspect of my
life.
 .628    
God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to
happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed.
 .577   
There are individuals who are messengers of God.  .571   
God has given some people the power to heal the sick.  .542   
Every human being is a member of the cosmos and ‘God
is the cosmic mind.
 .506    
Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through
mental forces.
  -.883   
There  is  such  a  thing  as  levitation  (raising  the  body
through mental power).
  -.707   
Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic
powers, does exist.
  -.704   
Some  men  and  women  can  find  missing  persons  by
swinging a pendulum over a map.
  -.453  
There  exist  evil,  personal  spiritual  beings,  whom  we
might call demons.
   -.675  
There is a devil.    -.644  
Black magic really exists.    -.493  
There  exist  good  personal  spiritual  beings,  whom  we
might call angels.
   -.492  
I firmly believe that ghosts or spirits do exist.    -.457
I believe that there is a divine plan and purpose for every
living being and thing.
  -.451  
A Supreme Being exists.   -.447  
In  spite  of  what  many people  think,  card  reading,  for
example tarot cards, can tell a lot about a person and their
future.
    -.644
Some psychics can accurately predict the future.     -.565
Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.     -.559
Some buildings are haunted.    -.511
There are such things as poltergeists (spirits which signal
their presence by moving objects or making noises).
   -.457
As  a  general  rule,  a  fortune  teller's  predictions  which
come true are the result of coincidence.
    .450
It is often possible to make valid personality judgements
about people by knowing their astrological sign.
    -.403
3.3 Discussion
Following  item reduction  and  factor  analysis  on  the  initial  71  items,  the  item pool  was
reduced to 44 items and a five factor solution was selected. The factors were labelled in the
following way: Factor one was named ‘mental and psychic phenomena’, because the items in
the factor related to such things as ESP or mental telepathy. Other phenomena were present in
this group, such as auras and reincarnation. Factor two was labelled ‘religious belief’. The
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items within this factor were focused mainly on religious belief and different aspects of God.
The third factor was named ‘psychokinesis’. This factor had items that related to concepts
such as levitation or the movement of objects using the mind. The fourth factor was named
‘supernatural entities’. The items within this factor seemed to relate to spiritual beings such as
demons,  angels  or  a  supreme  being.  The  fifth  and  final  factor  was  named  ‘common
paranormal  perceptions’ and  includes  items  that  relate  to  haunting  or  poltergeists  for
example. The five factor solution differed from previous measures mainly because the items
chosen only measured belief. While the new scale measures supernatural belief, the closest
comparison scale would be the rPBS. The original seven factors ascribed to the rPBS by
(Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk, 1988) differ from the new scale in some key ways. The first is the
number of factors; the new scale has five whereas the original rPBS had seven. However, a
five factor solution for the rPBS has been proposed (Lawrence, 1995a; Lawrence & Cicco,
1997; Lawrence et  al.,  1997) and other scales have had similar factor numbers.  The five
factors of the new scale will be examined individually.
3.3.1 Factor One - Mental and Psychic Phenomena.
The first factor has 16 items, some of which are similar to items on the ASGS (Thalbourne,
1995) factor that deals with extrasensory experiences. This has more aspects of this type of
phenomena than the rPBS, however, the overlap is mainly found on the spiritualism subscale.
This factor is more in line with Lange et al.'s (2000) purification of the rPBS which places
these kinds of items in the ‘new age’ subscale. Also, this factor deals with precognition which
is in line with the rPBS’s (Tobacyk, 2004) seven factor solution’s subscale of ‘precogniton’.
Lastly the factor has an element of spirituality. One interesting aspect of this factor is that it is
consolidating items that have been used previously as separate factors on a scale like the
rPBS.
3.3.2 Factor Two – Religious Belief.
This factor has 10 items and is made up of a majority of items that refer to religion, God or
the divine in some respect. This is in line with the ‘traditional religious belief’ subscale on the
rPBS, and is a more robust measure of religious belief than the rPBS’s factor due to there
being more items. Since the items are all associated with belief, this factor was aligned with
subscales on religiosity scales that deal with intrinsic religiosity (G.W. Allport & Ross, 1967)
and also quest  (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991). Although at least two of the items could be
argued to be more spiritual in nature (‘my spiritual belief affects absolutely every aspect of
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my life’ and ‘every human being is a member of the cosmos and ‘God is the cosmic mind’).
However, some intrinsic religiosity subscales  (Hills et al., 2005) have these types of items
and this further shows the understandable overlap between religious and spiritual type beliefs.
This factor is also in line with the Metaphysical Chauvinism (Beck & Miller, 2001) theory
and also previous research that delineates between religious and paranormal belief (Schofield
et al., 2016). 
3.3.3 Factor Three – Psychokinesis.
The third factor  has four  items and the majority  are  clearly linked to  psychokinesis  (psi
kappa). This is similar to the ‘psi’ subscale on the rPBS (Tobacyk, 2004) and items on the
ASGS (Thalbourne, 1995). Three of the items on this factor are related in this way and the
only item that does not appear to fit is ‘some men and women can find missing persons by
swinging a pendulum over a map’. However, it could be argued that the mind is influencing
the pendulum to move, thus putting it in line with the other items in the factor.
3.3.4 Factor Four - Supernatural Entities.
The fourth factor has seven items that are mainly linked with ‘entities’. Rather than just being
life after death, the beliefs here are related to separate sentient beings. This has been covered
by religiosity scales (Hills et al., 2005) and the Supernatural Belief Scale (Jong, Bluemke, &
Halberstadt,  2013).  One  of  the  items  has  to  do  with  ghosts  and  could  be  classed  as
paranormal and would arguably be better placed in the ‘common paranormal perceptions’
subscale but this item does indicate a belief in life after death. Finally, one item relates to
black magic and has been placed in this factor due to its connotation of witchcraft and devil
worship (indicating the existence of an entity by inference). Again, it is interesting to note
that spirituality type items ‘I believe that there is a divine plan and purpose for every living
being and thing’ are present within this subscale too. This factor has items that relate to both
religious and paranormal constructs. 
3.3.5 Factor Five - Common Paranormal Perceptions.
The fifth and final factor has seven items and like the first factor of this scale, ‘mental and
psychic  phenomena’,  has  a  mixture  of  paranormal  beliefs  when  compared  to  other
paranormal  scales.  The  items  have  mainly  to  do  with  precognition  and  haunting.  The
precognition items are similar to the items in the ‘precognition‘ subscale on the seven factor
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rPBS and the ‘Traditional Paranormal Beliefs’ subscale on Lange et al.'s (2000) purification
of the rPBS. Unlike the precognitive items in the ‘mental and psychic phenomena’ factor, the
items here deal with the method of predicting the future, such as astrology and tarot cards.
However, there is some overlap in relation to reference to psychic phenomena. Also, these
types of items have been linked together on other scales such as Otis & Alcock's (1982)
Extraordinary  Beliefs  Inventory. Although  the  rPBS  does  not  refer  to  either  ghosts  or
poltergeists specifically, despite these being staples of paranormal/supernatural belief.
While the majority of the items make the groups discreet, there is some overlap of items
within four of the factors. The ‘mental and psychic phenomena’ and ‘common paranormal
perceptions’ factors both had items relating to precognition. It would seem that the difference
between  the  factors'  precognitive  items  is  that  the  former  states  that  these  abilities  are
‘mysterious’ or ‘unexplained’, whilst the latter factor states that these abilities exist and offer
methods  by  which  the  predictions  are  arrived  at.  The  ‘mental  and  psychic  phenomena’,
‘religious  belief’ and ‘supernatural  entities’ factors also had items that  overlapped.  These
factors all  had items that  related to  spirituality.  The majority  of the items that  related to
spirituality were found in the first factor, ‘mental and psychic phenomena’, making it the
most ‘spiritual’ of the factors. The links between ESP and an increased interest in spirituality
have  been noted  (Kennedy  & Kanthamani,  1995;  Palmer,  1979),  also  the  mental  energy
aspects  to  the  factors  fall  in  line  with  other  ideas  surrounding  spirituality,  for  example,
‘auras’. The ‘religious belief’ factor has items that relate to spirituality; this is in line with the
acknowledged  overlap  between  religiosity  and  spirituality  (Zinnbauer  et  al.,  1997);  in
particular  the  intrinsic  notion  of  religiosity  (Marler  &  Hadaway,  2002).  Finally  the
‘supernatural  entities’ factor  has  two items  that  concern  spiritual  beings,  here  relating  to
angels  and  demons,  potentially  covering  both  religious  (reference  to  angels)  and
paranormal/religious  (reference  to  demons)  concepts.  The  links  between  religious  and
paranormal belief have been shown to be largely mixed (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007) and the
Metaphysical Chauvinism theory (Beck & Miller, 2001) and empirical studies (Schofield et
al.,  2016) have suggested that people believe in different ways depending on ‘what’ they
believe. The underlying link could be spiritual belief; the commonality between religious and
paranormal belief, and the concept that underpins them both. So rather than religiosity and




One potential criticism of the new scale could be that by measuring supernatural belief, it is
covering too much. The attempt to measure the three concepts of religious,  spiritual  and
paranormal belief could be the reason for the amount of overlap seen between the resulting
five factors. Conversely, by covering supernatural belief in such a broad fashion, paranormal
belief may have been constrained. Taking the rPBS as a general standard measure of global
paranormal belief, the exclusion of items relating to superstition and witchcraft, arguably put
the new scale at a disadvantage, despite the recognised problems with the items on the rPBS,
this alone is not a good enough reason for exclusion on the new scale. Also, the lack of a
subscale  that  measures  spirituality  alone  is  a  potential  problem,  however,  the  overlap  of
spirituality with other concepts might make this an impossible task. Finally, it remains to be
seen if the scale can measure unbelievers adequately. The new scale will need to be further
tested using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis  but should be a valuable research tool when
measuring the correlates of supernatural belief. Also, the subscales when used in conjunction
with a cluster analysis to group people according to what they believe (Schofield et al., 2016)
will prove to be a useful tool when comparing people who believe in different things.
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the creation of an item pool based on scales that measured religiosity,
spirituality and paranormality. This item pool was reduced from 71 item to 44 items. An EFA
was then conducted and a five factor solution was selected. Factor one was labelled ‘mental
and psychic phenomena’ because the items in the factor related to such things as ESP or
mental telepathy. Factor two was labelled ‘religious belief’, with the items focussing mainly
on religious belief and different aspects of God. Factor three was named ‘psychokinesis’.
This factor had items that related to concepts such as levitation or the movement of objects
using the mind. Factor four was named ‘supernatural entities’. The items within this factor
seemed to relate to supernatural beings such as demons, angels or a supreme being. Factor
five was named ‘common paranormal perceptions’ and includes items that relate to haunting
or poltergeists for example. The following chapter validates the scale that has been created.
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4 Chapter Five - A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Belief in
the Supernatural Scale.
The aim of this chapter is to conduct a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) on the BitSS
developed in study one using a fresh sample of participants. The test-retest reliability of this
scale was assessed by doing a three-month follow-up study of participants who took part in
the first part of study two. Comparisons were also made for convergent validity to the three
scales  used  by  Schofield  et  al.  (2016);  the  revised  Paranormal  Belief  Scale  (rPBS),  the
revised Religious Life Inventory (rRLI) and the Intrinsic Spirituality Scale (ISS). A cluster
analysis was conducted on the new scale to see if similar groups of believer could can be
identified to those found by Schofield et al. (2016) in support of Metaphysical Chauvinism
(Beck & Miller, 2001).
4.1 Introduction
The term ‘supernatural’ has been used in various contexts in research. Generally, it has been
used  in  studies  that  look  at  religion  to  refer  to  religion,  and  in  studies  that  look  at  the
paranormal to refer to the paranormal (J. Jong et al., 2012). Lindeman and Svedholm (2012)
posit  that  a tightening up of  the definitions  surrounding these concepts  is  needed and to
achieve this more empirical research surrounding these terms would go some way to solving
these problems. Schofield et al.'s (2016) study provided more empirical evidence to suggest
the need for religious and paranormal belief to be separated, and that placing religious belief
under the umbrella of paranormal belief might be causing problems when trying to establish a
person’s level of paranormal belief. They suggested that placing religious and paranormal
belief  under  the term ‘supernatural’ would keep the terms separate  but  at  the  same time
acknowledge  that  they  overlapped.  This  led  to  the  development  of  the  Belief  in  the
Supernatural scale (BitSS). This chapter will validate the BitSS and carry out a Confirmatory
Factor Analysis on the five factors of the scale, whilst also performing checks for reliability.
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The BitSS scale is a 44 item scale and it proposed to have five latent factors. these are:
‘mental and psychic phenomena; ‘religious belief’; ‘psychokinesis’; ‘supernatural entities’;
‘common paranormal perceptions’. The scale put the terms religious and paranormal under
the umbrella of supernatural. This is in line with Metaphysical Chauvinism (Beck & Miller,
2001),  the  theory  that  people  might  reject  a  belief  that  has  an  equal  amount  of  validity
because it does not fit with their worldview. The aim of the new scale was to create a measure
that  can  delineate  between  religious  and  paranormal  belief  and  successfully  capture  the
nuances of both; while also acknowledging the role of spiritual belief. Schofield et al. (2016)
used a cluster analysis to provide further empirical evidence that people believe in different
ways  and  identified  four  types  of  believer.  These  types  were:  ‘believers’,  ‘paranormal
believers’, ‘sceptics’ and ‘religious believers’. This was done on three separate scales that
measured religiosity, spirituality and paranormal belief and provided a method of separating
people that could be used in research when looking at the differences between these groups.
However,  using  the  three  scales  was  not  ideal  and  a  more  parsimonious  method  that
concentrated on belief only was needed. This led to the development of the BitSS scale in the
first study of this thesis and the model will be assessed using CFA.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis  is  a  statistical  technique that uses SEM to test  a  particular
model. Data are taken and compared to a model to assess ‘model fit’. This done by examining
fit  indices  that  measure  concepts  such  as  incremental,  absolute  and  predictive  fit.  For  a
successful model fit, the various values of the fit indices must meet certain criteria  (Hu &
Bentler,  1999), however, CFA is susceptible to certain conditions that might affect the fit
indices in a  certain way. The chi-square statistic  is  affected by sample size and may not
appear significant  if  the sample size is  too large  (Brown, 2015) and other fit  indices  are
affected by the complexity of the model proposed  (Hu & Bentler,  1999).  Sometimes the
criteria posited on the fit indices have been seen as quite strict, but they have also been seen
more as ‘rules of thumb’ that are guidelines rather than steadfast ‘cut offs’ (Worthington &
Whittaker, 2006). These fit indices should be taken in conjunction with previous theory and
research, and used in tandem when assessing the success of the proposed model.
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A Confirmatory Factor Analysis will be conducted using a fresh sample of people on the
BitSS that was developed in study one of this thesis. Reliability of this scale will also be
assessed by doing a three month follow up study of participants that took part in the first part
of  study  two.  Also,  comparisons  will  be  made  for  validity  to  the  three  scales  used  by
Schofield et al. (2016), the rPBS, the rRLI and the ISS. A cluster analysis will be done on the
new scale and the three that were previously used to see if similar groups can be identified.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Sample  sizes  for  a  CFA generally  range  from  100  to  200,  however  different  ways  of
calculating sample size have been offered; Bentler and Chou (1987) state there should be
between  five  and  10  participants  per  parameter,  but  Worthington  and  Whittaker  (2006)
suggest that 100 participants should be the absolute minimum. Participants (n= 318) were
recruited from the University of Derby (both on campus and online), social media (Facebook
and Twitter) using an opportunity sampling method. The age range was from 18 to 72 (mean
= 31.19, SD = 15.17). The gender of the participants was as follows: 75 (23.6%) males, 241
(75.8%) females and 2 (0.6%) preferred not to say. 255 (80.2%) identified as students, of
which 219 (68.9%) were undergraduates, 34 (10.7%) were postgraduates and 2 (.6%) were in
college or post-secondary school education. In total, 422, (four of which were duplicated)
people started the survey with 318 answering all the items, this shows a completion rate of
81.1%.
4.2.2 Materials
The following materials were used: An online survey tool (Qualtrics). Four questionnaires;
these measured supernatural, religious, spiritual and paranormal belief.
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4.2.2.1 Belief in the Supernatural Scale
The Belief in the Supernatural Scale (BitSS) was developed in study one of this thesis. The
scale has 44 items and five subscales. These subscales are: mental and psychic phenomena
(16 items), religious belief (10 items), psychokinesis (four items), supernatural entities (seven
items) and common paranormal perceptions (seven items). The item response format is a
seven point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The possible scores
range from 44 to 308. Items included ‘I believe that it is possible to send a mental message to
another person, or in some way influence them at a distance, by means other than the normal
channels of communication’, ‘There is both a spiritual as well as a natural side to reality’ and
‘Religion gives meaning to my life’. Item 39 is reverse scored.
4.2.2.2 Revised Religious Life Inventory
The Revised Religious  Life  Inventory  (rRLI)  (Hills  et  al.,  2005) has  24 items  and three
subscales. The subscales measure: Intrinsic religious belief (nine items), extrinsic religious
belief (seven items) and quest (eight items). The item response format is a seven point Likert
scale; the range of scores is from 24 to 168. No items were reverse scored. Items include: ‘As
I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change’, ‘If not prevented by
unavoidable circumstances,  I  attend church’ and ‘My religious beliefs are  what really lie
behind my whole approach to life’.
4.2.2.3 Intrinsic Spirituality Scale
The Intrinsic Spirituality Scale (ISS) (Hodge, 2003) has six items and no subscales; the item
response format  is  an 11 point  Likert  scale.  Items two,  four  and six are  reversed.  Items
include: ‘In terms of the questions I have about life, my spirituality answers’ and ‘When I am
faced with an important decision, my spirituality’. The item response format is also tailored
for  each item,  for  example:  ‘0  plays  absolutely  no  role’ to  ‘10 is  always  the  overriding
consideration’. Scores range from 0 to 60.
4.2.2.4 Revised Paranormal Belief Scale
The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (rPBS) (Tobacyk ,1988:2004) is a 26 items scale that
consists of seven subscales;  precognition, spiritualism, witchcraft, psi, traditional religious
belief  (4  items  each),  superstition  and extraordinary  life  forms (3  items  each).  The item
response format is seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree), giving a range of scores from 26 to 182. Item 23 is reversed. Items include: ‘Black
cats can bring bad luck’, ‘The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists’ and ‘Some people have
an unexplained ability to predict the future’.
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Subscale scores for all scales should be averaged. For Cronbach’s α Coefficients of all scales
and subscales see 
. For the full scales see appendix 5.1.2 to 5.1.5.
4.2.3 Procedure
After participants had been recruited, they were emailed details of the study and a link to the
online survey that was hosted at www.qualtrics.com. The participants were then briefed with
details of the study and presented with the right to withdraw, anonymity and confidentiality.
They were presented with a question asking if they agreed and wanted to participate. They
were then asked to create a unique ID code. Demographic data was then taken: age, gender,
religious belief, occupation and education. The four questionnaires (BitSS, ISS, RRLI and
rPBS), were presented in a random order for each participant for counterbalancing. The final
page of the survey was a debrief explaining the study, restating the right to withdraw, and
asking if they would participate in a three-month follow-up* study. After three months, a new
survey with a brief, debrief and the BitSS survey was emailed to the participants who had
agreed to take part.
Table 5.8.  BitSS ISS, rRLI and rPBS Scales and Subscales Cronbach’s α Coefficients. 
Previous research: ISS (Hodge, 2003), RRLI (Hills et al., 2005) and RPBS (Tobacyk, 2004).










 n = 6
RRLI Items
0.93 0.93




Subscales   
Mental and Psychic Phenomena (BitSS) items
N/A 0.97
n=16











Common Paranormal Perceptions (BitSS) items
N/A 0.90
n=7
Intrinsic Belief (RRLI) Items
0.93 0.77
 n = 9
Extrinsic Belief (RRLI) Items
0.76 0.9
 n  = 7
Quest (RRLI) Items
0.83 0.89
 n  = 8
Traditional Religious Belief (RPBS) Items
0.58 0.85
 n  = 4
Psi Belief (RPBS) Items
0.70 0.86
 n  = 4
Witchcraft (RPBS) Items
0.80 0.88
 n  = 4
Superstition (RPBS) Items
0.73 0.82
 n  = 3
Spiritualism (RPBS) Items
0.69 0.90
 n = 4
Extraordinary Life Forms (RPBS) Items
0.55 0.62
 n  = 3
Precognition (RPBS) Items
0.62 0.86
 n = 4
4.2.4 Ethics
As  per  Chapter  Four  British  Psychological  Society  (2006)  guidelines  were  followed
regarding informed consent and confidentiality.
Ethical  approval  for  this  study  was  received  from  the  University  of  Derby  Psychology
Research Ethics Committee.
4.2.5 Analysis
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed on the data from the BitSS Scale. Further
tests of validity were carried out using correlations and two cluster analysis and reliability





A Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted on the proposed ‘Belief in the Supernatural’
scale. The parameters were formed by an earlier Exploratory Factor Analysis (See chapter
four). The scale consists of 44 items that are theorised to make up five latent factors. The data
was analysed for normality. Sampling adequacy was ‘marvellous’ (Field, 2013; Hutcheson &
Sofroniou,  1999) according  to  the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin  measure  (KMO=.968).  The
correlation matrix was also seen to be factorable due to Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was
highly significant (Χ2 (946) = 14289.47, p < .0001). Also, the sample size was greater than 200
(N=318) and therefore according to  Worthington and Whittaker (2006) was deemed more
than adequate. Based on the above, the Maximum Likelihood method was adopted as the
estimator. The first variable in each subscale was set as one for data scaling purposes.
Initially the data was screened for Heywood Cases. There were no negative error variances
and none of the Squared Multiple Correlations (SMCS) exceeded 1. Factor loadings were
examined and deemed as being adequate, the lowest value being item 39 (r² = .271).
Table 5.9. Table Showing Fit Indices for the BitSS Scale.












0.129 0.116 0.663 0.646 0.624
Cut off Values 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999) N/A N/A >.05 <= 0.06 <= 0.08 >=0.95 >=0.95 >=0.95
A number of measures of fit were examined (See Table  5 .9) taken from various types of fit
indices including: Overall fit (chi-square) absolute fit (SRMR, RMSEA) and incremental fit
(NFI, CFI, TLI). All of the fit indices were beyond the recommended thresholds. While Kline
(Kline, 2011) state that these thresholds are ‘marginal’, and the value of the Χ2 indices being
suspect  (Gerbing & Anderson, 1985) the indices indicated the possibility  of  the data  not




Standardised  residuals  were  examined  to  further  identify  localised  areas  of  strain.  The
correlations  of  the  standardised  residuals  were  investigated  for  values  >.2  (Kline,  2011).
Eighteen of the items had values >.2, 13 items were only correlated with one other (13, 19,
26, 6, 9, 35, 16, 3, 7, 20, 29, 34, 41), three correlated with two items (36, 1, 2), one item
correlated with three (43), and one item correlated with seven others (31). An examination of
the z correlation table showed that these values were significant, the typical cut off value for
this is >1.96 for significance of .05 or >2.58 for a significance of .01 (Harlow, 2014). For a
diagram of factor loadings and error residuals see Figure  5 .13.
The modification indices also highlighted some areas of change that could help improve the
model fit indices. Item 2 seems to be problematic with the modification indices improving fit
if it were to be loaded onto more than one factor (common paranormal perceptions, mental
and psychic phenomena and religious belief). Also, item 31 could also improve model fit by
loading onto religious belief and supernatural entities. Further items could co-vary, such as
items 13 and 36, 8 and 10, and 29 and 41. Based on the above, several items have been
identified for possible removal and scale respecification.
4.3.1.1 Scale Respecification.
The following items based on the variance, localised areas of strain and modification indices
have been identified for possible removal. Items, 39, 43, 31 and 2, were removed one by one,
see Table  5 .10 for the fit indices at each stage of the respecification.
Table 5.10. Table Showing Fit Indices for the BitSS Scale at Each Stage of Respecification.
Item
removed
















0.084 0.825 0.814 0.780
31 2988.431 769 <.001 0.095
(0.092
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0.078 0.844 0.833 0.799
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Figure 5.13. Diagram Showing Loadings and Error Residuals of the BitSS.
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Correlations Between Scales and Subscales
For the correlations between the scales and subscales see Table  5 .11.
Table 5.11 . Table Showing Correlations Between Scales and Subscales (** p< .01, * p<.05, two tailed).
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Belief in the Supernatural Scale                    
Intrinsic Spirituality Scale 0.67**                   
Revised Religious Life Scale 0.56** 0.66**                  
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale 0.91** 0.52** 0.40**                 
BitSS Mental and Psychic
Phenomena
0.95** 0.56** 0.42** 0.89**                
BitSS Religious Belief 0.75** 0.74** 0.77** 0.56** 0.54**               
BitSS Psychokenisis 0.83** 0.47** 0.31** 0.84** 0.80** 0.46**              





0.86** 0.44** 0.27** 0.88** 0.86** 0.41** 0.80** 0.73**            
RRLI Extrinsic 0.44** 0.05** 0.87** 0.32** 0.32** 0.62** 0.21** 0.46** 0.21**           
RRLI Intrinsic 0.59** 0.73** 0.88** 0.40** 0.41** 0.85** 0.33** 0.60** 0.27** 0.66**          
RRLI Quest 0.43** 0.51** 0.89** 0.34** 0.35** 0.55** 0.24** 0.44** 0.22** 0.72** 0.61**         
rPBS Traditional Religious Belief 0.77** 0.62** 0.62** 0.69** 0.61** 0.83** 0.47** 0.87** 0.51** 0.50** .67** 0.44**        
rPBS Psi 0.77** 0.45** 0.32** 0.84** 0.77** 0.43** 0.89** 0.62** 0.73** 0.22** 0.33** 0.27** 0.45**       
rPBS Witchcraft 0.77** 0.50** 0.40** 0.85** 0.74** 0.48** 0.74** 0.72** 0.72** 0.28** 0.40** 0.35** 0.54** 0.72**      
rPBS Superstition 0.29** 0.00 -0.04 0.49** 0.28** 0.05 0.26** 0.28** 0.41** 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.24** 0.25** 0.28**     
rPBS Spiritualism 0.85** 0.48** 0.28** 0.89** 0.90** 0.42** 0.76** 0.72** 0.84** 0.20** 0.28** 0.24** 0.53** 0.73** 0.72** 0.34**    
rPBS Extraordinary Life Forms 0.42** 0.13* 0.16** 0.59** 0.45** 0.16** 0.47** 0.35** 0.42** 0.15** 0.07 0.21** 0.28** 0.47** 0.43** 0.32** 0.47**   




Two cluster analyses were performed to see if the BitSS scale offered further clarity to the
four cluster groups posited by Schofield et al. (2016). The first analysis used the three scales:
ISS, rRLI and the rPBS; the second used the subscales from the BitSS.
4.3.2.1 ISS, rRLI and rPBS Four Cluster Solution
For descriptive statistics and ANOVA values see Table  5 .12. A hierarchical cluster analysis
was performed on the ISS rRLI and rPBS scales. Z-scores were used to normalise the data of
the three scales. Due to optimising minimum variances between the clusters, Ward’s method
was selected (Ward Jr, 1963).
Table 5.12. The Mean (And Standard Deviation) z-Scores for The Four Clusters. The ANOVA
f Values and Significance Levels for the ISS, rRLI and rPBS Scales.




 (n =102, 32.08%)
Cluster 3
 (n =49, 15.41%)
Cluster 4
 (n =34, 10.69%)
f (3,314) p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
ISS -.88 (.58) .91 (.66) .04 (.61) .67 (.48) 189.17 <.001
rRLI -.85 (.58) .89 (.66) -.23 (.59) .94 (.42) 193.35 <.001
rPB
S
-.78 (.73) .98 (.53) .51 (.42) -.61 (.36) 189.17 <.001
Figure 5.14. Graph Showing the Last 10 Merged Squared Agglomeration Distances and the 
Cluster Merges of the ISS, rRLI and rPBS Scales.
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The  dendrogram  (see  Figure   5  .14),  did  not  conclusively  indicate  the  cluster  number,
however, based on previous research and for comparison purposes, a four cluster solution was
selected. Assumption of equality of variance using Levene’s Test was met in for the variables
ISS (=.19) and rRLI (=.24), however, rPBS (<.001) did not meet the assumption. Box’s test
was also significant (<.001). Due to the sample size, the following probability values can be
accepted (Tabachnick et al., 2007). The four cluster solution was internally validated using a
one-way  MANOVA (IV1 =  4  ×  clusters;  DV1(ISS), DV2(rRLI) and  DV3(rPBS)).  This  showed  a
significant  difference  between  the  scales  and  that  the  model  accounted  for  64% of  the
variance (F(9) = 128.97, p < .001, Wilks Λ = 0.11).  A one-way ANOVA and post hoc Tukey
HSD examined the squared Euclidian difference between each cluster (see Table  5 .12). The
majority  of  which were significant  apart  from the ISS and rRLI,  the  difference between
cluster 2 and 4 (both >.05) and the rPBS, no significant difference between clusters 1 and 4
(=.83). For a graph of the z-scores of the scale within the clusters see Figure  5 .15.
Figure 5.15. Mean z-Scores for the Scales of the ISS, rRLI and rPBS and their Respective 
Cluster Membership.
4.3.2.2 BitSS Four Cluster Solution
For descriptive statistics and ANOVA values see Table  5 .13. A Hierarchical Cluster analysis
was performed on the ISS rRLI and rPBS scales. Z-scores were used to normalise the data of
the three scales. Due to optimising minimum variances between the clusters, Ward’s method
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was selected  (Ward Jr, 1963).  Again, a Hierarchical Cluster analysis was performed on the
subscales of the BitSS, Ward’s method was used on the z score of the five subscales.
Table 5.13. The Mean (and Standard Deviation) Z-Scores for the Four Clusters. The ANOVA 
f Values and Significance Levels for the Five Subscales of the BitSS.




 (n =127, 39.94%)
Cluster 3
 (n =105, 33.02%)
Cluster 4
 (n =25, 7.86%)
f (3,314) p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Mental and Psychic Phenomena
.24 (.37) .88 (.49) -1.16 (.53) -.17 (.53) 343.65 <.001
Religious Belief
-.43 (.51) .64 (.87) -.85 (.28) 1.42 (.58) 155.52 <.001
Psychokinesis
-.17 (.54) .99 (.70) -.94 (.19) -.66 (.41) 277.47 <.001
Supernatural Entities
-.15 (.54) .85 (.61) -1.08 (.40) .60 (.72) 248.93 <.001
Common Paranormal
Perceptions .18 (.50) .90 (.63) -1.02 (.42) -.75 (.47) 269.17 <.001
Figure 5.16. Graph Showing the Last 10 Merged Squared Agglomeration Distances and the 
Cluster Merges the Five Subscales of the BitSS.
The  dendrogram  (see  Figure   5  .16)  indicates  at  least  three  clusters,  but  again,  for
comparative purposes a four cluster solution was used. Levene’s Test was significant (<.05)
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for all five subscales violating the assumption of equality and Box’s Test was also significant,
but the probability values were accepted again due to the sample size  (Tabachnick et al.,
2007).
The four Cluster solution was internally validated using a  one-way MANOVA (IV1 = 4 ×
clusters; DV1(MPP), DV2(RB), DV3(PK),  DV4(SE) and DV5(CPP)). This showed a significant difference
between the scales and that the model accounted for an average of 70% of the variance (F(15)
= 90.23, p < .001, Wilks Λ = 0.07).  A one-way ANOVA and post hoc Tukey HSD examined
the squared Euclidian difference between each cluster (see  Table  5 .13). The majority of
which were significant apart from: PK difference between cluster 3 and 4 (=.08) and the CPP,
difference between clusters 3 and 4 (=.11). For a graph of the z-scores of the scale within the
clusters see Figure  5 .17. 




4.3.3 Three Month Follow up Study
Figure 5.18. Graph Showing Relationship between the BitSS totals at the Study Date and 
Three Months After.
After three months, a follow-up survey that consisted of the 44 item BitSS survey was sent
out  to  the  106  participants  who  agreed  to  the  follow-up.  Of  the  106  participants,  93
completed the survey, and 67 of those were matched to the initial study by their ID code. The
total scores of the BitSS on the initial,  and the three month follow survey show a strong
positive and significant correlation (r=0.88, n=67, p < .001), see Figure  5 .18. This indicates
that the BitSS scale has an excellent test- retest reliability.
4.4 Discussion
A CFA was used to further test the model proposed by the EFA in study one. The five factor
model of supernatural belief  was tested.  The factors tested were as follows: ‘Mental  and
Psychic  Phenomena’,  ‘Religious  Belief’,  ‘Psychokinesis’,  ‘Supernatural  Entities’  and
‘Common Paranormal Perceptions’. The fit indices showed that the data were not a perfect
match to the model, with many of the fit indices values being marginally beyond recommend
limits. Model respecification was examined and the changes produced small differences in
the fit indices values and further changes to the model were therefore rejected. The model
was  also  correlated  with  three  other  measures.  These  measures  were  for  spirituality,
religiosity and paranormal belief. The BitSS scale highly correlated with the scale measuring
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paranormal belief, and moderately with the other two scales. The ‘Religious Belief’ subscale
correlated  highly  with  the  religiosity  scale  and  the  remaining  subscales  on  the  BitSS
correlated  highly  with  the  paranormal  belief  measure.   The  spirituality  scale  showing  a
moderate correlation for all susbcales apart from ‘Psychokinesis’ and ‘Common Paranormal
Perceptions’. Further to this, two cluster analyses were carried out on: the three scales to
measure spirituality, religiosity and paranormal belief, and the subscales of the BitSS. The
cluster analyses showed that the groups posited by  Schofield et al. (2016) were supported,
and in turn this supported the five factor model of the BitSS scale. Finally, the BitSS scale
showed  good  test  retest  reliability  with  a  three  month  follow up  study  showing  a  high
correlation.
Once again,  the  distinction  between the  paranormal  and the  religious  has  been clarified,
particularly because the BitSS scale deals with belief only. This has rectified some of the
confusion in previous studies  (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007) when other  constructs such as
behaviour or experience have been dealt with. This study further adds credence to the need
for religious and paranormal being distinguished from each other but at the same time being
allowed to overlap under the term supernatural belief. However, it has been acknowledged
that there are methodological concerns with how religiosity has been measured in the past
(Hill & Maltby, 2009) and the need for a scale that can cover a wide remit of belief and yet
still capture the nuanced nature of supernatural belief. This scale deals with that problem, and
goes  someway  to  confirming  the  separation  of  religious  and  paranormal  belief  and
strengthening some of the proposed definitions.  The correlation of the ‘Religious  Belief’
subscale on the BitSS and the rRLI shows the scale is capturing religious belief well, but it is
interesting to note that the subscale does not correlate well with the rPBS. This could be due
to the rPBS having a subscale that capture religious belief itself. 
The cluster analysis  also provided some key information that further validated the BitSS
scale. The initial analysis confirmed the four group’s posited by  Schofield et al. (2016) by
using the rPBS, rRLI and the ISS, and the second cluster analysis used the BitSS and came up
with similar groups.  However, the new subscales offered a greater definition of the groups,
without losing clarity due to there being too many variables. The two groups of religious
believers and paranormal believers were apparent, with religious believers exhibiting higher
scores in ‘religious belief’ and ‘supernatural entities’ subscales, with the latter  containing
items relating to angels and demons. The paranormal believers exhibiting higher scores in the
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‘mental and psychic phenomena’ and ‘common paranormal perceptions’ subscales. The BitSS
can not only replicate the four groups, but also adds further detail that helps to interpret the
nature of  the groups,  whilst  eliminating the noise created by having too many variables.
However, this model, having five subscales and a total of 44 items, is arguably a complex
one. 
While the CFA showed that the data did not fit the model perfectly, there may be reasons for
this. Chi-square is affected by large sample size (Brown, 2015), and the sample in this study
being greater than 200 is arguably large. Model complexity also plays a role as the more
complex the model,  the less likely some of the fit indices are to fall  within the accepted
boundaries. The model being tested has 44 items and five factors and could be considered to
be very complex. Moreover, the fit indices are often described as thresholds but according to
Hu  and  Bentler  (1999) they  should  be  used  as  ‘rules  of  thumb’ rather  than  ‘cut  offs’.
Therefore the sample size, model complexity and the assertion that the indices are just rules
of  thumb,  suggesting  that  although  the  model  is  not  a  perfect  fit,  it  is  nonetheless  an
acceptable fit. More importantly the findings are in line with previous theory (Beck & Miller,
2001) and research (Schofield et al., 2016). The scale also shows good validity, correlating
highly with the rPBS, and moderately with the rRLI. Further than this, compared to the three
scales used in the cluster analysis, the BitSS subscales when used in a cluster analysis based
on four groups of belief show a good amount of detail and shows the groups clearly in line
with previous research and theory. Rather than using separate scales to build a picture of how
people believe using Cluster analysis, the BitSS and its subscales, offer a clear picture of the
beliefs that make up the four cluster groups.
Belief  itself  is  a  complex  phenomenon  and  with  the  way  people  believe  becoming
increasingly  complex,  a  better  method  of  measuring  belief  is  needed.  The  way  this  is
determined and how scales are constructed and validated is also a complex process. Simply
relying on statistical fit indices to determine factor numbers can only be trusted in tandem
with a strong theoretical underpinning. This is generally to do with the semantic differences
between the terms supernatural and the paranormal for example. That being said, the reverse
should also be the case; the breakdown of the items into factors should be used to inform
theory,  definition and semantic  difference.  The analysis  coupled with a strong theoretical




This chapter successfully validates the BitSS and captures the nature of supernatural belief
and  being  based  on  previous  scales  that  have  measured  religiosity,  spirituality  and
parnormality, providing a wide range of items that cover these three concepts. The factors
themselves were easy to interpret have a have strong meaning based on theory, research and
previous scales and factors. Also, the new scale provide insight into how these three concepts
of  religious,  spiritual  and  paranormal  belief  might  fit  together.  While  religious  and
paranormal  belief  show  a  clear  divide,  spiritual  belief  is  spread  amongst  the  factors.
Spirituality being the underlying concept to religious and paranormal belief could be further
tested in  future studies.  It  provides a  new measure of supernatural  belief  and provides  a
valuable new tool that can be used alone or alongside other measures of belief to assess the
personality and cognitive correlates of these types of belief.
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5 Chapter Six – Belief and Cognition 
The BitSS that was developed in chapters four and five of this thesis will be used alongside
the four types of believer; sceptic, religious believer, paranormal believer, and believer, to
identify individual differences in cognition. The following chapter presents a literature review
of cognitive differences, followed by an online study that uses the new scale and various
measures of cognition. This will establish what aspects of cognition are salient, and how the
type of  believer’s cognition differ.  This  will  address part  of  the main aim of this  thesis:
Examine cognition and personality of people who hold different types of supernatural belief.
Summarising the literature surrounding cognition and belief  will  be challenging,  and this
chapter will briefly focus on a wide range of cognition with a focus on thinking styles. This
will then establish which measures of cognition will be taken forward to the next study when
personality differences will be examined.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Belief and Cognition: A Literature Review
Cognitive differences are purported to be differences in the way people think. In this case, the
hypothesis is that people who hold belief think differently to those who do not. With regards
to paranormal belief, the main theory is the Cognitive Deficits Hypothesis. The cognitive
deficits hypothesis was proposed by Irwin (1993) as one of four hypotheses to explain belief
in the paranormal. This theory posits that believers in the paranormal are somehow mentally
deficient, not critical, and foolish (Alcock & Otis, 1980), with a focus on the hypothesis  that
people who have a poor education or lower intelligence levels are more likely to believe in
the supernatural  (Irwin, 2009). Cognitive deficits cover a wide range of cognitions, such as
education (Genovese, 2005; Jerome Tobacyk, Miller, & Jones, 1984) and intelligence (Jones
et al., 1977). However, other variables could be have an effect, for example critical thinking.
Aarnio and Lindeman (2005) looked at paranormal belief, education level, and discipline,
length  of  study,  gender  and  thinking  styles  in  3,141  Finnish  students.  They  found  that
university students had lower paranormal belief than more vocational students, and out of the
university  students,  medical  and psychology students  had the  lowest  level  of  paranormal
beliefs. Length of University education was only negatively correlated with paranormal belief
to a small degree. This could be linked to critical thinking levels in university students. Psi
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believers have been seen to have poorer critical thinking skills than non-believers (Alcock &
Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill, 1990; Morgan & Morgan, 1998), however, these findings are not
stable  (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Roe, 1999) and could be due to student populations
skewing critical thinking rates. Self-selection is a problem in studies on paranormal belief and
education with only those with an interest in the paranormal taking part, seriously skewing
the data gathered  (Genovese, 2005). Student populations can be self-selecting and critical
thinking could just be one aspect of cognition that is relevant to belief. Other studies have not
focused upon educational level specifically, but rather have examined intelligence and belief
in more general terms, particularly regarding religiosity.
It has been posited that intelligence increases levels of liberalism and atheism  (Kanazawa,
2010), supported by Lynn et al. (2009), who looked at a sample of 137 countries and found a
positive  correlation  between  intelligence  and  atheism.  They  took  data  from the  National
Longitudinal  Study  of  Youth,  the  IQ  and  Global  Inequality,  and  Belief  in  God  from
Zuckerman (2007). They noted that exceptions were from former or currently communist
countries (Cuba for example) where being religious is frowned upon. This study takes it data
from a secondary source and it can be difficult to control from confounding variables, with
experimenter effect being a major problem. These kinds of study, while interesting, should
only  be  used  as  starting  points  when  unpacking  the  relationship  between  belief  and
intelligence.  Bertsch  and  Pesta  (2009) examined  at  IQ  scores,  elementary  cognitive  task
performance and their relationship to three types of religious belief: sectarianism; spiritual
acceptance  and  religious  questioning.  Sectarianism  correlated  negatively  with  all  the
cognitive  measures.  However,  ‘religious  questioning’  correlated  positively  with  the
elementary cognitive task performance.  In this  case,  the ‘extreme’ view had the negative
relationship, while the believer who questioned did better on the cognitive task performance.
Caution must be taken at this point and referring to one aspect of religious belief as being
‘positive’ and  the  other  as  being  ‘negative’ may  not  be  helpful  due  to  the  pejorative
undertones. This study indicates that different domains of belief need to be examined, and
contrasted.
Lewis et al. (2011) looked at different  domains of religious belief and intelligence. Rather
than looking at one aspect of religiosity, they looked at six: mindfulness, spirituality, religious
support, religious identification, private religious practice and fundamentalism. They used a
large sample size of 2,307,  however  they did exclude less than 100 people who did not
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identify as Christian, making the study limited cross culturally. Effect sizes were small, and
five  of  the  six  measures  were  negatively  correlated  with  intelligence.  Openness  was
significantly  positively  associated  with  mindfulness  and  spirituality,  and  negatively
associated with fundamentalism. Lower intelligence in fundamentalism did not change when
education was controlled for. They concluded that people with lower intelligence are prone to
be  less  open,  and  less  likely  to  experience  ‘intellectual  conflict’ that  higher  intelligence
people  may  suffer.  But  they  do  acknowledge  that  this  association  maybe  be  spurious.
Zuckerman et al. (2013) carried out a meta-analysis of 63 studies examining the relationship
between religiosity and intelligence. There was a significant negative relationship, which was
more pronounced for religious belief rather than religious behaviour. Reasons presented by
the authors included that higher intelligence means less conformity…” or “Reasons presented
by authors  are  that  being  intelligent  means  less  conformity,  and  is  more  expressive  and
creative, but this indicates that other variables are having an effect and not intelligence alone.
Having a more analytic thinking style and people who are intelligent may have less need for
religious belief in general. However, religious people may have lower evidence thresholds
than people who hold a more scientific worldview (McPhetres & Zuckerman, 2017) and this
could be linked back to critical  thinking and reasoning skills.  While there is evidence of
religious belief influencing intelligence, the evidence is certain mixed showing that different
beliefs yield different results and that other variables such as thinking style may be having a
greater effect than intelligence alone.  This idea of thinking styles rather than intelligence
levels has been explored regarding reasoning.
5.1.1.1 Reasoning and Thinking Styles
Reasoning impairments  and biases  have  been posited  to  play  a  key role  in  forming and
maintaining delusional beliefs (Colbert & Peters, 2002). Roig et al. (1998) used the PBS to
look at irrational thinking and context effects, and found that the religious belief, superstition
and precognition subscales correlated with irrational thinking, despite their main analysis on
context effects not being significant. This might indicate that religious belief is driving levels
of irrationality rather than paranormal belief, giving the study a misleading title. Buzdar, Ali,
and Tariq (2015) looked at rational thinking among secondary students. They looked at a
large sample of Hindu (n=1050), Christian (n=1073) and Muslim (n=1394) students. They
examined their relationship to the variables: intrinsic, extrinsic personal and extrinsic social
and  rational  and  experiential  thinking  styles.  They  found  that  intrinsic  orientation  was
positively  associated  with  rational  thinking,  while  the  external  extrinsic  orientation  is
negatively  associated,  and  orientation  had  a  small  effect  on  experiential  thinking.  One
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possible reason for the findings is that religious belief in this context is not seen as antithetic
toward analytical thinking. These two studies indicate that it is not only the type of belief, but
the dimension of belief that influences reasoning.
Dagnall et al. (2014) looked at whether misperception of chance and conjunction fallacy were
associated  with  reality  testing  deficits  and  paranormal  belief.  Using  Lange,  Irwin,  and
Houran's  (2000) top  down  purification  of  the  rPBS,  and  other  scales  measuring  the
paranormal, reasoning was negatively correlated with paranormal belief, whereas perception
of randomness predicted reality testing and paranormal belief and high believers had less
correct  responses.  Dagnall,  Drinkwater,  Parker,  and  Rowley  (2014) do  not  consider
misperception  of  chance  to  be  a  cognitive  deficit,  rather  a  preference  of  information
processing, however,  surely information processing is a cognition, albeit  a cognitive bias.
Dagnall et al. (2016) examined belief in the paranormal, conjunction, framing effects and the
misperception of chance. They introduced the use of paranormal framed misperception of
chance  problems.  Perceptions  of  randomness,  rather  than  conjunction  fallacy  were  more
strongly  associated  with  paranormal  belief.  The  study  is  based  around  coincidences  and
seeing  them  where  none  are  present.  Two  models  were  constructed  using  SEM;  both
indicated  an  association  with  conjunction  fallacy  but  the  link  between  misperception  of
chance was stronger and both relationships were negative. However, the role of experience
rather than belief could have an effect. Both of the above studies used Lange et al.’s (2000)
top  down  purification  interpretation  of  the  rPBS  with  the  two  factors  of  traditional
paranormal beliefs and new age beliefs. The reasoning being is that new age beliefs relate to
the individual (psi, witchcraft, and spiritualism) and the paranormal beliefs are more socio-
cultural (traditional religious beliefs, precognition and witchcraft), although this distinction
between  the  two  factors  is  not  solid.  For  example,  Spiritualism  itself  is  a  religion  and
therefore can be open to socio-cultural influence and the reasoning behind precognition being
a socio-cultural influence is not clear. These two studies indicate that the type of paranormal
belief  measure  used  can  have  an  influence  on  the  outcome  and  the  difference  between
cognition and other processes is blurred.
Lawrence and Peters (2004) found that people who had a stronger belief in the paranormal
displayed errors in reasoning and had greater delusional ideation. The reasoning bias was
only  associated  with  paranormal  believers  and  not  people  who  had  reported  paranormal
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experience. This could indicate that reasoning bias has a role in the formation of paranormal
beliefs.  Finally,   Gray  and  Gallo  (2016) looked  at  believers  in  psychic  phenomena  and
sceptics in what they claimed was a large scale test of the cognitive deficits hypothesis. They
generally tested different aspects of memory, false memory, working memory and problem
solving. They found that the two groups were similar on the memory test but differed on the
analytic measures. While this claimed to be a large-scale test,  they had a narrow type of
believer and what the sceptics were actually sceptical about was unclear. This study might
have included a larger number of participants but it  adds little to the base of knowledge
surrounding cognitive differences. There is confusion as to if this study is covering religious
or spirituality  belief  or both.  They state  that  spirituality is  not  related to cognitive bias,
however  this  study  was  using  a  word  recall  task  that  is  potentially  flawed  and  overly
simplistic, and the use of religious words could have led to a priming effect (Verno, Cohen, &
Patrick, 2007). As with intelligence, reasoning shows mixed results for different beliefs and
for different dimensions of religiosity, such as intrinsic and extrinsic, and difference in belief
and experience for paranormality. The evidence for both intelligence and reasoning points to
an  overall  thinking  style  rather  than  a  competence  for  those  two  variables.  Rather  than
reasoning or intelligence deficits, an overall thinking style has been examined and this brings
the term difference rather than deficit closer.
Reasoning may not be enough to explain differences in belief groups, so it could be that 
alongside the type of belief, the dimension of belief could be having an effect. Also, the type 
of measure could be having an effect, the different factor structures employed with the rPBS 
seeming to have influenced the findings. It appears the mixed findings could be due do an 
overall thinking style rather than a specific deficit in one area.
5.1.1.2 Dual Process Theory
Individual differences in thinking styles, with relation to religiosity and paranormality, have
primarily been rooted in Dual Process Theory (e.g Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015; Finley et al.,
2015; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016; Lindeman & Svedholm-
Häkkinen, 2016; G. Pennycook et  al.,  2012; Gordon Pennycook et  al.,  2016; Ross et  al.,
2016; Shenhav et al., 2012; Yonker et al., 2016). Dual Process Theory posits that there are
two possible systems of cognition that are active when an individual is making a decision.
Often  referred  to  as  ‘fast’  and  ‘slow’,  they  are  named  ‘Type  One’  and  ‘Type  Two’
respectively.  Type One is  a  fast  and heuristic  mode of  thinking that  relies  on top  down
processing and ‘gut’ reactions. This system is ‘intuitive’ and low on cognitive ‘load’ or effort,
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and due to this is preferable (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Stanovich, 1999). Type Two is
slower,  and more considered form of processing that overrides Type One when activated
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). It is high in cognitive load and therefore more
effortful, and is ‘reflective’ rather than ‘intuitive’. As a consequence, due to the ease, we are
more likely to engage in Type One processing than Type Two (Evans, 2008). This does not
mean that Type One processing is wrong, for the majority of the time it serves us well but
occasionally  using  Type  One  can  lead  to  errors.  In  that  situation  Type  Two  should  be
employed. However, the point at which Type One ends and Type Two takes over, and why
this  happens  has  been  debated  extensively  (Osman,  2004).  For  example,  the  Corrective
Model states that Type One generates the intuitive answer, and it is then up to Type Two
thinking to correct the answer (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005). Analytic vs. reflective
thinking is measured using sets of questions that require Type Two thinking. The questions
will have an incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer and a correct ‘reflective’ answer. One of the most
popular measures is the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005).
The CRT was developed by Frederick (2005) and has been used extensively in different areas
of  research  (Thomson & Oppenheimer,  2016),  but  has  been increasingly  used in  studies
looking  at  religiosity  and  paranormality  (Pennycook  et  al.,  2012).  The  CRT  strives  to
measures a person’s intuitive response to a set of questions. These intuitive responses are
incorrect and the correct answers can only be achieved by engaging an analytic (Type Two)
cognitive process. Further, the measure is related to belief bias, the incorrect answers being
more ‘believable’. The CRT consists of three items and despite this has been seen to be an
excellent measure of a variety of cognitive measures  (Toplak,  West,  & Stanovich,  2014).
However,  the test  has some shortcomings.  For example,  the test  might  not be measuring
reflective thinking, as a good standard of numerical ability is required to answer the questions
(Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) with a high amount of students in one particular study
scoring zero (Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2015). Despite these criticisms,
the measure has been widely used,  which in itself  can be problematic,  with more people
knowing the ‘correct’ answers leading to a major skewing of the results, particularly with the
advent  of  ‘paid participants’.  These are  people who are paid to  take part  in surveys,  for
example, Amazon’s Mturk participant providing service  (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).
However,  other  measures  of  cognitive  reflection  have  been  developed  that  attempt  to
circumvent some of these problems  (Primi et  al.,  2015; Thomson & Oppenheimer,  2016;
Toplak et al., 2014). While the debate surrounds what is actually being measured, research
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into supernatural belief still favours the CRT. The focus of this research is on different groups
of supernatural believers and whether they favour Type One or Type Two processing. Rather
than a particular type of believer having a lower intelligence or some other form of cognitive
deficit (Irwin, 2009), different thinking styles have been examined by previous researchers.
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) looked at superstitious thinking, and found a
moderate negative correlation with need for cognition and a small positive correlation with
faith  in  intuition.  Religiosity  being  studied  somewhat  later,  according  to  Aarnio  and
Lindeman (2007), with their study being the initial examination of DPT and religiosity. The
majority of the findings indicate that people who have higher levels of religiosity are more
prone to Type One thinking styles  (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012;
Shenhav et al., 2012) however, another study did find that religiosity was linked to Type Two
thinking (Yonker et al., 2016). It has been theorised that religiosity is intuitive and a cognitive
by-product of other systems that have evolved for other purposes (Shenhav et al., 2012), and
that humans are intuitive dualists  (Bloom, 2009; Hood, Gjersoe, & Bloom, 2012). Whether
intuitive thinking or intuitive belief are related, or is just a coincidence of convenient naming,
remains to be seen. However, differences have been noted in different types of religiosity,
with an extrinsic orientation being more likely to exhibit Type One than intrinsic religiosity
(Gervais  & Norenzayan,  2012).  This  could account  for  differences  in  findings,  but  other
issues have been raised, such as order effects (Finley et al., 2015). This suggests that, rather
than people who do not engage in Type Two being more religious, exposure to Type Two
problems increases  disbelief. While religious belief and DPT seems to have a parsimonious
explanation, the relationship of paranormal beliefs to DPT is less clear.
Paranormal beliefs have been looked at within the framework of dual process theory to a
lesser extent (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Irwin, 2015; Pennycook et al., 2012; Risen, 2016;
Ross et al., 2016; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). As with religious belief, paranormal beliefs
seem to emerge when intuition is being relied on  (Epstein et al., 1996; Wolfradt, Oubaid,
Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999) but results have been mixed. However, whether Type
One and Type Two thinking styles give rise to different kinds of supernatural belief in the
same way is unclear. One explanation for a difference in thinking styles is the way these
beliefs are formed. Religious belief being based more on social tradition and familial passing
down  (Vyse,  1997) and  paranormal  beliefs  being  transmitted  through  popular  culture
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). This belief formation would be aided by their intuitive nature.
However, people may be drawn to paranormal ideas for psychological reasons (Irwin, 1993),
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at  a  time  of  personal  crisis  for  example.  Possible  reasons  for  paranormal  belief’s  being
correlated with intuitive thinking style are varied: paranormal beliefs do not stand up to high
scrutiny, or analytic thinking  (Irwin, 2009); however,  arguably the same could be said of
religious beliefs and if one were simply able to ‘think’ their way out of a particular belief,
then they would not be as pervasive as they are today. It could be that the analytic thinking is
increasing disbelief, as can be seen with religious beliefs, or it could be susceptible to order
effects  and  experimenter  effects  (Watt  &  Wiseman,  2002).  One  problem  could  be  the
measures that are used for paranormal belief. The rPBS is heavily used in this area  (Irwin,
2009) and itself has a religious belief subscale which could be acting as a confound when the
measure is used as an indicator of global paranormal belief  (Schofield, Baker, Staples, &
Sheffield,  2016).  Certain  subscales  of  the  rPBS have stronger  associations  with  intuitive
thinking styles; superstition for example (Epstein et al., 1996). This of course, intimates that
these beliefs  are  irrational  and need to  be corrected  (Risen,  2016).  If  the beliefs  are  not
harmful  and  are  beneficial  (to  health  and  well  being  for  example)  the  two  have  then
‘corrected’ would not be rational.
Dual process theory appears to link Type One and Type Two thinking to beliefs that are
intuitive, and the rejection of those beliefs. However, it is clear that different beliefs appear to
affect thinking styles in different ways. One explanation could be that it is the religious belief
from the rPBS that is driving the intuitive thinking and this could be due to religious belief
being more minimally counterintuitive than paranormal belief.
5.1.1.3 Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts and Intuitive Thinking
Minimal  counterintuitive  theory  has  relatively  recently  come to  the  fore  in  the  study  of
cognitive science of religion. This theory offers an explanation of why and how religious idea
are transmitted. The core ideas that underpin the theory are as follows: the mind has evolved
innate inferential  systems (knowledge that is not explicitly learned);  Ideas that minimally
violate these inferences are more likely to be remembered and passed on; Religious concepts
are  minimally  counterintuitive  in  nature;  the  reason  religious  beliefs  are  so  prevalent  is
because they are retained more than other ideas.  The ideas form part  of care ontological
categories  that  allow  us  to  classify  the  world  and  are  intuitive  cognitions  do  not  vary
according to culture. These are seen as deep inferences. As opposed to shallow inferences that
are  easily  assessable  and  contain  reflective  information.  Therefore  deep  inferences  are
‘natural’  and  shallow  are  culturally  derived  (Purzycki  &  Willard,  2016).  Minimally
counterintuitive  theory  essentially  states  that  because  religious  beliefs  breach  these  deep
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inferences  they  are  remembered,  and are  more  ‘catchy’  (Boyer  & Ramble,  2001).  When
shallow  inferences  are  violated  they  are  less  memorable,  therefore  culturally  schematic
violations are less likely to be remembered and are less ‘catchy’ (Purzycki, 2011). Although it
could be argued that concepts such as God maximally violate these deep inferences (Barrett,
2008). Whether minimally counterintuitive theory can explain all religious belief remains to
be  seen,  and does  not  answer  the  further  question  of  other  supernatural  beliefs,  such as
paranormal belief. Paranormal beliefs would indeed violate these deep inferences, but they
may lack some of the other attributes that define religious belief.
 
The minimally counterintuitive intuitive status of paranormal belief is still unclear. Rather
than being minimally counterintuitive, paranormal beliefs could be counterintuitive, and more
readily  prone  to  disbelief,  however,   determining  the  difference  between  intuitive  and
counterintuitive is problematic for the empirical study of belief  (Barrett, 2008). Rather than
minimally violated deep inferences, the paranormal beliefs could be complete violating them.
This would depend on the kind of paranormal belief, for example a belief in an afterlife might
be  seen  as  quite  spiritual,  and  consistent  with  religious  belief  and  therefore  should  be
minimally counterintuitive. However, if paranormal beliefs are based on shallow inferences
then they are culturally transmitted and arguably have a more limited ‘life’; an example of
this would be belief in UFOs. Another argument is that afterlife types of paranormal belief
are minimally counterintuitive and paranormal beliefs, such as ESP, that are counterintuitive.
However, the use of the term ‘counterintuitive’ has been criticised (Polkinghorne, 2001): the
more  intuitive  the  idea,  the  more  a  person  should  be  implicitly  drawn  to  it.  Another
explanation for the paranormal belief and analytical thinking anomaly is that people might be
being implicitly drawn to certain concepts because they are intuitive.
Svedholm and Lindeman (2013) extended the studies that looked at paranormal belief and
intuitive thinking. They looked at ontological confusion, or the attribution of phenomena to
the mental, physical or biological, and found An increase of cognitive load led to a decreased
adoption of paranormal beliefs, indicating that the more people think, the less likely they are
to  accept  paranormal  beliefs.  Increases  in  analytic  thinking  have  also  been  linked  to  a
reduction  in  conspiracy  theory  type  beliefs  (Swami,  Voracek,  Stieger,  Tran,  & Furnham,
2014). Conspiracy beliefs can be factual and not metaphysical (arguably some supernatural
belief could have a factual basis, depending on your definition,  aliens for example).  This
supports the idea that people who are more likely to confuse the ontology of a phenomena are
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more  likely  to  adopt  these  types  of  belief.  The  role  of  analytic  thinking  has  also  been
examined by priming religious belief to see if the effects work in the other direction. Yilmaz,
Karadöller and Sofuoglu (2016) used a Muslim sample to look at religious belief, analytical
thinking  and  prejudice.  This  harks  back  to  (Allport  & Ross,  1967) study  that  examined
religiosity and prejudice. They primed both analytic thinking and religious belief finding that
religious priming increased prejudice, while analytic priming only had an effect on anti-gay
prejudice. This is consistent with religious belief increasing conformity and hostility toward
outgroups (Norenzayan, 2013). Ross et al. (2016) looked at delusional ideation and analytic
cognitive style and found no support for delusions being related to dual process type theories,
however, religious and paranormal beliefs were negatively correlated with analytic cognitive
style, consistent with previous research. Rather than believers being deluded, it is the beliefs
themselves that are having an effect, and the ontological confusion demonstrates that the type
of belief can have an effect, with priming shows that religious and analytic priming can have
different effects. However, priming analytic though could be an artefact of religious belief
levels.
Finley et al. (2015) challenged the consensus that analytic thought is associated with lower
religiosity, and observed that they were a consequence of many studies measuring analytical
belief first and were priming the participant to think more analytically. They found that when
analytic thinking was measured first, there was a significant negative correlation, however
when religious belief was measured first, the significance disappeared, indicating a problem
with order effects. Finley et al. (2015) states that the only time a correlation will be present
between  analytic  thing  and  religious  belief  is  when  analytic  thinking  is  placed  before
religious belief in the study, as this would put the participant in an ‘analytic’ state of mind.
Pennycook  et  al.  (2016) challenged  these  findings  and  examined  the  order  effects  of
measuring religious belief  after analytical thinking, conducting four empirical studies and a
meta-analysis. They used the studies to measures analytical thinking and belief in separate
sessions to avoid order effects. They found that analytic thinking increased disbelief, and
atheists are more reflective than religious believers. However, the argument is more subtle
than religious  believers  not  engaging in  analytically  though;  the analytic  though actually
increases  disbelief,  which  could  arguably  be  due  to  priming.  The  problem  could  be
experimenter effect and not just order effect. The difference may also be the types of belief




Analytic thinking increases disbelief because religious beliefs are only active when analytical
thinking is not (Van Leeuwen, 2014). This can only be true if religious beliefs are factual and
not able to stand up to analytic scrutiny (Boudry & Coyne, 2016) but if religious beliefs are
considered  fictional  (rather  than  metaphorical),  then  they  are  never  even  considered
analytically (Boudry & Coyne, 2016) and therefore these types of belief are ‘cognitively ring
fenced’ from analysis. If paranormal beliefs are not considered fictional or metaphorical (i.e.,
they  are  seen  as  being  potentially  real)  by  the  believer  and  therefore  are  more  open  to
analytical  scrutiny.  This  could  be  due  to  how  the  beliefs  are  formed.  Culture  is  not
responsible for the beliefs themselves but rather the form the  belief takes and why people are
drawn to them might  be psychological  (Irwin,  1993).  Lindeman and Svedholm-Häkkinen
(2016) examined supernatural belief and how people view the physical world. They found
that physical capability based around skills, interest and knowledge along with an intuitive
thinking style were the best predictors of supernatural belief. However, when using a priming
paradigm, Yonker et al. (2016) did not find that analytic thinking caused disbelief, and that
intrinsic religiosity was related to analytic thinking. This would indicate that the relationship
between  belief  and  thinking  is  complex  and  that  the  type  of  belief  might  be  a  factor.
Religiosity and paranormal belief affect thinking in different ways due to the way the beliefs
were acquired.  If religious beliefs are intuitive then there should be an ‘implicit’ level of
belief. Irwin (2015) examined paranormal scepticism and attempted to get people to engage
in  analytical  thinking  by  showing  them a  paranormal  image.  People  who  had  formed  a
paranormal disbelief during the experiment, due to being shown a paranormal image, were
more likely to use an analytic mode of thinking. This study indicates that implicit belief has a
larger role to play and might not always be reflected in explicit belief, and that there might be
a difference between what a people say they believe and what they actually believe.  The
status of a particular belief and it being intuitive or counterintuitive is not clear and further
research into what drives these beliefs is needed.
5.1.1.4 Metacognition and Confidence 
Metacognition  is  how a  person  monitors  their  own thoughts  and  is  often  referred  to  as
‘thinking about thinking’, and has been studied alongside dual process theory. Research has
demonstrated that people are aware they are giving the wrong answers to the questions when
answering measures such as the CRT. Rather than being unware of the errors, a subsection of
people know they are not thinking analytically (De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013). This can be
linked to the Dunning Kruger Effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This is the overestimation of
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one’s abilities, both intellectual and social. The problem is seen as two-fold, as they are not
good  at  estimating  their  own  competence  and  because  of  this  they  do  not  have  the
metacognitive  ability  to  realise  that  they  are  doing  it.  Again,  this  has  clear  link  to  the
cognitive  deficits  hypothesis  and  further  insight  into  the  metacognitive  confidence  of
believers would be helpful. Research has shown that supernatural believers are more likely to
be confident in their intuitions (Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015) and lower cognitive reflection is
more likely to exhibit over-confidence (Noori, 2016). Bouvet and Bonnefon (2015) looked at
cognitive style and how it is important after experiencing an uncanny event. They found that
despite higher levels of paranormal belief (explicit), non-reflective thinkers were more likely
to accept a supernatural cause when something uncanny occurred. This supports an analytic
frame of mind suppressing belief and while they talk about it, they do not have a measure of
confidence.  Confidence  in  this  case  indicates  metacognitive  ability,  the  less  confident  a
person is could be an indication of more thought monitoring.  However, this could be linked
to type of belief, with certain types of belief being gained and maintained in different ways.
Baker and Morrison (1998) found that maladaptive metacognitions like worrisome thoughts
were  related  to  higher  levels  of  paranormal  belief.  While  direct  studies  linking
metacognitions  are  sparse,  they  have  been  studied  in  areas  often  studied  alongside
paranormal  belief:  superstition  (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells,  1997),  psychoticism  (Reeder,
Rexhepi-Johansson,  & Wykes,  2010),  and  schizotypy  (Stirling,  Barkus,  & Lewis,  2007),
however,  there is  a dearth of studies relating directly  to  religiosity  and metacognition.  A
unique contribution of this thesis would be to factor in metacognition as a part of an overall
model  of  belief.  In  this  case  metacognition  would  take  the  form  of  confidence.  While
believers may or may not show biases in thinking in relation to the Cognitive Reflection Test,
whether they are aware they are making these biased choices is another matter. De Neys et al.
(2013) found that biased reasoners are aware they are making mistakes but they do not know
why. This awareness of the mistake could also be linked to critical thinking, as one would
expect a lower level of critical thinking to be associated with a lower level of metacognition
(Magno, 2010). This could be linked to critical  thinking levels in university students. Psi
believers have been seen have poorer critical thinking skills than non-believers  (Alcock &
Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill, 1990; Morgan & Morgan, 1998), however, these findings are not
stable  (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Roe, 1999) and could be due to student populations
skewing critical thinking rates. Self-selection is a problem in studies on paranormal belief and
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education with only those with an interest in the paranormal taking part, seriously skewing
the data gathered (Genovese, 2005).
Measures of metacognition would provide the link between implicit and priming paradigms
and  provide  further  evidence  surrounding  different  types  of  belief  and  how  they  affect
cognition. There is evidence that belief has an effect on intelligence, reasoning and thinking
style, however the type, dimension, and measure of the belief could be having an effect. Dual
process theory appears to link to belief strongly, but the nature of intuitive and minimally
counterintuitive belief is unclear. One of the effects could come from implicit belief, and this,
alongside  with  a  priming  paradigm,  could  offer  insight  into  the  mechanism  behind  this
process. Finally, measuring of metacognition would also show the awareness of a particular
holder of belief of their perceived limitations. This study aims to incorporate aspects of the
cognition discussed above and will  use: the CRT to examine thinking style,  the BIAT to
measure implicit belief, the CDT to look at the effect of priming; linking thinking style and
implicit  belief.  The  third  element  here  is  metacognition  and  this  will  be  measured  by
confidence  in  the  answers  to  the  CRT and  CDT  and  a  critical  thinking  measure.  The
following hypotheses are considered for the four types of believer.
5.1.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses will provide potential profiles for each type of believer as per Schofield et al.
(2016).  Profile  one  will  have:  the  highest  levels  of  cognitive  reflection,  confidence  and
critical thinking. Profile two will: have the lowest cognitive reflection score but they have
higher confidence and critical thinking. The sceptics group will be more likely to have profile
one. The religious believers will be a combination of profile one and profile two. Paranormal




According to GPower (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) for a mixed MANOVA design to
achieve an effect size of 0.2, using five measurements, a sample size of 68 is required. Due to
the  power  analysis  being  prospective,  the  obtained  sample  size  is  deemed  adequate.
Participants  (n  =  179)  were  recruited  using  an  opportunity  sampling  method  from  the
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University of Derby and via social media (Facebook and Twitter). Participants’ gender was 43
(24%) male,  135 (75.4 %) female, and one (0.6 %) preferred not to answer. Ages of the
participants ranged from 18 to 59 (mean = 27.4, SD=10.18). 161 (89.9 %) were students and
of those seven (3.9 %) were in further education, 130 (72.6%) were undergraduates, and 24
(13.4%) were in postgraduate study. The number of people who attempted the survey was
432;  179 people completed all  the tasks and questionnaires on the survey.   For religious
demographics  see  Table   6  .15.  Religious  identification  includes  some of  the  following:
Christian,  Muslim,  Hindu, Jewish and Jedi.  This was a  completion rate of 41.45 %; low
completion rate was due to the initial 68 cases on the BIAT using the incorrect Inquisit script
and poor attrition rates due to the survey and the BIAT being in two separate internet hosts. 
5.2.2 Materials
An online survey (Qualtrics) tool was used to host the various measures and Inquisit (see
appendix 6.1.3) was used to host the BIAT. The other aspects measured using the survey
were:  supernatural  belief,  covariance  detection,  implicit  association,  critical  thinking,
cognitive reflection and confidence. The methods to measure these concepts are listed below.
5.2.2.1 Belief in the Supernatural Scale
The BitSS is a 44 item scale with five subscales which are: ‘mental and psychic phenomena’
(16 items), ‘religious belief’ (10 items), ‘psychokinesis’ (four items), ‘supernatural entities’
(seven items) and ‘common paranormal perceptions’ (seven items). The scale is scored using
a 1 to 7 point Likert scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree) and the scores can be between
44 and 308. One item (39) is reverse scored. Items include: ‘There are individuals who are
messengers of God’, ‘There is both a spiritual as well as a natural side to reality’ and ‘Some
individuals are able to levitate (lift)  objects through mental forces.  For Cronbachs on the
scale and subscales see Table  6 .14.
5.2.2.2 Critical Thinking Disposition Scale
The Critical Thinking Disposition Scale (CTDS) (Sosu, 2013) is an 11 item scale to measure
critical  thinking.  It  has  two  subscales:  ‘Critical  openness’ (seven  items)  and  ‘reflective
scepticism’ (four items). The item response format is a five point Likert scale (1 = strongly
disagree and 5 = strongly agree). Example items include: ‘I usually try to think about the
bigger picture during a discussion’, ‘I am often on the lookout for new ideas’ and ‘I often re-
evaluate my experiences so that I can learn from them’. The scores from the 11 items and
summed, no items are reversed and scores can range from 11-55. The scales author noted
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that:  11  and  34  indicates  low  disposition;  35–44  moderate  disposition;  and  45–55  high
disposition. For Cronbachs on the scale and subscales see Table  6 .14.









 n =11 
Subscales  
Mental and Psychic Phenomena (BitSS) items
0.963
n=16






Supernatural Entities (BitSS) items
0.922
n=7
Common Paranormal Perceptions (BitSS) items
0.876
n=7
Critical Openness (CTDS) Items
0.669
 n =7 
Reflective Scepticism (CTDS) Items
0.666
 n  =4 
5.2.2.3 Cognitive Reflection Test – Long
The Cognitive Reflection Test – Long (CRT-L)  (Primi et al., 2015) is a 6 item measure of
intuitive and normative responses as a measure of effortful reasoning, using an open ended
item response format. The items can be classified in three ways: correct answers, an intuitive
(heuristic) incorrect response, or a response that was neither correct nor intuitive. Example
items include: A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. ‘The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball.
How much does the ball cost?’ (Correct answer = 5 cents; heuristic answer = 10 cents), ‘In a
lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake?’ (Correct answer = 47 days; heuristic answer = 24 days) and ‘Jerry received both the
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15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are there in the class?’
(Correct answer= 29 students; heuristic answer= 30 students).
5.2.2.4 Confidence Scale
Confidence  in  each  answer  given  for  the  CRT-L and  the  CDT was  measured  using  the
question  ‘How confident  are  you that  you gave  the  correct  answer? Please type in  your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure)’ (Neys, Cromheeke, &
Osman, 2011). The response was open ended, but asking for a number between 1 and 100.
5.2.3 Procedure
Following  recruitment,  participants  were  sent  a  link  to  the  online  survey  hosted  at
www.qualtrics.com.  They  were  then  informed  of  their  right  to  withdraw,  confidentiality,
anonymity and further details of the study in the brief. They were then asked to generate a
unique ID code and age, gender, religious belief and occupation demographics were taken.
The rest of the survey had five parts, all counterbalanced with each other; the BitSS scale,
the CRT-L,  and the CTDS. The confidence question was asked after each of the question in
the  CRT-L.   The debrief  was then  displayed reminding them of  their  right  to  withdraw,
anonymity and confidentiality.
5.2.4 Ethics
See Chapters Four and Five for British Psychological Society (2006) guidelines that were
followed regarding informed consent and confidentiality.
Ethical  approval  for  this  study  was  received  from  the  University  of  Derby  Psychology
Research Ethics Committee.
5.2.5 Analytical Method
Initially, a Cluster analysis was performed on the BitSS to establish the types of believer and
the number of dependant variables for the analysis. A one way MANOVA was conducted to
validate  the  groups  found.  Following  this,  a  MANOVA was  conducted  with  the  CRT-L,
CTDS and confidence questions as IV’s with one level each, and the scores from each group
of believer as the four DV’s. A post-hoc Discriminant Functions Analysis was carried out to




5.3.1 Religious Self Identification
The relationship between the four groups of believer identified above and the self-reported
religious belief. The self-reported beliefs were placed into to one of five categorises; for the
categories, frequencies and percentages see Table  6 .15. Due to more than two cells having
expected counts less than five, Fishers Exact Probability was used to examine the association
and the association was significant, p <.001 and due to the size of the contingency table, the
Monte  Carlo  Method  was  employed  (Field,  2013).  This  indicates  that  there  was  an
association between the groups found in the above analysis and the self-reported religious
belief of the participants.







Believers 13 (30.2 %) 0 (0%) 3 (60%) 1 (2.2 %) 1 (33.3%)
Paranormal
Believers








Religious Believers 19 (44.2 %) 1 (2.8 %) 1 (20 %) 1 (2.2 %) 0 (0 %)
Total 43 (100%) 36 (100%) 5 (100%) 46 (100%) 3 (100%)
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5.3.2 Main Analysis – The Four Groups of Believer and Cognition
The main analysis will examine the four groups of believers and determine if there are any difference between the groups with respect to their
cognition.  A Hierarchical Cluster analysis was used to examine the BitSS scale and group people based on their score on the five subscales.
Ward’s method was used to optimise the variance between the clusters and the analysis was performed on the  z scores (to normalize the
variables) on the five subscales. For further details see appendix 6.3. 
5.3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Initially the descriptive statistics were examined to make sure the data was normally distributed (see Table  6 .16).
Table 6.16.Table Showing Descriptive Statistics (Mean (SD)), and Skewness and Kurtosis (Divided By SE) of the BitSS, Confidence, CRTL, and 
the CTDS.
Sceptics (N=55) Religious Believer (N=29) Paranormal Believer (N=69) Believer (N=26)
Mean (SD) Skew Kurt Mean (SD) Skew Kurt Mean (SD) Skew Kurt Mean (SD) Skew Kurt
Belief in the Supernatural Scale 68.73 (18.61) 1.32 -1.72
164.76 
(29.68)
0.28 -0.34 157.45 (29.6) -0.61 -1.32 223.5 (27.86) 1.23 -0.53
Confidence 78.83 (18.67) -2.81 0.05 72.07 (17.83) -1.53 -0.85 71.81 (19.54) -3.79 3.07 79.69 (15.95) -2.46 1.28
Cognitive Reflection Test Long 2.91 (1.68) -0.97 -1.83 1.72 (1.56) 1.43 -0.66 1.78 (1.59) 1.67 -1.86 2.19 (1.77) 0.24 -1.48
Critical Thinking Disposition Scale 46.16 (4.72) -3.20 3.01 44.9 (4.51) 0.98 -0.59 43.14 (5.77) -1.33 0.16 45.73 (6.32) -4.93 8.19
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For means and SD’s of the cognitive measures, see  Table  6 .16. Data were examined for
normality by eyeballing boxplots and histograms, skewness and kurtosis were examined, and
finally  z scores within their respective cluster group. Generally the histograms and boxplot
showed normal distribution for the data but some outliers were identified: the confidence
variable showed two outliers in the ‘paranormal believer’ group (88 and 152) and two in the
‘believer group’ (65 and 112); the CTDS had three outliers in the ‘sceptics’ group (14, 52, and
98)  one  in  ‘paranormal  believer’ (89)  and finally  one in  ‘believer’ (125).  Skewness  and
kurtosis were then examined (see Table  6 .16). A few cases lay outside on the -2.58 – +2.58
for samples sizes between 100 and 200 (Field, 2013). The CTDS was skewed and kurtosed in
both the ‘sceptic’ and the ‘believers’ group. Z scores again were mostly normally distributed
with  some  expectations  (great  or  less  than  +/-  3  (Field,  2013)):  CTDS  participant  89;
confidence participant 152. The question’ If three elves can wrap six toys in half an hour, how
many elves are needed to wrap twenty toys in one hour?’ on the CRTL was excluded from the
analysis due to an error in the question on the survey.
5.3.2.2 MANOVA
The data was tested for univariate normality above and while some outliers were present, this
was within the parameters of the test (Field, 2013). Also, Box’s test was non-significant (p= .
295)  indicating  that  the  equality  of  covariance’s  matrices  has  not  been  violated.  The
MANOVA (IV1 (CTDS), IV2 (Confidence),  and IV3 (CRTL),  = 4 × clusters; DV1 (Sceptic), DV2 (Religious Believers),
DV3  (Paranormal  Believers),  and DV4  (Believers) indicated a significant effect of group membership on
critical thinking, confidence and cognitive reflection (F (9) = 3.00,  p =.002, Pillai’s  V = .15,
partial η 2= 0.05).
5.3.2.3 Discriminant Functions Analysis
Following the main analysis which determined that there were differences between the four
groups of believer, a  post-hoc Discriminant Functions Analysis was carried out to establish
the composition of the variables of the group. This establishes which variables are different
and between which groups, and provides composites that will contain different levels of each
cognition. The composites were then checked for the likelihood that a believer group will be
in that composite. Again, the data was within the parameters of the test and the equality of the
test  not being violated; Box’s test  being non-significant (p=.295). Analysis revealed three
composites. However, only two of these were deemed significant (See Table  6 .18).
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Table 6.17. Table Showing the First Three Composites of the Discriminant Functions 
Analysis.
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % Canonical Correlation
1 .140 85.2 85.2 .350
2 .018 11.1 96.3 .134
3 .006 3.7 100.0 .077
Table 6.18. Table Showing the Significance of the Three Profiles.
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda
Chi-
square df Sig.
1 through 3 .856 27.049 9 .001
2 through 3 .976 4.200 4 .380
3 .994 1.044 1 .307
Composite one accounting for 85.2% of the total between group variance; composite two:
11.1% and composite three 3.7% (See  Table  6 .18).  Next,  the standardized discriminant
function  coefficients  were  examined  to  interpret  the  composites.  A  sufficiently  strong
coefficient  is  around  .3  (Pituch  & Stevens,  2015);  values  below this  will  be  given  less
consideration in composite interpretation. For coefficient values, see Table  6 .19. Finally, the
group differences in means between composites are as follows: Sceptics and belivers were
more likely to comprise composite 1 and paranormal believers and religious believers least
likely to be in composite 1 (see Table  6 .20 for group means (centroids) for the discriminant
functions and tentative label).
Table 6.19. Table Showing the Standardized Function Coefficient Loadings on the Cognitive 
Measures for Each Composite.
    
1 2 3
CRTL Total .106 .107 -.114
CTDS Total .457* -.498* -.045
Confidence Total .004 .035 .049
          * Indicates value of significance. 









The post-hoc analysis showed that the four groups of believers consisted of one composite.
These were ‘reflective thinkers’.
5.4 Discussion
The initial cluster analysis run on the subscales of the BitSS revealed four groups; sceptics,
religious  believers,  paranormal  believers  and  believers.  Further  analysis  suggested  one
separate profile of cognition. This profile was interpreted as ‘reflective thinkers’ and was high
in cognitive reflection and slightly high in critical thinking.
The sceptics group and believers group were more likely to  contain people who had the
profile ‘reflective thinkers’; the religious believers group and the paranormal believers were
least likely to be in the ‘reflective thinkers’ profile. Only one of profile was revealed and not
two as hypothesised and the only aspect of that profile that was significant was cognitive
reflection, with critical thinking only having partial support.
5.4.1 Intelligence
The findings that the sceptics group are more reflective thinking are in line with previous
research that found that intelligence levels increase with atheism (Kanazawa, 2010; Lynn et
al., 2009). However, when looking at religious belief  Bertsch and Pesta (2009) found that
extremes  religious  views  had  a  negative  correlation  with  intelligence  and  religious
questioning had a positive relationship. One aspect of this is in line with the findings, but it
could be that the religious ‘questioning’ group are more analogous to the believers group and
the religious believers group to the ‘extreme’. Again, this could be problematic, and to fall
into stereotyping traditional religious belief as being ‘bad’ and the more spiritual, questioning
type belief as ‘good’. While intelligence could be tangentially linked to belief, it  is more
likely  that  higher  intelligence  leads  to  being  more  open  and  less  likely  to  conform
(Zuckerman et al., 2013).
5.4.2 Reasoning and Thinking Styles
When looking at thinking styles, the findings are again partially supported by past research.
Religious  believers being more intuitive in  thinking style  is  supported by  Roig,  Bridges,
Renner, and Jackson (1998), although their findings were based on the PBS and they failed to
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find an overall effect of paranormal belief; unlike this study which found that paranormal
believers were least  likely to be ‘reflective thinkers’.  Looking at  religious belief  in more
depth, the difference between dimensions of religiosity has an effect. This broadly fits with
the findings in this study, the extrinsic religiosity participants being less rational, in line with
the religious believers group and the intrinsic believers being more rational, in line with the
overall believers group (possibly being more spiritual). The inference here is that people who
adopt a reflective thinking style are irrational and because the people are irrational, therefore
the  beliefs  must  also  be  irrational,  supporting  the  Cognitive  Deficits  Hypothesis  (Irwin,
1993). Furthermore,  if  the religious believers and paranormal believers are irrational, this
would not account for the levels of critical thinking.
5.4.3 Dual Process Theory
The findings of this study that religious believers were more likely to be ‘intuitive implicit
believers’ are generally supported by previous research indicating a positive relationship with
intuitive Type One thinking (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav
et al., 2012). The findings did conflict with at least one study that indicated religiosity linked
with Type Two thinking  (Yonker et al., 2016). Also, it has been noted that it is the extrinsic
religiosity that is more likely to be linked to Type One thinking  (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012). Again, this is in line with the findings that the overall believers are the ones who are
more likely to think analytically, but not as analytically as the sceptics group. The paranormal
believers were the least likely to be reflective, which is broadly supported by research but
again with mixed results (Epstein et al., 1996; U Wolfradt et al., 1999). While the paranormal
believers group are not the most likely to think intuitively, they are the least likely to think
reflectively. It would appear that religious believers are able to think reflectively but this does
not affect their beliefs, and the paranormal believers are not as able to be reflective. The
reasons for this could be due to the ways the beliefs are maintained and formed, and whether
they are intuitive, counterintuitive or minimally counterintuitive.
5.4.4 Minimally Counterintuitive Concepts and Intuitive Thinking
This study supports the previous research that religious belief is minimally counterintuitive
(Harmon-Vukić,  2016;  Pennycook  et  al.,  2012).  However,  the  results  of  the  study  also
indicate a problem with the use of the term ‘counterintuitive’. The paranormal believers were
less cognitively reflective in their answers than the religious believers. This would indicate
that paranormal beliefs require even less reflection to be accepted by a person.  Previous
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research  indicates  that  religious  beliefs  are  intuitive  and  that  is  why  they  are  accepted
(Bloom, 2009;  Hood et al., 2012). The difference between an intuitive belief and a minimally
counterintuitive belief is unclear as both beliefs are possibly intuitive but the way that they
are developed and accepted could be the cause of the difference in thinking style. Paranormal
beliefs require an intuitive thinking style and lack of questioning to be accepted, and the way
that paranormal beliefs are acquired could be the key factor here. The paranormal beliefs are
rejected by the religious believers because of their level of cognitive refection and accepted
by the paranormal believer because of their lack of this reflection. Therefore, the religious
beliefs require a worldview that accepts them and this cognitively ring-fences these beliefs
from being rejected and enables the rejection of paranormal beliefs. The rejection of religious
beliefs by the paranormal believer group however is not explained; this could be due to a lack
of openness in thought, or a propensity to reject more ‘traditional’ beliefs. The personality
and worldview of the two groups require further exploration to fully answer this question.
5.4.4.1.1 Metacognition: Critical Thinking and Confidence
The critical thinking area of the study was at odds with previous research showing that psi
believers having lower critical thinking (Alcock & Otis, 1980; Gray & Mill, 1990; Morgan &
Morgan, 1998); the paranormal believers group in this studied showed a high level of critical
thinking. Religious believers also had similar levels of critical thinking. One explanation for
these findings is that religious beliefs themselves are gained in such a way as to make them
‘immune’ to critical thinking skills. However, this would mean that paranormal belief should
be prone to critical thinking and rejection, but this was not the case. The difference here is
that religious believers are cognitively reflective and thinking critically and the paranormal
believers are not cognitively reflective, indicating that they only think that they are thinking
critically. This critical thinking is linked to metacognition and the difference in confidence
levels was also demonstrated albeit in the third, non-significant profile, but this third profile
was linked to the paranormal believers. Therefore, not only did they not think analytically,
they  were not  aware  of  it;  this  is  a  unique  finding and indicates  that  this  type of  belief
requires a lower level of metacognition and demonstrates the Dunning Kruger Effect (Kruger





The measure of critical thinking could have been problematic. This type of measure is open
to social desirability with it not giving an actual measure of critical thinking but a measure of
how the person wants to be viewed. The measure giving an indication that what they think
they are doing is thinking critically, but they are not. Furthermore, the measure of confidence
could  have  been  more  comprehensive,  rather  than  just  one  question,  it  could  have
incorporated  a  broader  measure  of  confidence  and metacognition  to  get  a  more  nuanced
finding. 
5.5 Chapter Summary
Intelligence does not give a full picture and could lead to being more open regarding belief,
which could account for the mixed findings; higher intelligence, leading to openness, in turn
leading to more belief. The status of supernatural belief being irrational is also controversial,
and what exactly makes a belief and a type of thinking irrational is not clear. Thinking styles
appears to be a more helpful term when looking at these types of belief, with believers in the
supernatural  being  more  intuitive  in  their  thinking  style.  This  is  based  on  Dual  Process
Theory with supernatural believers being more prone to Type One thinking and sceptics being
more  likely  to  engage  in  Type  Two processing  with  belief  being  equivalent  to  intuitive
thinking. However, the status of certain beliefs being intuitive or minimally counterintuitive,
and what leads one type of belief to be more prone to intuitive or reflective thinking is not
clear. While religious beliefs could be cognitively ring-fenced off from analytic thought, and
allow  rejection  of  paranormal  belief  by  religious  believers,  the  reason  for  rejection  of
religious belief by paranormal believers is unknown. This could be due to the paranormal
believer’s level of implicit religious belief or they might not have been raised in a traditional
religious  environment.  While  both  religious  and  paranormal  believers  have  high  critical
thinking scores,  their  own appreciation  for  what  that  means is  different  with  paranormal
believers only  thinking they are critical, when in reality they are not aware of their lack of
metacognition and lack of analytic thinking. The findings of this study support the Cognitive
Deficits  Hypothesis  for  paranormal believers  but  not  religious  believers;  however,  this  is
contingent  on  deficit  being  taken  as  synonymous  with  a  different  style  of  thinking.
Furthermore, this  is dependent on it being incorrect that the paranormal believers are not
using Type Two thinking to evaluate their own beliefs.
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6 Chapter Seven - Building a Model of Cognition, Personality
and Belief
This  chapter  brings  together  the  BitSS developed in  chapters  four  and five,  the  relevant
cognitive measures selected in chapter six, and measures of personality. This will address the
overall aim of the thesis: Examine the cognition and personality of people who hold different
types of belief; and one of the objectives: Create and test a new model of belief based on
cognition and personality. Once again, as with cognition in the previous chapter, there are
many ways to measure personality and this, coupled with different beliefs and the dimensions
within these beliefs, presents a complex picture. This chapter will acknowledge the overlap
between  cognitive  and  personality  correlates  and  incorporate  them  into  a  model  of
supernatural  belief.  This  will  be  accomplished  by  providing  a  literature  review  of  the
relationship between personality and types of belief. The relationship between personality
and paranormality, religiosity and spirituality will be discussed initially; followed by a look at
the specific personality traits of schizotypy and dogmatism. Finally, the various models that
have been developed to explain supernatural belief will be discussed. Personality measures
are added to the cognitive elements that were pertinent from the previous chapter to create an
overall model of belief, examining the direction of influence of personality and cognition on
belief. The hypotheses of this chapter will be based on the results of the previous chapter and
previous literature on personality, in order to establish a new model of belief.
6.1 Introduction
The  influence  of  personality  on  belief  has  been  contested.  One  theory  to  explain  the
relationship is the  Psychodynamic Functions Hypothesis  (Irwin, 1993). The premise of the
Psychodynamic  Functions  Hypothesis  of  paranormal  belief  is  that  these  beliefs  serve  a
particular  need  within  the  individual  (Irwin,  2009).  Broadly  speaking  this  theory  sees
paranormal belief pejoratively, much like the Cognitive Deficits Hypothesis discussed in the
previous  chapter.  The  areas  studied  are  based  on  interpersonal  or  social  behaviour,
psychological adjustment, and psychopathological elements  (Irwin, 2009) and assume that
the beliefs serve a psychodynamic need (Katz, 1960). These beliefs have been seen as deviant
and potentially correlate with the more negative aspects of personality, or at least what is
deemed to be a negative personality trait by society. Socially, the paranormal believer is often
seen as a loner (Northcote, 2007) but this might not be the case. Holding this type of belief
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might serve the need to be connected to something larger than themselves; the parallel can be
seen  with  religious  belief  (Epley,  Akalis,  Waytz,  &  Cacioppo,  2008).  However,  the
paranormal believer is purported to be dysfunctional in some way  (Irwin, 2009); neurotic
(Wiseman  & Watt,  2004) or  anxious  (Uwe Wolfradt,  1997),  for  example.  The  idea  that
paranormal beliefs are a type of coping mechanism is a popular concept in folk psychology
but has not been borne out  (Rogers, Qualter, Phelps, & Gardner, 2006). Not all aspects of
personality are pertinent to every area of supernatural belief, and some may have a larger
effect than others, for example religious belief and paranormal belief show different aspects
of  the  same  factor  of  personality.  However,  religion  and  personality  are  viewed  more
sympathetically.
The  religious  belief  theories  tend  toward  the  first  two  aspects  of  the  Psychodynamic
Functions Hypothesis: social and psychological attribution, with psychopathology not being
considered.  Individual  differences  in  personality  traits  between  religious  and  paranormal
believers  have  not  been  studied  to  a  great  degree.  This  chapter  aims  to  use  personality
measures that will measure social, psychological adjustment and psychopathological aspects
and allow comparisons between the four types of believer.  Hood et al. (2009) note that self-
esteem and locus of control have been relatively well researched with regard to religiosity.
This has been often been done within the framework of Attribution Theory  (Heider, 2013),
the idea being that self-esteem is aided by religious belief and people who believe in a god or
gods are more likely to have an external locus of control and believe that someone is guiding
their life. Three other theories have been identified when it comes to religion and spirituality:
psychodynamic,  behaviourist  and humanistic  (Paloutzian,  2017) but  these  theories  are  at
heart  more  philosophical  than  the  Psychodynamic  Functions  Hypothesis  that  relates  to
paranormal  belief,  demonstrating  the  difference  in  conceptualisation  of  these  two  belief
structures.  Furthermore,  the  notion  of  spirituality  will  be  considered  in  this  chapter.
Spirituality  has  often  been  seen  as  the  ‘good’ part  of  religion,  however,  war,  killing,
suppression,  and hatred  amongst  other  negative  aspects  can also be spiritual  (Paloutzian,
2017). Some think that spirituality is a personality trait in its own right  (Piedmont, 1999;
Rican & Janosova, 2010), however, this has also been disputed (Lazar, 2016). There has been
difficultly in trying to account for personality facets and religiousness (Paloutzian, 2017) and





Personality is defined as ‘a dynamic organisation, inside the person, of psychological systems
that create the person’s characteristic patterns of behaviour, thoughts and feelings’ (Gordon
W.  Allport,  1961).  A person  generally  has  a  ‘type’  of  personality,  however,  it  is  the
measurement of ‘traits’ that is more common. Traits refer to concepts such as openness and
extraversion, which are seen as stable aspects of a person’s personality (Gordon W. Allport,
1961).  Personality  traits  have been measured using several different  tools that  essentially
break personality down into factors. These can be constructs using trait models of personality,
such as the 16 factor model of personality  (Cattell, 1946), the five-factor model  (Costa &
McCrae,  1992),  or  the  HEXACO six-factor  model  of  personality  (Lee  & Ashton,  2004).
Using these various methods, the nature of an individual’s personality can be judged. When
looking  at  paranormality,  personality  measures  have  used  the  five-factor  model  (Milas,
Mlačić, & Mikloušić, 2012; Rattet & Bursik, 2001) and the HEXACO (Williams & Roberts,
2016).  Relationships  between  anomalous  beliefs  and  the  key  traits  of  openness  and
conscientiousness  (e.g.  Swami  et  al.  2009),  extraversion  (e.g.  Thalborne,  1981)  and
neuroticism (e.g. Thalbornue, Dunbar and Delin, 1995) have demonstrated some links with
the five-factor model, but with mixed findings. Earlier studies used measures such as the
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to examine religiosity  (D. G. Brown & Lowe,
1951; Martin & Nichols, 1962); others, the five-factor model (e.g Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007;
Chlewinski,  1981;  Francis,  1993;  Maltby,  1999;  Rowatt  &  Kirkpatrick,  2002;  Taylor  &
MacDonald, 1999) (also see a comprehensive meta-analysis by  Saroglou, [2002]) and the
HEXACO (Aghababaei, 2013). In addition, much of this research has focussed upon the trait
model, or the five-factor model of personality, both of which have been extensively criticised
in the psychometrics literature (e.g. McAdams, 2006). However, there is a dearth of research
examining the relationship between supernatural beliefs and the more comprehensive models
of personality, such as the 16 factor model (i.e. Cattell, 1946).
The  Psychodynamic  Functions  Hypothesis  and  Attribution  Theory  indicate  that  certain
‘types’ of  people  are  attracted  to  certain  beliefs  for  different  reasons;  that  the  beliefs
themselves serve a particular need or that the individual attributes events either to themselves
or to outside influence. These types are identified by personality ‘traits’. What follows will be
a brief review of the literature that relates to paranormality, religiosity and spirituality, and
traits of personality. It will finish with an overall view of supernatural belief and personality.
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6.1.1.1 Paranormality and Personality
Paranormality  has  been  studied  in  many  different  fashions,  with  regard  to  belief  and
experience and by examining the different dimensions of paranormal belief. However, studies
looking directly at personality traits are limited. Paranormal belief has been seen to correlate
with  neuroticism  (Vyse,  1997;  Wiseman  & Watt,  2004),  aggression,  defendance  (Auton,
Pope, & Seeger, 2003), sensation seeking, and locus of control  (Groth-Marnat & Pegden,
1998). Paranormal experience correlated more with personality than belief in the paranormal
(Rattet & Bursik, 2001). Different aspects of paranormal belief correlated with personality in
different  ways;  conscientiousness  correlated  negatively  with  psi  belief;  neuroticism  was
positively correlated with superstition, extraordinary life forms and precognition. Openness
was positive with psi and spiritualism (Milas et al., 2012). Furthermore, another study found
that  superstition  was  negatively  correlated  with  conscientiousness  and  openness  to
experience, and precognition was negatively correlated with honesty/humility  (Williams &
Roberts,  2016).  While  these studies  dealt  with quite  broad measures  of personality  other
studies have examined the five-factor model of personality and paranormality.
There are  few studies that  deal  with paranormality  and the five-factor  model.  Rattet  and
Bursik  (2001) showed  that  there  was  a  strong  positive  correlation  between  precognitive
experiences and paranormal belief, however, this was not conducted on the rPBS subscales of
‘traditional  religious  belief’,  ‘superstition’ or  ‘witchcraft’,  but  rather  on  the  ‘traditional’
aspects of paranormal belief. The study found that personality (introversion, intuition, and
extraversion) correlates with experience but not with belief. This study concentrated more on
the aspect of experience rather than belief and did not discuss the belief/experience paradox –
the issue that belief in the paranormal being is a requirement for a paranormal experience
(Irwin, Schofield, & Baker, 2014). The findings could be due to the lack of clarification of the
dimensions of belief  examined.  Milas  et  al.  (2012) looked at  the different dimensions of
paranormal belief using a Croatian sample of 307 students to look at the relationship with the
five-factor model. They used the rPBS and carried out a factor analysis on the overall scale,
finding three factors: ‘general paranormal belief’, ‘traditional religious belief’, and ‘rituals
and practices’. Openness, conscientiousness and neuroticism correlated best with the three
factors they found, and the original seven factor solution of the rPBS. Conscientiousness
correlated  positively  with  traditional  religious  belief  and  negatively  with  psi  belief.
Neuroticism was  positively  correlated  with  ‘superstition’,  ‘extraordinary  life  forms’,  and
‘precognition’,  whereas  openness  had  the  highest  correlations;  negative  for  ‘traditional
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religious  belief’,  and  positive  with  ‘psi’  and  ‘spiritualism’.  However,  the  strongest
correlations for these were still only .025 and -.25. The three factors posited by the authors
correlated as follows: conscientiousness correlated negatively with general paranormal belief
and positively with ‘traditional  religious belief’.  Openness also positively correlated with
‘traditional  religious  belief’ and  finally  extraversion  correlated  with  general  paranormal
beliefs. Again, correlations were low. It is difficult to see what their new factor structure adds,
and it is likely that their interpretation is closer to Lange et al.'s (2000) top down purification
of two factors.
The main personality  traits  that  correlate  with paranormality  are  as follows:  neuroticism,
conscientiousness,  openness  with  paranormal  belief  and  introversion,  intuition,  and
extraversion with paranormal experience. However, this could be partly due to the measures
used for paranormal belief. The traits of openness and conscientiousness were correlated with
‘traditional religious belief’ and ‘spiritualism’ (openness only). This indicates the measure
could  be  attributing  certain  correlates  of  personality  to  paranormal  belief  when they  are
applicable to religious beliefs.
6.1.1.2 Religiosity and Personality
There have been more studies that look at religiosity and trait models of personality than look
at paranormality. However, as with paranormality dimensions, the different dimensions of
religiosity have different personality traits associated with them, often making the findings
appear conflicted. Generally, introverts are more likely to be religious and neuroticism is not
correlated with religious people or atheists (Chlewinski, 1981) as religious believers are more
‘stable’  (Saroglou,  2002b).  However,  there  is  a  link  between  intrinsic  religiosity  and
neuroticism (Maltby, Talley, Cooper, & Leslie, 1995; Saroglou, 2002). Francis (1993) looked
at personality and religion using attitude to Christianity and found no relationship between
neuroticism and extraversion with religiosity but religisoity was negatively correlated with
psychoticism. However, in a later study Francis and Kay (1995) found that personality and
Pentecostal  ministry candidates were lower in neuroticism compared to a control.  Francis
(2010) also  looked  at  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  orientation  and  personality,  finding  that
extrinsically-oriented individuals had higher neuroticism and lower levels of psychoticism,
and  intrinsically-oriented  individuals  had  negative  psychoticism  and  no  correlation  with
extraversion and neuroticism. Furthermore,  Francis et al. (2010) examined Christian belief
and paranormal belief with personality on a very large sample of teenagers (n=10,851). They
found that religious belief and paranormal belief placed differently on the personality scale;
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Christian belief  had lower psychoticism scores than paranormal belief.  This was taken to
indicate more social conformity in religious believers than paranormal believers. However,
despite  the  large  sample  size,  only  four  items in  total  were  used  to  gauge religious  and
paranormal belief, bringing the findings into question. Furthermore, social desirability would
play a large role in this study as they were ministry candidates and might be eager to present
a caring façade; this problem is more likely to affect extrinsic orientation. It appears that
agreeableness and conscientiousness seem to correlate in different ways depending on the
dimension (intrinsic  or  extrinsic)  of  religiosity  examined  and  this  plays  a  key  role  in
personality factors of religiosity.
Taylor and MacDonald (1999) used the intrinsic and extrinsic model of religiosity to examine
the five-factor  model of personality.  Agreeableness and conscientiousness were positively
related to intrinsic but not to extrinsic religiosity. However, the other factors of personality
were not shown to be related to either of the religiosity dimensions. They concluded that
openness was the least relatable to the construct of religiosity. They acknowledge that the
sample was not very diverse and this may have contributed to the results. A meta-analysis
carried out by Saroglou (2002) looked at the  five-factor model and religiosity and found that
agreeableness  and  conscientiousness  were  the  two  factors  of  personality  that  were  most
related to religiosity. However, they did find that other dimensions of the five-factor model
were related to other dimensions of religiosity. Intrinsic religiosity was found to be related to
extraversion  and  extrinsic  religiosity  to  neuroticism.  Also,  they  found  that  intrinsic  and
spiritual scores were positively related to openness and religious fundamentalism was low on
openness. They also noted that the effect sizes for the studies were small. When measuring
different dimensions, the results appear somewhat different. Altruism has been seen to be a
key factor when looking at religiosity and the personality trait of agreeableness.
Religious belief has pro-social and conservative values (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007) and these
personality correlates point to the need for order and stability within a person’s life and show
a concern for others' welfare. However, it may not be altruism but the need to be seen as
caring;  this  could link to  extrinsic  rather  than intrinsic  orientation.  Robbins  et  al.  (2010)
looked at extrinsic, intrinsic and quest and personality, finding that only agreeableness was
related to intrinsic religiosity. Furnham and Cheng (2015) found that religious believers were
more likely to be open, educated, agreeable, and female. However, the effect sizes in this
study were small.  Aghababaei (2012) examined religiosity and personality using the five-
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factor model and the HEXACO model. Agreeableness and conscientiousness were the best
correlate from the big five and honesty and humility from the HEXACO. While intrinsic and
extrinsic were used, they were only measured by a single item each. Results from this study
should  be  treated  with  extreme  caution.  Aghababaei  (2013) looked  at  personality  and
religiosity  within  a  Muslim  population.  Using  the  five-factor  model  it  was  found  that
agreeableness  and  conscientiousness  were  the  best  correlates.  The  general  factor  of
personality  correlated  with  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  personal  religiosity,  indicating  an
extraverted, emotionally stable personality, which is socially desirable. Abdel-Khalek (2013)
looked at religiosity and personality in Muslim college students. Religiosity in women was
negatively  correlated  with  neuroticism and  positively  with  extraversion.  Burris  and  Raif
(2015) looked at childhood play states, personality and people who change their religious
identity. The measure of religiosity was asking them what religion they were born into and
what religion they are now, to identify apostates. They looked at the differences between five
groups: lifelong nonreligious, apostates, converts, switchers, and lifelong religious. Lifelong
religious were more agreeable and conscientious compared to the other groups, but less open
to  experience.  Extraversion  and  neuroticism did  not  appear  to  be  different  between  the
groups. The only difference was in the lifelong religious group indicating that belief is the
deciding factor;  with the caveat  that  the belief  is  traditional  and not changed. There is  a
difference  between  intrinsic  and  extrinsic  religiosity,  with  the  lifelong  religious  being
potentially more extrinsic. This further links to spirituality and intrinsic religiosity potentially
having  differing  correlates  of  personality  traits.  However,  the  link  between  intrinsic
religiosity and spirituality could be a key factor, and spirituality may even be a personality
trait in its own right.
The findings relating the religiosity and personality traits are mixed at best, generally with
low effect sizes. Religious people in general are not neurotic or psychotic. However, findings
are mixed regarding introversion. Agreeableness and conscientiousness are the most related
to  religiosity,  and  openness  is  the  least.  However,  when  looking  at  the  dimensions  of
religiosity,  intrinsic  and  neuroticism  showed  mixed  findings;  agreeableness  and
conscientiousness  were  positively  correlated  with  intrinsic  but  not  extrinsic.  Also,  the
extrinsic neuroticism results are mixed. Finally, intrinsic was linked to openness, but this was
framed more spiritually. Also, it was found that intrinsic and spiritual scores were positively
related to openness, while religious fundamentalism was low on openness. These findings
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indicate various problems; dimensions may be playing different roles when interacting with
certain traits; the five factor model is not defined enough to cope with these differences.
6.1.1.3 Spirituality and Personality
Spirituality has been positively linked to extraversion  (Lazar, 2016; Maltby & Day, 2001),
agreeableness and conscientiousness  (Saroglou & Muñoz-García,  2008), but negatively to
neuroticism (Chang et al., 2015; Labbé & Fobes, 2010). However, people who identified as
spiritual  but  not  religious  showed  higher  levels  of  neuroticism  (Schnell,  2012).
Henningsgaard and Arnau (2008) stated that a multivariate approach to religiosity, spirituality
and personality was required. They looked at the religiosity dimensions: intrinsic, extrinsic
and quest. There were strong relationships between religiosity, spirituality, and personality.
Intrinsic  was  related  positively  to  agreeableness  and  conscientiousness.  Also,  spiritual
meaning positively correlated with extraversion,  conscientiousness,  and agreeableness and
had a negative association with neuroticism. However, they did not discuss the relationship
between spirituality and intrinsic religiosity (see chapter two); this oversight would help to
explain some of their results.  Saroglou (2010) states that the five-factors of personality are
linked to ‘religiousness’ in the following way: agreeableness is the investment by people in
their belief and they are a pro-social person guided by a loving God; conscientiousness looks
at goals and meaning in life which will be mirrored in the religious beliefs and practices they
subscribe to; extraversion, an active engagement in their beliefs and surrounding and finally
neuroticism will look at the positive and negative emotion, although the author's thinking of
this is vague and fuzzy, in keeping with spirituality itself. Noticeably absent here is openness,
but  high openness would sooner  be linked to  spiritual types of belief,  and low openness
would link to more fundamentalist types of belief. However, results appear differently when
looking at extremes of belief.  Saroglou's (2010) meta-analysis looked at 63 studies that had
71 samples from 19 countries.  Agreeableness and conscientiousness were correlated with
religiosity,  spirituality  and  fundamentalism;  the  relationships  were  stronger  in  adults.
Spirituality  was  predicted  by  high  openness  to  experience  and  fundamentalism  was
associated with low openness in adults. However, it has been noted that people with more
spiritual beliefs are more likely to overstate their own openness  (Ludeke & Carey, 2015).
High extraversion and low neuroticism (so called positive emotionality)  was strongest  in
religious adults, possibly reflecting the stability in older life styles, although this is highly
debateable. The mean effect sizes for this meta-analysis were modest. Problems with this
meta-analysis  were  that  students  and females  were too  prevalent  and not  enough studies
within it contained non-western religious groups.
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Spirituality  appears  to  correlate  positively  with  openness  and  this  seems  to  be  a  key
difference  to  some of  the  studies  based  on religiosity.  However,  this  could  be  due  to  a
conflation by some studies of spirituality and religiosity. Spirituality appears to be more open
than religiosity which could help clarify the differences between the two concepts. A clearer
demarcation would help to overcome some of these problems. The openness of spirituality
and closed mindedness of people who hold more traditional religious beliefs has been studied
alongside dogmatism. 
6.1.1.4 Dogmatism and Belief
Dogmatism is  defined  as  the  subordination  of  peripheral  belief  to  a  more  central  belief
(Rokeach, 1960). For example, a person’s religious belief would have an effect on beliefs
held about other constructs such as paranormal belief. Dogmatism has been linked to close
mindedness  (Saroglou,  2002a).  This  is  a  key  difference  between  religious,  spiritual  and
paranormal believers with less dogmatism potentially leading to higher rates of openness.
Irwin  (2009) states that there is a lack of research into dogmatism and paranormal belief.
However, dogmatism has been classed as a cognitive deficit rather than a personality deficit,
once again demonstrating the overlap between cognition and personality (Irwin, 2009). Only
some dimensions of paranormal belief correlated with dogmatism. Witchcraft  (Tobacyk &
Milford,  1983),  tradition  religious  belief,  superstition  and  psi  correlate  with  dogmatism
(Alcock & Otis, 1980). However, dogmatism could be helping to maintain the belief rather
than form it  (Irwin,  2009) or be influenced by other aspects of personality.  Although the
findings between two aspects of dogmatism, conscientiousness and authoritarianism, do not
fit with this (Irwin, 2009). Naturally, there has been more research surrounding religiosity and
dogmatism.
Dogmatism has been linked to religious fundamentalism (Hood et al., 2009), and dogmatism
has  also  been  linked  to  scepticism  (Pryor,  2000).  However  the  findings  are  mixed  for
religiosity and dogmatism (Francis, 2001). This indicates that as with paranormal belief, it is
the religiosity dimensions that are influencing the relationship or that dogmatism is reflecting
other aspects of personality. Rather than dogmatism simply being the rejection of beliefs that
do not  fit  with a  person’s  worldview,  it  requires  that  other  beliefs  are  subordinated  to  a
person’s  core  belief;  be  that  religious,  paranormal  or  sceptical  (Saroglou,  2002a).  The
subordination of  other  belief  can be  seen in  greater  confidence  levels  as  associated with
higher levels of dogmatism  (Davies, 1998). However, other research shows that dogmatic
atheists and religious believers are more uncertain about the world around them (Kossowska,
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Czernatowicz-Kukuczka,  &  Sekerdej,  2017).  While  this  may  appear  paradoxical,  the
uncertainness about the world around them, may be causing them to be more dogmatic about
the beliefs that they are familiar with and that offer them comfort. It appears that dogmatism
may play a key role in the maintenance of certain beliefs. This is of interest when looking at
whether scepticism and dogmatism may play a key role in an overall model of belief.
6.1.2 Models of Belief
The final intention of this thesis is to develop a casual model of supernatural belief. The
cognition measures taken from chapter six will be added to the personality measures that
have been discussed above along with further measures discussed below. This will meet the
second objective of this thesis: Create and test a new model of supernatural belief based on
cognitive and personality differences. Previous models will be discussed that are related to
schizotypy,  childhood  trauma,  scientifically  unaccepted  beliefs  and  cognition.  Previous
research and theory as well as the findings of chapter six and this chapter will inform the
possible construction of this model. There have been previous models based on supernatural
belief and these will be useful in determining the direction of influence of personality and
cognition on belief.
6.1.2.1 Schizotypy Model of Belief
Hergovich  et  al.'s  (2008) model  (see  Figure   7  .19)  included  schizotypy,  feeding  into
paranormal belief and superstition (including traditional religiosity). Their model showed that
schizotypy strongly predicted paranormal belief and superstition, however, the superstition
element of their model did include extraordinary life forms and religiosity which are arguably
not superstitious (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). This indicates that personality is important
in a model and schizoytpy is a central part of that model.
Schizotypy is a type of thinking that can be similar to schizophrenia but is present in a person
that is not afflicted by the disorder. This type of thinking can include magical, muddled and
disjointed thinking (Irwin, 2009). A schizotype person might also appear aloof and distance
themselves from others, or exhibit impulsive behaviour and be fantasy prone. Day and Peters
(1999) looked at new religious movements, such as Hare Krishna and Druids, and compared
them to Christians using the O-Life Scale  (Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995) to measure
schizotypy. They found that members of new religious movements scored higher in unusual
experiences  and  that  ‘positive’ schizotypal  traits  were  present  in  the  members  of  new
religious movements but that this did not wholly support the idea of the ‘happy schizotype’.
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The ‘happy schizotype’ is a person who is prone to anomalous experiences and finds them
pleasant.  They  have  no  psychopathology  and  report  high  levels  of  wellbeing  (Holt,
Simmonds-Moore, & Moore, 2008). 
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Figure 7.19. Structural Model Showing the Relationship between Schizotypy, Superstition 
and Paranormal Belief (Hergovich et al., 2008).
Lindeman and Lipsanen (2016) looked at the cognitive profiles of 984 religious believers and
1000 non-believers. They grouped them together using latent class analysis based on: analytic
thinking, empathising, mechanistic cognition, and autistic and schizotypal traits. They wanted
to identify the different subgroups that might be within the two groups of believer and non-
believer. They found that there was more variation  within the groups than  between them.
They identified the following subgroups: low analytical empathisers, analytical empathisers,
and impaired empathisers with increased schizotypal  and autistic  symptoms coupled with
either low or high analytic thinking. While it is an interesting finding which may offer a
solution for all the mixed findings in this area, the measurement of belief may have not been
thorough enough. Simply creating two groups loses the subtlety of the different beliefs (i.e.,
spiritual vs religious vs paranormal). For this reason the differences within the two groups
were  poorly  defined.  The  person-centred  approach is  interesting  and  the  study might  be
improved with the use of a better measure of belief. Spirituality has also been linked to the
positive schizotype (Unterrainer et al., 2016; Unterrainer & Lewis, 2014) and spiritual but not
religious people have also scored higher on schizotypy than religious or non-religious people




The type of disorganised thinking associated with schizotypal personality could be used to
interpret  experience  via  belief,  to  make  sense  of  one's  life  (Claridge,  Clark,  Powney,  &
Hassan, 2008; Goulding, 2004). Swami et al. (2011) found that the belief that extra-terrestrial
life had visited earth was predicted by paranormal belief, the unusual experience factor on the
schizotypy scale, openness to experience, and level of education. Thalbourne (2005) looked
at eight studies that examined the link between paranormal belief and creativity personalities,
and concluded that sheep-types have a more creative style of personality than goat-types.
They found that the creative personality is correlated with schizotypy,which is seen to suggest
that the ‘happy schizotype’ is high functioning despite or because of their belief/experiences.
Genovese (2005) found that an intuitive thinking style and schizotypy both had an effect on
paranormal belief but there was no effect between thinking style and schizotypy. The study
had a small effect size and was based on teachers. They suggest that a teacher might transmit
paranormal beliefs to students. Studies on experience can be helpful, particular with regard to
how experience effects belief and vice versa (Irwin et al., 2014).
 
Mathijsen  (2016) examined  paranormal  experiences  and  their  relationship  to  schizotypy.
They  proposed  that  paranormal  experiences  create  a  ‘paradigm shift’ in  personality  and
change personal worldview; this leads to the development of a schizotypal personality via
cognitive change. This has been called ‘Hermit Crab Syndrome’ (Mathijsen, 2010), which is
when an  individual  is  confronted  with  an  anomalous  experience,  such as  seeing  a  book
thrown from a shelf, and they use magical thinking to explain it, therefore reducing cognitive
dissonance; this would mean the person can integrate the experience with their belief system.
Belief could mediate between the experience and schizotypy, but the relationship between
belief and experience is unclear. The idea of a positive schizotype would appear to show
different beliefs in a more positive light, and is a key element when it comes to certain types
of supernatural belief. This way of thinking may enable the believer to develop the belief and
to  maintain  it.  One  route  for  the  development  of  schizotypal  and  fantasy  proneness  is
childhood trauma that has been included in various models of paranormal belief.
6.1.2.2 Models of Childhood Trauma and Paranormal Belief
Childhood  trauma has  also  been  brought  into  previous  models  of  paranormal  belief  and
experience  (Irwin, 1993; Lawrence et al., 1995) (see  Figure  7 .20 and  Figure  7 .21). The
definitions used for childhood trauma have been broad. The types of trauma could possibly
be viewed on a continuum; some studies identified extreme childhood trauma, such as abuse
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(Lawrence et al., 1995), or having parents who were alcoholics (Irwin, 1994). It can be seen
that this  covers a wide range of trauma but some experiences could be best described as
childhood experience, rather than trauma. Several studies have examined the link between
childhood trauma and paranormality  (Berkowski & MacDonald, 2014; Irwin, 1994; Irwin,
1992; Lawrence et al., 1995; Perkins & Allen, 2006; Rabeyron & Watt, 2010; Ross & Joshi,
1992) generally finding small, positive correlations or borderline significant/non-significant
results. However, these studies do not look at childhood trauma in isolation but usually in
conjunction with other factors. In his study, Irwin (1992) examined the psychological origins
of  paranormal  belief.  He  suggests  a  direct  link  between  paranormal  belief  and  fantasy
proneness. He suggests that the link between fantasy proneness and paranormal experience is
mediated by paranormal belief; further indicating that there have been positive correlations
found between fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 1990, 1991). The theory is
that the root of fantasy proneness lies in early childhood development. The two crucial factors
in the early childhood stage are being encouraged to fantasize in early life, and/or childhood
trauma of some kind (S. C. Wilson & Barber, 1982). This can be seen in the first half of the
model in Figure  7 .20. However, the role that childhood trauma plays here is unclear, and not
strongly supported by research.
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Figure 7.20. Model Showing The Functions and Origins of Paranormal Belief (Irwin, 1993).
150
Sensitivity: Internal
Content Removed for Copyright Reasons
Figure 7.21. A Model Showing the Childhood Causes of Paranormal Belief (Lawrence et al., 
1995).
Lawrence et al. (1995) looked at the childhood factors model of paranormal belief in Irwin’s
study of paranormal belief, psychological adjustment, and fantasy proneness and attempted to
confirm his model (see Figure  7 .21). They examined both paranormal belief and paranormal
experience and looked at childhood trauma and childhood fantasy; making the link between
fantasy  proneness  and  childhood  trauma.  Interestingly  the  highest  effect  size  was
demonstrated by paranormal experience, rather than belief, suggesting that trauma is more
likely to lead to experience rather than to belief. The link with fantasy proneness is certainly
stronger with paranormal belief and while childhood trauma also correlated with both, the
effect sizes were small. A need for control seems also to be linked to paranormality here but
again this does not necessarily point directly to childhood trauma. One problem is the wide
array of the definitions of childhood trauma, from loneliness, to more serious physical abuse
(Perkins & Allen, 2006). This is a wide range and arguably most people will report some kind
of childhood trauma, be it only getting separated from parents in a supermarket, for example.
These  memories  have,  on  occasion,  been  shown  to  be  false,  and  sometimes  easily
suggestable. The fact that participants were asked to recall events that occurred a long time
ago can also lead to confabulation of events. Caution should be taken when doing research on




6.1.2.3 Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs
Irwin (2009) posited a model that examined Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs (see Figure  7 .
22). Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs are beliefs that are scientifically impossible; in the case
of this model, parapsychological beliefs and belief in black magic. This model attempted to
look at how certain correlates interact and how they influence cognition when these types of
belief are both formed and maintained. Involved in the model are socio-cultural factors, the
need for a sense of mastery, and additional links to mental processes and reality testing. Like
the  childhood trauma type models,  this  starts  with  early  diminished control  and while  it
presents  an  interesting  model,  there  is  a  need  for  a  more  empirical  approach  to  model
building and one that includes both cognition and personality. One difficultly with this model
is that the term parapsychological belief is confined to psi type beliefs, and the belief in black
magic element of the model is oddly specific. Also, the terms used are vague, such as the
need for a sense of mastery. There is a clear need for a more comprehensive model. Irwin
(2009) noted that the primary focus of his model was to stimulate further research to examine
the mental processes. Also, he notes that a better method of measuring paranormal belief is
greatly needed. While Irwin’s proposed model contains information processing styles (which
is analogous to thinking styles) some models have used empirical data to include cognition
within the model.
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Figure 7.22. Model Showing the Potential Causes of Scientifically Unaccepted Beliefs
(Irwin, 2009).
6.1.2.4 Model of Cognition and Belief
Pennycook  et  al.  (2012)  developed  a  model  that  found that  religious  belief  served  as  a
mediator between an analytic cognitive style and religious engagement (see  Figure  7 .23).
However, this is only one aspect of supernatural belief and only one aspect of cognition;
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cognition  in  this  case  is  causing  belief,  while  it  could  be  vice  versa  or  a  reciprocal
relationship between the two. The strongest relationship in the model is between religious
belief  and engagement.  However,  the  link  between analytic  cognitive  style  and religious
beliefs  is  considerably weaker,  weaker  still  is  the relationship between analytic  cognitive
style  and  religious  engagement.  It  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  the  relationship  between
analytic cognitive style and religious engagement is positive. Indicating that people who are
more  extrinsic  may  be  more  reflective.  The  use  of  too  few  variables  in  this  model  is
problematic and a regressional model would have been sufficient. 
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Figure 7.23. Model Showing the Relationship between Analytic Cognitive Style, Religious 
Beliefs and Religious Engagement (Pennycook et al., 2012).
As Irwin (2009) commented on the model that was proposed (see Figure  7 .22): it was an
initial start to be built and improved on. As has been discussed, previous models have added
elements  but  none  have  attempted  to  incorporate  religious  and  paranormal  beliefs,  and
cognitive  and  personality  differences.  Schizotypy  appears  to  be  an  important  element  of
personality  when modelling  supernatural  belief  alongside  cognition.  While  the  childhood
trauma model is inherently flawed, schizotypy via fantasy proneness would be more likely to
yield  a  better  model.  The  models  of  cognition  that  have  so  far  been  suggested  offer  an
indication of possible direction but are not comprehensive enough as they stand and require
elements  of  personality  to  offer  a  more  holistic  picture.  This  will  be  offered  by  a
comprehensive model that will give insight into the causal effect of belief on cognition and
personality  or  vice versa:  an effect  of  cognition  and personality  on belief.  And as  Irwin
(2009) states, there is a need for a holistic approach when modelling belief.
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The measures of personality that have been used indicate mixed findings when examining the
five-factor  model  of  personality  and  belief.  To  identify  and  account  for  these  previous
findings  a  more  defined measure  of  personality  is  needed.  The 15FQ+ will  provide  this
much-needed  clarification  and  determine  what  is  happening  within  the  five  factors  of
personality and the different types of believers. This will then lead to a more comprehensive
model of belief.
6.1.3 Hypotheses
The hypotheses will  provide potential  profiles that  each type of believer as identified by
Schofield et al. (2016) may have membership. Profile one will have: reflective thinking (in
line with the previous chapter), introverted, and not neurotic. Finally they will be low on
schizotypal  thinking  and  dogmatic.  Profile  two  will  be:  low  in  reflective  thinking,
extraverted, neurotic and open. Also, they will have a high level of schizotypy. The sceptics
group will have profile one. The religious believers will be a combination of profile one and




Participants (n=152) were recruited from the University  of Derby,  Twitter,  Facebook and
Reddit via an opportunity sampling method. G*Power (Erdfelder et al., 1996) indicated that a
sample size of 60 was required and that the optimum sample size for Structural Equation
Modelling  is  between  100  and  200  participants.  Therefore,  the  sample  size  of  153  was
deemed adequate. The age range was between 18 and 72 (mean =29.63, SD= 11.61). Gender
was 55 (35.9%) male,  92 (60.1%) female and 6 (3.9%) preferred not to say.  Ninety-four
(61.8%) participants were students, of which 6 (10.3%) were in upper secondary education,
13 (22.4 %) were in further education, 16 (27.6%) were undergraduates and 23 (39.7%) were
in postgraduate study. Religious self-identification includes the following: Christian, Muslim,
Hindu, Jewish and Pagan; these were categorised and are presented in  Table  7 .23.  Five
hundred and forty people attempted the survey with 153 completed both surveys to the end,
giving a completion rate of 28.15%. The low completion rate being due to the length of the




The relevant measures of cognition from chapter six were taken forward into this chapter. An
additional  measure of cognitive reflection was added to account  for practice effects.  The
measures were hosted on two online surveys; the measures of supernatural belief, cognitive
reflection, critical thinking, confidence, dogmatism, and schizotypy on one survey and the
15F+Q measure of  personality  on a  separate  survey.  The 15FQ+ was held on a  separate
survey due to it being owned by Psytech. The measures are listed below.
6.2.2.1 Belief in the Supernatural Scale
The BitSS is a 44 item scale with five subscales used to measure supernatural belief. For
details of this scale please see chapter six. For Cronbach’s α Coefficients, see Table  7 .21.
6.2.2.2 Cognitive Reflection Test Long
The CRT-L (Primi et al., 2015) is a 6 item measure of cognitive refection. For more details of
this tool, please see chapter six.
6.2.2.3 Critical Thinking and Disposition Scale
The CTDS (Sosu, 2013) is an 11 item scale used measure critical thinking. For further details
of this scale please see chapter six. For Cronbach’s α Coefficients, see Table  7 .21.
6.2.2.4 Confidence Scale
Confidence for the CRT-L and the CRT-2 questions were measured using the question ‘How
confident  are  you  that  you  gave  the  correct  answer?  Please  type  in  your  answer  below
between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure)’ (Neys et al., 2011). The response was
open ended, but asking for a number between 1 and 100.
6.2.2.5 Cognitive Reflection Test 2 
The CRT-2 (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) is another measure of intuitive and normative
response that was used alongside the CRT-L to combat practice effects that may have arisen
from the CRT –L being used in the preceding chapter. This measure has four items and the
item response format is open ended. The response can be correct, have a heuristic intuitive
answer or have an answer that is neither. Items are: ‘If you’re running a race and you pass the
person  in  second  place,  what  place  are  you in?’ (Intuitive  answer:  first;  correct  answer:
second), ‘A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?’ (Intuitive answer: 7;
correct answer: 8), ‘Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April and
May. What is the third daughter’s name?’ (intuitive answer: June; correct answer: Emily) and
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‘How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ long?’ (Intuitive
answer: 27; correct answer: none).
6.2.2.6 Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings & Experiences (O-LIFE).
The O-LIFE (Mason et al., 1995) scale is at 104 item measure of schizotypy that has four
subscales.   These  subscales  measure  unusual  experiences  (30  items),  cognitive
disorganisation (24 items), introvertive anhedonia (27 items) and impulsive nonconformity
(23 items). The item response format is a binary yes/no. All items scored +1 for ‘yes’, 0 for
‘no’ except for reverse scored items (22 items) items for which +1 for ‘no’,  0 for ‘yes’.
Example items include ‘Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food?’, ‘Do you usually have
very little desire to buy new kinds of food?’ and ‘No matter how hard you try to concentrate
do unrelated thoughts creep into your mind?’ For Cronbach’s α Coefficients, see Table  7 .21.
6.2.2.7 DOG Scale
The DOG Scale  (Altemeyer,  2002) is a 20 item scale (that has two initial  statements for
participant familiarisation that are not scored) with no subscales. The scale is intended to
measure dogmatism. The item response format is -4 to +4 and converted to 1 to 9 for scoring.
Ten items are reverse scored. Example items include: ‘It is best to be open to all possibilities
and ready to re-evaluate all your beliefs’, ‘My opinions are right and will stand the test of
time’  and  ‘“Flexibility  in  thinking”  is  another  name  for  being  “wishy-washy”’.  For
Cronbach’s α Coefficients, see Table  7 .21.
Table  7.21.  Table showing Cronbach’s α Coefficients for the scales and Subscales of  the
BitSS, O LIFE, CTDS and DOG Taken from the Current Study.












 n =11 
Subscales  











Supernatural Entities (BitSS) items
0.94
n=7
Common Paranormal Perceptions (BitSS) items
0.90
n=7
Critical Openness (CTDS) Items
0.79
 n =7 
Reflective Scepticism (CTDS) Items 0.78
 n  =4 
Unusual Experiences (O LIFE) items
0.86
n =30
Cognitive Disorganisation (O LIFE) items
0.87
n=24
Introvertive Anhedonia (O LIFE) items
0.83
n=27




The 15FQ+ is a 200 item scale to measure personality that has 15 subscales (see Table  7 .22
for the 15FQ+s relationship with to the five-factor model and a description of the terms). This
measure was selected to measure the 15 factors of personality in more detail than the five-
factor model. The item response format in three possible answers that differ depending on the
question. The scoring is a one to ten sten (a person’s score compared to other in a normal
distributed sample) scale. Further details are protected by copyright Psytech.
 
Table 7.22. Table Showing the Five-Factors of Personality and How the 15FQ+ Factors Map




Lacking  in  empathy,  distant/friendly,
caring
Sober Serious/Enthusiastic Restrained, cautious/lively, cheerful
Retiring/Socially Bold Timid, shy/ talkative, socially confident
Group-Orientated/Self-Sufficient Sociable/solitary, self-reliant
Agreeableness Low Intellectance/High Intellectance Lacking  confidence  in  intellectual
abilities/confident of intellectual abilities
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Utilitarian,  touch  minded/sensitive,
sentimental 
Conventional/ Radical See above
Conscientiousness
Expedient/ Conscientious Spontaneous/dutiful, detail conscious





Affected by Feelings/Emotionally Stable Emotional, changeable/mature, calm
Trusting/Suspicious See above
Confident/Self-Doubting Secure, self-assured/worrying, insecure
Composed/Tense-Driven
Relaxed,  placid/impatient,  low
frustration tolerance
6.2.3 Procedure
The study had two parts. Participants were sent a link to an online survey that was hosted by
www.qualtrics.com. They were then presented with an information sheet providing details on
their right to withdraw, confidentiality, anonymity and further details of what they would be
required to do should they agree to take part.  They were asked to state their age, gender,
religious belief, occupation, a unique ID code and their email address so they could be sent
the second part of the study. Next they were presented with several scales or tasks that were
randomised for counter balancing purposes: CRTL, CRT2 (after these two confidence scores
were requested), the O-LIFE Scale and the CTDS. Finally they were debriefed about the first
part  of  the  study.  They  were  then  emailed  a  link  to  the  15FQ+  that  was  hosted  by
www.gensys.com. After they completed this they were emailed a debrief.
6.2.4 Ethics
See Chapters Four, Five and Six for British Psychological Society (2006) guidelines that
were followed regarding informed consent and confidentiality.





A Cluster Analysis was performed on the subscale of the BitSS to identify the different types
of believer. This was followed by a MANOVA on the CRTL, CRT2, CTDS, O-LIFE Scale,
DOG  Scale,  confidence  measure,  and  the  15  subscales  of  the  15FQ+.  A Discriminant
Function Analysis  was then carried out  to  establish profile  of  the four  types of  believer.
Finally, several Structural Equation Models were tested to establish the model that had the
optimal fit with the data.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Religious Self Identification
The self-reported beliefs were categorised into five groups and the association between these
categories and the four groups of believer identified in the Cluster Analysis were compared.
For the categories, frequencies and percentage, see 
. More than two cells had counts of less than two, therefore Fishers Exact Probability was
used to assess the association. There was a significant (p < .001) association between the four
types of believer and the self-reported religious belief  of the participants.  A Monte Carle
Method was used due to the size of the contingency table (Field, 2013).
Table  7.23.  Table  Showing Religious  Self-Identification in  Relation to  the  Four Types  of
Believer.
 Traditional Religious Belief Agnostic or Atheist Spiritual None Other
Believers 14 (51.9%) 8 (16.7%) 1 (100%) 8 (22.2%) 7 (70%)
Paranormal Believers 2 (7.4%) 18 (37.5%) 0 (0%) 9 (25%) 1 (10%)
Sceptics 2 (7.4%) 22 (45.8%) 0 (0%) 19 (52.8%) 2 (20%)
Religious Believers 9 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Total 27 (100%) 48 (100%) 1 (100%) 36 (100%) 10 (100%)
30 participants chose not to answer the question.
6.3.2 Main Analysis
To classify  the  data  into  different  believer  groups,  a  Hierarchical  Cluster  Analysis  using
Ward’s method was performed on the z scores (to normalise the scores) of the five subscales




For  descriptive  statistics  see  Table   7  .24.  Histograms  and  boxplots  were  examined  for
normality, there were several outliers, but due to the skewedness and kurtosis being mostly




Table 7.24. Table Showing Descriptive Statistics for the Four Clusters and the Cognitive and Personality Measures.
Cluster One Cluster Two Cluster Three Cluster Four
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis
OLIFE Total 32.84 11.16 -0.11 -0.69 43.90 13.59 0.04 -1.07 32.60 9.89 -0.10 0.46 46.14 15.12 -0.09 -0.70
CRTL Total 4.10 1.79 -0.85 -0.35 3.29 1.97 -0.10 -1.39 3.50 2.07 -0.94 -0.11 3.22 1.87 -0.08 -1.34
CRT2 Total 2.78 0.93 -0.80 0.65 2.95 0.97 -0.93 0.87 2.50 1.27 -0.82 0.25 2.61 1.17 -0.90 0.02
CRT Confidence Total 85.16 14.36 -1.15 0.63 84.55 12.67 -0.71 0.07 78.08 18.51 -0.10 -1.36 82.39 13.90 -0.90 0.73
DOG Total 68.66 19.56 -0.34 0.20 55.24 15.96 0.71 0.00 76.10 27.93 -0.53 -1.01 65.49 19.59 0.43 -0.52
CTDS Total 46.50 5.53 -0.32 -0.82 44.49 6.86 -0.14 -0.72 44.90 4.20 0.65 -0.16 45.96 6.90 -1.60 3.92
15FQ+
Distant Aloof/Empathetic 5.30 2.40 -0.10 -0.69 5.15 2.56 -0.16 -0.97 5.70 2.41 -0.16 -1.49 6.63 1.85 -0.21 0.04
Low Intellectance/High Intellectance 8.04 2.18 -0.93 0.03 7.12 2.58 -0.70 -0.49 7.60 2.41 -0.30 -1.77 7.00 2.58 -0.48 -0.80
Affected By Feelings/Emotionally Stable 4.26 1.82 0.72 1.43 3.61 2.14 0.43 -0.77 5.00 1.41 -0.30 -1.39 3.69 2.02 0.69 0.03
Accommodating/Dominant 4.12 2.27 0.46 -0.56 4.10 1.96 0.32 -0.57 4.10 2.92 0.88 0.21 4.10 2.29 0.31 -0.83
Sober Serious/Enthusiastic 3.92 1.78 -0.30 -0.91 4.15 1.77 0.19 -0.31 3.70 2.00 -0.32 -1.80 4.33 2.02 0.51 0.06
Expedient/ Conscientious 6.14 2.51 0.18 -1.07 5.34 2.24 0.25 -0.33 7.10 2.56 -0.29 -1.23 5.55 2.04 0.29 -0.22
Retiring/Socially Bold 4.14 1.93 -0.10 -1.13 4.20 2.30 0.96 0.97 2.80 2.10 1.86 4.29 4.37 2.31 0.12 -0.70
Hard-Headed/Tender Minded 4.96 1.64 -0.54 -0.12 5.41 1.48 0.30 -0.41 5.80 1.81 1.49 2.48 6.08 1.53 -0.10 2.13
Trusting/Suspicious 5.16 2.60 -0.04 -0.77 5.95 2.26 -0.27 -0.44 5.90 2.51 -0.44 -0.68 6.16 2.19 -0.40 -0.37
Concrete/Abstract 5.66 2.01 0.38 0.14 6.34 1.89 -0.13 0.69 5.70 2.11 0.76 0.38 6.84 1.89 -0.15 -0.79
Direct/Restrained 5.50 2.39 0.13 -0.46 4.46 2.17 0.85 0.59 6.40 2.27 0.59 -0.34 5.61 2.28 0.15 -0.50
Confident/Self-Doubting 6.90 2.20 0.01 -0.83 7.20 2.06 -0.01 -1.08 7.20 2.44 -0.29 -0.98 7.49 2.33 -0.58 -0.49
Conventional/ Radical 6.40 2.01 0.04 -0.98 6.78 2.42 -0.59 -0.16 4.60 1.90 0.11 1.31 6.57 2.10 0.05 -1.01
Group-Orientated/Self-Sufficient 7.34 2.01 -0.65 0.39 7.54 2.05 -0.76 0.98 8.00 1.56 0.00 -1.78 7.08 2.37 -0.98 0.84
Informal/Self-Disciplined 4.56 1.81 -0.02 -0.84 4.46 1.95 0.49 -0.46 6.70 1.83 0.28 -0.49 5.69 2.18 0.25 -0.62




The data were tested for univariate normality as can be seen above in Table  7 .24 and were
within acceptable parameters for the test required (Field, 2013). Levene’s Test for equality of
variances were all non-significant (p values ranging from .065 to 0.904). The MANOVA (IV1
(Schizotypy),  IV2 (CRT-L),  IV3 (CRT-2),   IV4 (CRT Confidence), IV5 (Dogmatism),   IV6 (Critical Thinking),   IV7 (Distant Aloof/Empathetic),
IV8  (Low  Intellectance/High  Intellectance),   IV9  (Affected  By  Feelings/Emotionally  Stable),   IV10  (Accommodating/Dominant),   IV11  (Sober
Serious/Enthusiastic),   IV12  (Expedient/  Conscientious),   IV13  (Retiring/Socially  Bold),   IV14  (Hard-Headed/Tender  Minded),   IV15
(Trusting/Suspicious),  IV16 (Concrete/Abstract),  IV17(Direct/Restrained),  IV18 (Confident/Self-Doubting),   IV19 (Conventional/ Radical),    IV20
(Group-Orientated/Self-Sufficient),     IV21  (Informal/Self-Disciplined),      and   IV22  (Composed/Tense-Driven) =  4  ×  clusters;
DV1(Sceptic), DV2(Religious Believers), DV3(Paranormal Believers),  and DV4(Believers)) indicated a significant effect
of  group  membership  on  critical  thinking,  confidence,  cognitive  reflection,  schizotypy,
dogmatism, and the factors on the 15FQ+ (see Table  7 .22) (F(66,387) = 2.30, p < .001, Pillai’s
V = 0.845, partial η 2 = 0.282).
6.3.2.3 Discriminant Functions Analysis
A Discriminant  Functions  Analysis  was  used  to  further  examine  the  difference  in  the
cognitive measures between believer groups. Box’s Test was significant (p=.004) indicating
that the equality of the test is violated. However, Box’s Test is very sensitive (Tabachnick et
al., 2007) and due to the data being normally distributed with no significant outliers this was
deemed to be acceptable. The analysis revealed three composites with the majority of the
variance being spread across the first two (see Table  7 .25). Furthermore, the third composite
was not significant (see ).
Table 7.25. Table Showing the Eigenvalues, Percentage of Variance and Canonical 
Correlations of the three Composites. 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative % Canonical correlation
1 .690a 53 53 0.639
2 .492a 37.8 90.8 0.574
3 .120a 9.2 100 0.327
First 3 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis.
Table 7.26. Table Showing Chi-square and Significance Levels of the Three Composites.
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df p
1 through 3 .354 143.241 66 <.001
2 through 3 .599 70.820 42 .004
3 .893 15.591 20 .742
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The Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients were examined in order to
establish labels for the three composites (see Table  7 .27); a coefficient of .3 is strong enough
to  interpret  (Pituch  &  Stevens,  2015) and  tentative  group  labelling  is  in  .  Composite
membership  is  as  follows:  Sceptics  were  least  likely  to  be  in  composite  one;  religious
believers, most likely in composite two; paranormal believers, in composite one and least in
two and believers in composite one and in two to a lesser extent.
Table 7.27. Table Showing the Standardised Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients.
Function
1 2 3
OLIFE Total 1.057* -.117 .172
CRTL Total -.186 .527* .179
CRT2 Total .035 -.219 -.139
CRT Confidence Total .174 -.534* .129
DOG Total -.305* .646* .331*
CTDS Total -.143 .094 .325*
Distant Aloof/Empathetic .307* .331* .515*
Low Intellectance/High Intellectance -.134 .230 -.025
Affected By Feelings/Emotionally Stable .284 .490* -.466*
Accommodating/Dominant .132 .162 -.296
Sober Serious/Enthusiastic .016 .088 -.502*
Expedient/ Conscientious -.120 .120 -.158
Retiring/Socially Bold -.263 -.683* .533*
Hard-Headed/Tender Minded .475* .242 -.366
Trusting/Suspicious .177 .374* -.173
Concrete/Abstract .165 .273 -.231
Direct/Restrained .045 -.212 .477*
Confident/Self-Doubting -.378* .210 -.421*
Conventional/ Radical .082 -.160 .510*
Group-Orientated/Self-Sufficient -.435* -.006 -.320*
Informal/Self-Disciplined .300* .587* .079
Composed/Tense-Driven -.201 -.011 .256
* Coefficients ≥ .3 
Table 7.28. Table Showing Composite Membership Means (and interpretive labels) of the 
Four Groups of Believer.




Religious believers -0.477 1.96
Believers 0.909 0.337
The  Discriminant  Functions  Analysis  revealed  two  significant  composites.  These  were:
‘sensitive  and abstract  thinkers’ and ‘reflective  metacognitive  dogmatists’.  ‘Sensitive  and
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abstract  thinkers’  were  seen  to  be  believers  and  paranormal  believers  and  ‘reflective
metacognitive dogmatists’ were religious believers and believers.
6.3.3 Structural Equation Model
Belief, cognition and personality were modelled using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).
SEM is a multivariate technique that constructs latent variable from measured variables and
looks at the relationships between the latent variable. It is a combination of factor analysis (to
create the latent variables) and multiple regression (to examine the relationship between the
latent variables). Seven different SEM models that combined different variable and different
predictive  directions  or  relationships  were  compared  for  fit  and  predictive  value.  The
relationship between five potential latent variables were considered that covered the three
elements  of  personality,  belief  and cognition.  These  were:  schizotypy,  personality,  belief,
cognition, and critical thinking. The personality latent was comprised of variables that were
significant  in  the  DFA.  The  variables  are:  distant  aloof/empathetic,  affected  by
feelings/emotionally stable, retiring/socially bold, hard headed/tender minded, confident/self-
doubting,  group orientated/self-sufficient, trusting/suspicious, and informal/self-disciplined.
To  establish  the  direction  of  influence  of  the  latent  variables  and  possible  covariances
between measures and latent variables, different combinations of the latent variables were
examined, see  for the explanation of each model. For each model the modification indices
were examined and changes were made to each model to achieve optimum fit in each case
(See appendix 6.3.1).
Table 7.29. Table Showing the Structure of each Model Tested.
 Model
One Personality and schizotypy predicting belief. Belief and cognition covarying.
Two Personality and schizotypy predicting belief. Belief predicting cognition.
Three Personality and schizotypy predicting belief. Cognition predicting belief.
Four Cognition and schizotypy predicting belief. 
Five Schizotypy predicting belief. Belief predicting cognition.
Six Schizotypy predicting belief. Belief and cognition covary.
Seven
Schizotypy predicting belief. Belief predicting cognition. Belief predicting critical thinking and 
dogmatism. Critical thinking and dogmatism predicting cognition. 
164
Sensitivity: Internal
The  seven  models  were  then  assessed  for  the  best  fit  to  the  data.  For  fit  indices  and
recommended fit values, see Table  7 .30.
Table 7.30. Table Showing Fit Indices and Recommend Values for the Seven Models.
Recommended Model Fit
Model One Two Three Four Five Six Seven Values (Hu & Bentler, 1999)
Χ2 375.04 337.39 347.74 71.58 71.81 71.58 176.59 N/A
Df 156.00 156.00 154.00 49.00 50.00 49.00 83.00 N/A
p  < .001 < .001  < .001 0.02 0.02 0.02 < .001 >.05
RMSEA 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.09 ≤ 0.06
SRMR 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 0.08 ≤ 0.08
CFI 0.86 0.89 0.88 0.98* 0.98* 0.98* 0.93 ≥ 0.95
TLI 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.97* 0.97* 0.97* 0.91 ≥ 0.95
NFI 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.87 ≥ 0.95
* meets the recommended value
Model four, five and six were within the recommended value on most of the fit indices. While
the fit indices for these three models were very close, model five had a slightly better fit.
However, this better fit is marginal. For model five, both regressions between the three latent
variables  of  personality,  cognition  and belief  were  significant  (p < .05). For  a  graphical
representation of model five see Figure  7 .24.
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IN = Impulsive Nonconformity; CD = Cognitive Disorganisation; IA = Introvertive Anhedonia; UE = Unusual Experiences; CRTL = 
Cognitive Reflection Test Long; CRT2 = Cognitive Reflective Test 2; CRT CON = Confidence Scale; MPP = Mental and Psychic 
Phenomena; RB = Religious Belief; PK = Psychokinesis; SE = Supernatural Entities; CPP= Common Paranormal Perceptions.
Figure 7.24. SEM Model Five Showing Schizotypy Predicting Belief which, in turn, Predicts 
Cognition.
Seven models were tested using the variables taken from chapter six and this chapter. While
three models provided a good fit that were based on schizotypy, cognition and belief, model
five presented the best fit to the data.  Schizotypy was the only aspect of personality that
provided a good fit to the data and cognitive refection and confidence for the latent variable
of  cognition.  This  indicated  that  schizotypy  predicted  belief,  which  in  turn  predicted




To separate the participants into groups a cluster analysis was run on the subscales of the
BittSS. This was run on a four group’s solution that were titled sceptics, religious believers,
paranormal believers and believers. Analysis on 23 variables showed significant differences
between the four groups above and the variables of: critical thinking, confidence, cognitive
reflection, schizotypy, dogmatism, and the factors on the 15FQ+. Further analysis sought to
examine the  differences  in  the  variables  between the  groups.  This  analysis  revealed  two
significant composites: Composite one was schizotypal, non-dogmatic, empathetic, tender-
minded,  confident,  group-orientated,  and  self-disciplined.  This  composite  was  labelled
‘sensitive  and  abstract  thinkers’.  The  second  composite  was  cognitively  reflective,
unconfident in answers, dogmatic, empathetic, emotionally stable, and retiring (introverted),
suspicious,  self-disciplined,  and group-orientated.  This  composite  was labelled  ‘reflective
metacognitive dogmatists’.  The four groups of believer were then assessed for composite
membership.  The  ‘sensitive  and  abstract  thinkers’ composite  was  least  likely  to  contain
sceptics, followed by religious believers and most likely to contain believers followed by
paranormal believers. The ‘reflective metacognitive dogmatists’ were most likely to contain
religious believers followed by believers, and the least likely to contain paranormal believers;
sceptics were neutral in this group. This offered partial support for the hypotheses relating to
the profiles. Following the main analysis, the data were modelled to look at latent variables
and how they might influence each other.  The optimum model was model  five,  that had
schizotypy predicting belief and belief predicting cognition, again, offering support for the
hypotheses relating to the model.
6.4.1 Religious Believers and the 15FQ+
The religious believer’s group’s personality was as follows: they were not: empathetic, tender
minded,  confident,  group  orientated  and  self-disciplined,  but  they  were:  empathetic,
emotionally stable,  retiring (introverted),  suspicious, self-disciplined and group orientated.
However,  three of  the elements  of  the profile  conflicted;  empathetic,  self-disciplined and
group oriented. When taken in the context of the five-factor model, the results map on as
follows:  Extraversion,  empathetic  (conflicting),  retiring,  group  orientated  (conflicting);
Agreeableness,  suspicious;  Openness,  hard-headed;  Conscientiousness,  self-disciplined
(conflicting);  Neuroticism,  emotionally stable,  suspicious,  and self-doubting. These mixed
findings could be due to differences in type of religiosity, intrinsic and extrinsic and are borne
out by previous research.
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These are broadly analogous to the main findings of previous research that associate with
agreeableness and conscientiousness (Aghababaei, 2013; Saroglou, 2002b), which have also
been mixed, and this could be due to the dimension of religiosity being referred to (Rowatt &
Kirkpatrick, 2002). However, religious believers were not tender-minded but hard-headed,
which is at odds with previous findings but could be linked with higher levels of religious
belief,  such  as  low  openness  in  religious  fundamentalism  (Saroglou,  2010).  Findings
indicated emotional stability which is supported by research (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007); that
religiosity is negatively correlated with neuroticism (Francis, 1993; Saroglou, 2002b), and the
15FQ+ indicated  self-doubt  and  suspicion,  which  links  to  previous  findings  surrounding
extrinsic religiosity (Francis, 2010). Also, openness was not strongly linked to religious belief
(Taylor & MacDonald, 1999), but the link to hard headedness is supported (Saroglou, 2010).
Finally, religious believers are more introverted, in one respect, but can be group oriented
too;  the  results  conflict  here,  which  could  be  due  to  respondents  being  concerned  with
religious belief and their self-worth and only being altruistic because of their religion rather
than themselves (Daniel et al., 1989).
6.4.2 Paranormal Believers and the 15FQ+
The paranormal believer’s group personality was not: empathetic, emotionally stable, retiring
(introverted),  suspicious,  self-disciplined  and  group-orientated.  These  map  onto  the  five-
factor  model  as  follows:  Extraversion,  distant  aloof,  socially  bold,  self-sufficient;
Agreeableness,  trusting;  Conscientiousness,  informal  (not  self-disciplined);  Neuroticism,
trusting, affected by feelings. Lack of empathy is in line with previous research that shows
that some aspects of paranormal belief are not correlated with conscientiousness  (Rattet &
Bursik,  2001;  Williams  & Roberts,  2016).  Also,  the  emotional  stability  is  borne  out  by
previous  research  linking paranormal  belief  to  neuroticism  (Milas  et  al.,  2012;  Rattet  &
Bursik, 2001). However, they were: extroverted, not suspicious or self-disciplined, which is
likely to be linked to previous research to openness to new experience  (Rattet & Bursik,
2001; Williams & Roberts, 2016); the lack of suspiciousness and self-discipline leading them
to  be  more  open  to  outlandish  ideas  and,  in  general,  more  trusting.  The  concept  of  the
paranormal  believer  being  a  loner  (Northcote,  2007) is  not  supported  by  this  research.
However, this might mean that the paranormal believer feels alone and is uncomfortable with
it and might require social contact. The conflicting findings in the paranormal belief literature
are most likely due to the conflation of religious and paranormal belief in the measures used.
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By using  the  new  belief  scale  and  a  more  defined  measure  of  personality,  these  subtle
differences are more apparent and easier to quantify. While this group does show signs of
being  supported  by  the  Psychodynamic  Functions  Hypothesis,  the  mixed  results  do  not
provide sound evidence to fully support it. 
6.4.3 Sceptics and the 15FQ+
Sceptics  were  not  empathetic,  tender  minded,  confident,  group  orientated  and  self-
disciplined. These mapped onto the five-factor model as follows: Extraversion, distant aloof,
self-sufficient, openness, hard-headed; Conscientiousness, informal, high in neuroticism, self-
doubting. This group’s personality was more consistent with the religious believers than the
other two groups. Interestingly the juxtaposition is with the paranormal believers more than
any of the other. 
6.4.4 Believers and the 15FQ+
The believers group were: tender minded, confident, empathetic, emotionally stable, retiring
(introverted), suspicious, self-disciplined, and group orientated. This group was positive on
both composites making the group difficult to interpret but they were stronger on ‘sensitive
and abstract  thinkers’ composite.  These  mapped onto the  five-factors  as  follows:  high in
Extroversion: empathetic, retiring, group-orientated; high in agreeableness, suspicious; high
in openness, tender-minded; high in conscientiousness, self-disciplined; high in neuroticism,
emotionally stable, suspicious, and confident. The findings did agree with previous research
in regard to extraversion (Lazar, 2016) agreeableness (Chang et al., 2015), conscientiousness
(Chang et al., 2015; Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008) and neuroticism (Schnell, 2012). But
other previous research presents conflicting evidence such as lower neuroticism (Chang et al.,
2015). The mixed findings do seem to be due to different types of spirituality, showing a
combination of paranormal and religious traits  that points to a belief  in a more spiritual,
possibly intrinsically religious, viewpoint. 
6.4.5 Summary of the 15FQ+ Findings
This could explain the believers group belonging to both composites. The believers group
were reflective and were not dogmatic; this would mean that they more likely to be open to
new ideas. Paranormal believers were not reflective, but also not dogmatic, is supported by
previous research. However, this group clearly rejected religious beliefs, and this could be
related to being more suspicious about more ‘traditional’ beliefs. However, the big difference
with  this  group  is  their  over-confidence;  this  indicates  that  they  may  be  lacking  in
metacognitive ability. Their rejection of religious beliefs leave a gap of belief, and this is too
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easily filled with other beliefs that go unchecked, they are intuitive and affected by their
feelings.  However,  the  best  predictor  of  the  believers  groups and the strongest  aspect  of
personality regarding belief is schizotypy.
6.4.6 Schizotypy 
Schizotypal personality has been linked to paranormal belief previously  (Genovese, 2005;
Thalbourne,  1995) and  while  the  study  did  not  indicate  a  particularly  high  level  for
paranormal believers, the findings for religious believers and sceptics did support Lindeman
and Lipsanen's (2016) research that there were more differences within the groups of believer
and  non-believer  than  between them,  with  the  more  spiritual  having  higher  levels  of
schizotypy. The believers group did have higher levels of schizotypy, supporting  Day and
Peters' (1999) link that their ‘new religious’ group had higher schizotypy, perhaps linking
further to more spiritual, non-traditional, belief systems. Spirituality has also been linked to
‘positive’ schizotypy  (Unterrainer  &  Lewis,  2014),  with  spiritual,  but  not  religious  self-
identifiers having high schizotypal scores compared to those who identify as religious or non-
religious  (Willard  &  Norenzayan,  2017).  A lot  of  spirituality  terms  overlap  with  both
paranormal and religious terms and this  could explain the mixed findings  in this  area.  It
would appear that having high levels of schizotypy allows a person to take on beliefs that are
more outlandish, and this is reflected by the findings that religious believers and sceptics had
lower levels than the other two groups.
6.4.7 Dogmatism
Dogmatism was present in the sceptics, which has been theorised (Pryor, 2000), believers and
religious  believers  groups,  which  is  supported  by  previous  research  (Hood et  al.,  2009).
However, the paranormal believers were not dogmatic, which goes against previous findings
(Alcock & Otis,  1980; Tobacyk & Milford,  1983). However,  the believer group also had
lower levels of dogmatism, due to being high in both composites. This supported the research
showing  that  dogmatism  maintains belief  rather  than  forming it  (Irwin,  2009) and  the
dogmatic  nature  of  religious  believers  and  sceptics  may  keep  people  from  entertaining
different worldviews; in the case of the believers group, the lack of dogmatism may allow
them  to  take  on  different,  possibly  more  outlandish,  beliefs.  Similarly,  critical  thinking
appears to play a comparative role in belief to dogmatism.
6.4.8 Critical Thinking, Metacognition and Reflection
The critical thinking scores are in line with the results for chapter six with the four groups
showing no significant differences in it. This is consistent with previous research where the
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findings are generally mixed (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Roe, 1999). This could also be
down to  a  flaw in the measure of  critical  thinking.  Critical  thinking itself  is  a  nebulous
concept and if indeed the Dunning Kruger Effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) is present within
a particular group then they would think they are thinking critically when they are in fact not
doing so. So, rather than critical thinking explicitly being an optimum measure, confidence
and metacognition might give an implicit measure of critical thinking via self-monitoring.
Religious believers are cognitively reflective and not confident as seen in chapter six, and
they also do not exhibit schizotypal thinking, which could indicate that they are not attracted
to paranormal-type beliefs. Members of this group are dogmatic, again, in line with research
(Alcock & Otis, 1980; Hood et al., 2009), so they would not be likely to stray too far from
doctrine, again explaining the lack of belief in paranormal constructs. They also can be hard
headed and suspicious of others, suspicious of other beliefs. Sceptics were reflective thinkers,
this is in line with previous research (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012;
Shenhav et al., 2012), but unlike in chapter six they did not appear to be as confident but they
were dogmatic. Interestingly, this group were more trusting than the religious believers and
also  low  on  schizotypy.  The  religious  believers  and  sceptics  group  were  very  closely
matched; one of the key differences was that sceptics are more trusting; i.e., they are more
accepting than religious believers. While this may seem paradoxical it could be that religious
believers are more sceptical of beliefs that do not match their own, whereas sceptics will
entertain a wider range of beliefs. Cognitive reflection and confidence showed similar levels
on each group to chapter six, with the religious believers and sceptics being the most similar
with regard to their composite membership, and with paranormal believers being the least
reflective  but  the  most  confident,  further  supporting  the  assertion  of  Kruger  (1999) that
people who are not thinking analytically are not aware of it.
6.4.9 Models of Belief
The model showed that  schizotypy was the strongest aspect of personality that  predicted
belief, in line with previous research (Hergovich et al., 2008), and other proposed models that
linked to fantasy proneness  (Irwin, 1993; Lawrence et al., 1995). The relationship between
belief and cognition was more complex. Previous research has argued that cognition predicts
belief  (Pennycook et al., 2012), however the findings of this study showed that it was the
belief that predicted the cognition. The model that showed this was only fractionally more
stable than the models tested by the study that had cognition predicting belief, which implies
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it may be more likely a ‘two-way street’, with the relationship between belief and cognition
being a complex interplay. Three models support that schizotypy influenced belief, but the
relation between cognition and belief is more complex. The different beliefs could be having
an effect on cognition in different ways. For example, sceptic beliefs could be more effected
by cognition, whereas paranormal beliefs can inhibit certain cognitions (Type Two).
The study did present some challenges and indicated areas for improvement. The mixture of
personality traits for all the groups was often difficult to interpret. This is mainly due to the
number of variables and, while this provided a great deal of clarity and enabled deeper focus,
this led to some of the personality traits conflicting when the composites were assigned to
believer  groups.  In  addition,  the 15FQ+ was hosted on a  different  server  and this  led to
recruitment problems. While many people did the first part of the study, the engagement with
the second part of the study was not as good; this could also be due to the sheer size of the
study and this  could  have  affected  the  allocation of  participants  to  group via  the  cluster
analysis. While this has been tested many time throughout this research project and seems to
be a robust method, the religious group cluster only had ten people in it. However, due to the
cluster analysis not being used as part of the model build, this had no impact on the overall
model of belief.
Schizotypy is the best indicator of belief when it comes to personality, and openness to new
ideas  can  lead  to  more  spiritual  type  beliefs.  Paranormal  beliefs  have  an  element  of
schizotypy, but appeal to people who are over confident and intuitive in their thinking style. It
seems that the beliefs themselves require this type of thinking to exist and this accounts for
the belief leading to the cognition style. Interestingly, religious believers and sceptics are the
same in personality and thinking style but the outcome for the belief is very different; this
would indicate a difference in the way these beliefs are arrived at or that religious beliefs are
resistant to certain types of thinking based on a person’s initial personality. If a person wants
to believe in something then a schizotypal personality might lead them to a paranormal or
spiritual belief but this still does not wholly account for them rejecting a more traditional
religious  belief.  This  study  does  support  the  Psychodynamic  Functions  Hypothesis  to  a
certain extent, but it also demonstrates that cognition and personality overlap and both play
their own roles in belief. The believers group would be the group that could be most linked to
spiritual type belief, but this should be treated with caution. They seem to believe in a range
of concepts and do appear to be picking and choosing what they want. While cognition is still
a  strong identifier,  the 15 factors  of personality  seems to be the weak link in  the study.
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Schizotypy is the best personality indicator of belief, but the evidence for spirituality being a
personality  trait  is  not  completely  discounted  and  furthermore,  it  could  suggest  that
scepticism is a personality trait. Not only does this chapter support the notion that there is an
overlap between personality and cognition, also, there could be a more fundamental overlap
between personality and belief.
6.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter took the cognitive measures that were pertinent from chapter six and included
the 15FQ+, schizotypy and dogmatism. It was seen that there were significant differences
between the four groups of believers. These broke down into two composites; ‘sensitive and
abstract  thinkers’ and  ‘reflective  metacognitive  dogmatists’.  It  was  found  that  religious
believers and sceptics were ‘reflective metacognitive dogmatists’, making them very similar,
which  was  the  opposite  of  paranormal  believers,  who were  least  likely  to  be  ‘reflective
metacognitive dogmatists’. The believers group were a combination of the two composites
but more likely to be the ‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’. Schizotypy was seen to be the most
dominant personality trait. This led to a model of belief being posited where schizotypy led
into belief  and belief  influenced cognition,  however,  the belief  and cognition relationship
could be reciprocal in nature.
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7 Chapter Eight – Discussion
The final chapter will present a brief overview of the thesis, discuss the findings in a wider
context, explore the strengths and limitations, and present possible future directions before
offering a conclusion.  The main aim of this thesis was to examine the relationship between
cognition and personality  to  supernatural  belief.  To achieve this  aim,  this  thesis  had two
objectives: (a) to create a new scale to measure supernatural belief, and (b) to create a model
of  cognition,  personality  and  belief.  This  thesis  addressed  the  aims  by  examining  the
cognition and personality of people who hold different types of supernatural belief and by not
treating  paranormal,  spiritual,  and  religious  beliefs  to  be  separate  a  priori  as  previous
research has done. To establish these differences, this thesis detailed the developmental a new
model of supernatural belief and a new scale of measurement of such beliefs.  The types of
belief  that  are  classed  as  supernatural  within  this  thesis  are  religious,  spiritual and
paranormal, as conceptualised by previous literature. This builds upon Schofield et al. (2016)
research,  which  found  four  different  supernatural  belief  groups.  The  first  group  were
universal believers in the supernatural. The second group held traditional religious beliefs but
did not believe in the paranormal. The third believed in the  paranormal and did not hold
traditional religious beliefs. The final group had low levels across all beliefs. This research
supported the theory that people believe in different ways, which is consistent the theory of
Metaphysical Chauvinism (Ladd & Borshuk, 2013). Metaphysical Chauvinism suggests that
some people believe in one unsubstantiated belief but not another. For example, a person
might  hold a  religious,  but  not  a  paranormal  belief,  even though they are arguably both
equally valid. However, there has been much debate in the literature over the definitions of
these terms.
There are many scales that measure the concepts of religious, spiritual and paranormal belief
and some that purport to measure supernatural belief. These suffer from the problem of lack
of  definition,  with  the  scales  generally  measuring  either  paranormal  or  religious  belief,
depending on what the researcher’s topic of interest is. As already discussed in this thesis, the
rPBS contains a subscale of traditional religious belief which has proved problematic in the
past but spirituality scales also can suffer from the problem of overlap. Some scales have
claimed to measure spirituality, but are actually measuring religiosity but again, the definition
and lack of acknowledgement of the overlap between the concepts is a problem. Despite there
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being so many scales, a new scale was required to help overcome these definition problems
and will help establish more precise definitions of these terms, and help clarify how and why
these terms and concepts overlap.  However,  due to the plentiful nature of these scales, a
plethora of items already exist that were used to populate a new scale.
7.1 Studies One and Two Findings
Whilst there has been great success in measuring different aspects and dimensions of the
supernatural scales, it has been acknowledged that there are problems with them. (Lawrence,
1995a).  Attempts  have  been  made  at  ‘tweaking’ existing  scales  but  a  shift  is  needed  in
defining and the conceptualising of the supernatural.  A large range of high quality items
exist;  however,  their  usage  has  been  problematic  as  the  general  overview  term  of  the
supernatural has enabled the interpretation of the factors without a priori assumption of the
paranormal and the religious.
7.1.1 The Spiritual Link Between Religious and Paranormal Belief 
While the paranormal and religious items were clearly demarcated, the spiritual items did not
have a discrete factor of their own; they appeared to be spread over the factors. The problem
here with interpretation is the difference between a spiritual and religious item. The spiritual
items that tapped onto the religious belief subscales, were linked to religious belief but could
be interpreted differently.  Returning to  the definitions laid out  in  Chapter  two,  the fuzzy
nature  of  spiritual  beliefs  is  no  more  in  focus  than  before,  i.e.,  no  discrete  spirituality
subscale. However, the new scale indicates that there is an overlap between religious and
spiritual  belief  but  not  between  paranormal  and religious  and a  further  overlap  between
spiritual and paranormal. This indicates that the reason for apparent overlap between religious
and paranormal belief is that spiritual belief unites the two concepts, and may account for the
mixed findings in previous research.
Reduction of the taxonomy of paranormal belief aided this suggestion, and the loss of the
elements of extraordinary life forms and superstition for example did not have a negative
impact. The extension of the religious belief items also provided a more rounded scale and
while the demarcation was clearly seen,  the scale still  presented several more avenues of
enquiry. As the nature of belief is forever changing, scales to measure will need to change
too, however, the BitSS does provide some clear evidence for the differences and unifying
concepts behind certain types of belief.
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The creation and validation of the BitSS meets the first objective to ‘create and validate a
new scale to measure supernatural belief’. It provides a unique scale that can measure both
religious and paranormal belief together under the term supernatural and still treat them as
separate belief systems. It also provides empirical evidence for the relationship between the
three  concepts  of  religious,  spiritual  and paranormal  belief.  This  new scale  aided in  the
meeting of the main aim to ‘examine cognition and personality of people who hold different
types of supernatural belief’. Following the development of the new scale, the cognitions of
different types of believer were examined.
7.2 Belief, Cognition and Personality
Cognition  in  this  case  was  described  differing  thoughts  processes.  Past  research  had
highlighted such areas as intelligence, reasoning, and dual process theory. The main theory of
cognition and paranormal belief is the Cognitive Deficits Hypothesis. The Cognitive Deficits
Hypothesis  (Irwin, 1993) posits that people who believe in paranormal phenomenon must
have some sort of cognitive deficit, for example they might lack intelligence. The purpose of
chapter six of the thesis was to establish if there are any cognitive differences between the
different types of believer; the religious believer, the paranormal believer, the sceptic and the
believers,  to test  the Cognitive Deficits Hypothesis. Chapter six examined thinking styles
through the lens of dual process theory (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). This is dependent on
the view that some beliefs are intuitive and some belief are minimally counterintuitive, i.e.,
they do not violate ontologies (the nature of a person’s reality) and are more memorable than
maximally counterintuitive.  In chapter seven, the final  study in this  thesis  introduced the
aspect of personality and took forward the successful elements of cognition to establish a
model of belief based on cognition and personality. The links and overlap between cognition
and personality within belief have been acknowledged (Irwin, 2009), however, the extent to
which personality has an influence on belief has yet to be established. As with the Cognitive
Deficits Hypothesis, one of the other main theories used to explain belief in the paranormal,
the Psychodynamic Functions Hypothesis, takes an arguably negative view of paranormal
belief. 
7.2.1 Study Three Findings 
The scores on the various measures of cognition were compared between the four groups of
believers and found that there was a significant difference. This was further explored using a
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Discriminant Functions Analysis and two composites or profile were established: ‘reflective
thinkers’ and  ‘intuitive  implicit  believers’.  The  two  profiles  showed  a  clear  delineation
between those who thought analytically and those who thought intuitively. However, there
was a third non-significant group that were intuitive and over confident. 
The findings  on  the  surface  do support  the  Cognitive  Deficits  Hypothesis.  The sceptical
group thought more analytically than the other groups. However, this indicates a difference
rather than a deficit. The findings on the other cognition measures suggested a more complex
picture.  The  reliance  on  intuitive  thinking  may  not  show  a  deficit  at  all.  The  implicit
association  test  score  was  significantly  different  for  the  second  profile  and  the  religious
believers  group had more of  these.  Interestingly,  all  of  the group had a  level  of implicit
religious  belief  and none of  the  groups  had any levels  of  paranormal.  This  could  be an
artefact of the test or it could indicate that these beliefs are intuitive to the point of being
pervasive across all the groups of believer. This finding does point to religious beliefs being
intuitive and back the assertion that we are evolved to engage in dualistic belief.
Rather than a cognitive difference, this indicates that the differences in thinking style are
aiding the beliefs. However, it is unknown if the lack of metacognitive ability is a deficit, and
if so, what the consequence would be of remedying it. The problem with viewing paranormal
beliefs as being something that needs to be ‘thought away’ is that this implies they are not
true. This is a dangerous to suggest, as many things in the past were deemed paranormal or
impossible and have since been proved true or an alternative reason was presented. Rather
than stigmatising certain beliefs, this study has shown that certain things can be believed by
certain people which has no bearing on whether they are true or not. Also, this study has no
indication of other influences on belief and cognition, and the model of cognition, personality
and belief still needed to be made.
7.2.2 Findings for Study Four
The  findings  indicated  that  only  certain  aspects  of  personality  were  relevant  and  when
combined with the relevant cognitive measure found in chapter six, the profiles/composites
‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’ and ‘reflective metacognitive dogmatists’ were revealed. The
sceptics were least likely to be ‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’, the religious believers not
likely to be ‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’ but very likely to be ‘reflective metacognitive
dogmatists’,  paranormal  believers  were  least  likely  to  be  ‘reflective  metacognitive
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dogmatists’ and the believers group were most likely to be ‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’
but could also be ‘sensitive and abstract thinkers’. The two profiles from study three differed
from those in study four. This was due to there being different measures employed in the two
studies,  particularly with study four having more measures. Also, while the profiles were
different,  the  way the  different  groups  of  believer  were  associated  with the  profiles  was
broadly similar but with each study adding different and new dimensions to the profile.
The most striking thing about the profiles is the similarity between the sceptics groups and
the religious believers. While indicating that the sceptics may still be reflective, they are also
dogmatic and have metacognitive ability, however, the religious believer are more dogmatic
and have greater metacognitive profile. The paranormal believers were opposite the sceptics
and religious believers,  again in line with the previous chapters findings. The personality
findings looking at the 15FQ+ and the religious belief findings were mixed and this could be
due to different types of religiosity having different effects; extrinsic vs intrinsic belief for
example,  indicating  that  differences  within  religious  belief  could  be  greater  than  the
differences between believer groups. This is potentially borne out by the believer group finds;
these  were  high  in  schizotypy,  when  compared  to  the  religious  believers,  indicating  the
difference between a more traditional religious belief and a more spiritual one could involve
the  ability  to  think  in  more  abstract  ways,  and  were  also  less  dogmatic.  The  difference
between  agreeableness  in  religious  believers  and  agreeableness  in  believers  is  also
highlighted, with agreeableness of the religious believers related to being hard headed, and
therefore dogmatic. The paranormal believers however also have agreeableness, but because
they  are  more  trusting  and  extroverted,  not  suspicious,  it  could  make  them  open  to
unsubstituted beliefs. Schizotypy is the clear indicator in this study, along with dogmatism
standing out.  The 15FQ+ raised some interesting points but provided mixed findings and
raised more questions than answers. However, it did highlight some of the more ‘negative’
points  surrounding  belief,  such  as  being  hard  headed  for  example.  The  most  pertinent
personality  measures  were  then  taken forward  to  construct  a  new model  of  supernatural
belief.
7.3 Modelling Supernatural Belief
The pertinent measures from chapter six and the most informative measure from the previous
chapter were used to hypothesise seven models. These seven models showed a variety of
directional  influence and differing use of  the aspects  of personality  and cognition.  Three
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models stood out as being the best fit with the data, and all included schizotypy as the main
aspect  of  personality  that  was  good  fit  with  the  data  and  the  model.  Cognition  being
comprised of the two CRT variants and confidence scores. These had different directions of
influence  regarding  the  latent  variables;  Cognition  and  schizotypy  predicting  belief,
schizotypy predicting belief and belief predicting cognition, and schizotypy predicting belief
with belief and cognition covarying. The strongest model was schizotypy predicting belief
and then belief predicting cognition, however, this model was only fractionally better than the
other two models proposed. This indicates that there might be directional issues and while the
main variables have been identified, the direction of influence is still unclear, so further study
in  this  area  is  needed.  Rather  than  unidirectional,  the  relationship  between  belief  and
cognition is reciprocal, with one influencing the other, and belief being fractionally larger
than cognition when strong enough. Also, different beliefs having more or less influence over
cognition has already been demonstrated in this thesis.
7.4 Methodological Reflections
What  follows  are  some  reflections  on  the  methodology  used  to  achieve  the  aims  and
objectives  of  this  thesis.  The  initial  objective  was  to  create  a  new  scale  that  measures
supernatural belief. The creation of the item pool involved taking items from previous scale
that measured religious, spiritual and paranormal belief.  The alternative would have been
conducting focus groups or generating fresh items from the researcher’s knowledge. This was
unlikely to generate any completely fresh items, and would have been considerably more
time consuming, with item clarification and checking of face, and cross cultural validity still
being needed. Therefore, the use of previous scale to harvest the items was the most prudent
methodological choice. However, the search for scales could have been wider, but the sheer
volume of scales would have made it impractical to carry out, therefore the method of book
searching and using the top scales in PsychInfo was selected. The reduction of items before
the analysis was conducted using strict guidelines relating to various forms of validity. This
led to a reduction in the scales chosen and then the further reduction of the items. This was
followed by the use of  experts  and novices  to further  reduce the item pool.  The experts
provided a good source of method to reduce the items, and cut down the pool considerably.
Inter rater reliability being very useful, and a methodical way of item reduction. The novices




The four  studies  all  used the  same opportunity sampling  method and the  only exclusion
criteria was the participants all had to be over the age of 18. This was a less time consuming
method  of  participant  sampling,  and  whilst  different  groups  were  targeted  (for  example,
various  religious  societies  at  the  University  of  Derby),  a  more  structured  method  of
recruitment may have been more beneficial. This would have accessed different groups and
provided participants  who had higher  beliefs  in  certain constructs;  this  would have  been
particularly useful in study four, when the number of religious believers was quite low. The
use of an online platform did lead to a higher dropout rate, but also gave access to a wider
range of participants rather than just relying on the student population at the University of
Derby. The use of Reddit in particular offered a great source of recruitment and provided
participants  from all  over  the  world.  The  main  problem with  just  using  an  opportunity
sampling method is that you might not reach people who have ‘extremes’ of belief. These
group might be very difficult to reach generally and also might be reluctant to take part in
such research. Self-selecting participants are always a danger with this type of research and to
avoid this, the researcher must be as impartial as possible so as to not isolate participants and
either make them not want to take part in the research or to influence the answers they give.
7.5 Unique Findings
The thesis  findings  would indicate  that  a  certain ‘mind-set’ is  required to  have a  certain
belief. This could be triggered by experience or simply exposure to that type of information.
Furthermore,  a  certain  personality  would  be  needed  to  enable  the  necessary  beliefs  and
cognitions to interact with each other. The beliefs in the case of higher schizotypy would be
more paranormal or spiritual in nature.  The religious traditional religious belief would be
more tempered and dogmatic and therefore be cognitively ‘ring fenced’ off from personality
and cognition issues. The belief in turn would then influence the cognition. An intuitive belief
could not couple with an analytic mind, therefore causing dissonance, furthermore, certain
beliefs require a lack of metacognitive ability to be maintained. This final study combines
cognitions and personality, and presents an overall model of belief that provides an indication
of the casual aspects of belief. This also points to how these beliefs might develop and how
they are maintained, where a schizotypal personality is needed to develop the belief and the
cognitive style is adopted because of the belief to maintain that belief.
When looking at cognition, the Cognitive Deficits Hypothesis is generally tested as there is
the idea that people who believe in certain phenomena are cognitively deficient in some way.
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The findings of the third study do indicate a cognitive deficit  with paranormal believers,
however, the picture is a more complex one and can only be fully answered when looking at
belief in terms of a whole model of cognition and personality. While initially it may seem like
the cognitive elements are deficient in some way, the model points in another direction. If it
were the case that these types of belief did show a cognitive deficit then they would affect the
religious  believers  and  the  believers  group  also.  This  indicates  that  there  is  something
different  about  the  paranormal  believers  group that  goes  beyond cognition  and that  it  is
personality that underpins the beliefs and the cognitions.
To add to the further complexity surrounding the beliefs and cognitions it is clear that some
beliefs interact differently with cognitions, with some beliefs inhibiting certain cognitions,
and certain cognitions being able to inhibit certain beliefs. Paranormal beliefs require low
levels of analytic thinking and low levels of metacognition. Metacognition appears to be the
key here and while the paranormal believers group did exhibit positive critical thinking, there
is  a  difference  between  critical  thinking  and  thinking  that  you  are  engaging  in  critical
thinking. Also, this can be affected by social desirability, with paranormal believers wanting
to present  a critical,  scientific exterior.  Another possibility  is  people simply do not think
critically when it comes to those beliefs, and they could be like religious beliefs in the way
that they have meaning within themselves and are highly personal. This fits with the idea that
certain beliefs are very personal, for example intrinsic religious orientation and in particular,
spiritual belief. The spiritual believer is very open to new things and experiences, and in turn
this could make spiritual belief be akin to a personality trait.
The believers group did seem open to anything and was the most analogous to the spiritual
nature. This group however could cover a multitude of different beliefs. Further investigation
into  this  area  may  help  with  further  definition  of  spiritual  and  be  able  to  examine  the
cognitions that surround this  type of more ‘open’ belief.  The overall  model of belief  did
indicate that personality influences belief and belief influences cognition. While schizotypy
was the main personality trait  that influence belief,  the relationship again could be more
complicated. Spirituality could be playing a key role in personality itself, and while the first
two studies indicated that spirituality was the uniting factor between religious and paranormal
belief, it would be that it is acting more as a personality trait than a belief. This could account
for  the  strong  link  between  belief  and  schizotypy,  however  this  again  indicates  the
problematic nature of defining belief and this could just be conflating belief and personality,
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but nonetheless, the notion of a spiritual or even a sceptical personality is one worthy of
future research.
Alief or implicit beliefs also play a role, more for the way they develop, but they clearly
interact  with  explicit  beliefs.  It  is  interesting  that  even the  sceptic  group had a  level  of
implicit  belief.  The effect  that  this  might  have is  unclear,  but  certainly  worthy of  future
research.
The priming element of the study, while unsuccessful, should still be pursued, to explore if it
is possible to prime somebody using a certain belief into behaving a certain way using a
certain belief. While paranormal experience was touched on in this thesis, a more in depth
look at the relationship between experience belief and cognition would be interesting and
help to answer the question surrounds which came first, belief or experience?  It would be
interesting to find out if certain cognitions can ‘block’ certain experiences. Of course this
would be related to personality as well; the unusual experience subscale on the O-Life scales
demonstrated in the model that it was connected to belief, indicating that having an unusual
experience  could  influence  the  belief  and  vice  versa,  but  again,  having  a  schizotypal
personality would help translate the experience.
7.5.1 Beyond Supernatural Belief
While this thesis has concentrated on supernatural beliefs, it has demonstrated that different
beliefs can have different effects or be affected by cognition and personality. Other beliefs
may  also  have  this  effect,  such  as  conspiracy  beliefs  (Sunstein  &  Vermeule,  2009),  or
political beliefs (Kahan et al., 2013). The current trends of things like fake news (Allcott &
Gentzkow, 2017) and alternative facts (Strong, 2017), the effect that beliefs could be having
on our judgement of the world around is key. The more we understand about belief and its
power, the more we will be able to see how belief can alter the way we think and in turn
cause us make a certain decision.
Getting people to think more and analyse what they are being presented with might cause
them to make better choices. Regardless of whether the phenomena exist or not, being more
careful about what you believe could prevent problems such as radicalisation or being duped
by fraudsters. Radicalisation has been cited as being a problem across all religious belief and
what  actually  drives  people  to  get  to  this  point  is  unknown  (Ghosh,  Chan,  Manuel,  &
Dilimulati, 2017). Particularity with recent criticism of the governments ‘Prevent’ programme
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(Mythen,  Walklate,  & Peatfield,  2017),  how these beliefs  are  viewed,  and what  can  and
should be done, is a question that remains unanswered. Religious fundamentalism is not the
only type of problematic belief that could be examined; conspiracy theories and in particular
the phenomenon of fake news need further scrutiny. However, the opposite could be true and
positive beliefs could be fostered and encouraged, giving a person a positive outlook and
potentiality boosting self-esteem, and therefore promote well-being. It has been demonstrated
in this thesis that belief is powerful and can affect the way our cognitive processes work. As
the model demonstrates, the right kind of belief can effectively disengage the analytic thought
process.  Even  though  we  might  be  fully  aware  of  it,  metacognitively  speaking,  this
disengagement  can  still  happen,  particular  with  paranormal  type  beliefs  engaging
metacognitively, which could go some way in to filtering out problematic beliefs and being
able to focus on healthy ones. It is possible that fundamentalist view operate like paranormal
beliefs and require over confidence in thinking to operate. This would be a worthy area for
future study.
The above arguments assume that value judgements can be placed on beliefs and that they
can be labelled as ‘bad’ or ‘good’ and that thinking and believing in different things is a
problem. Further than this, the notion that beliefs could be changed presents both ethical and
moral dilemmas. Clearly, when these beliefs are having a negative impact on person’s life and
or indeed other people’s lives, then this is something that should be changed, but how one
might judge if something is negative is a different story. The same can be said for trying to
establish  a  ‘correct’ way  of  thinking  or  an  ‘acceptable’ personality.  The  idea  that  these
differences can be term as ‘deficits’ is at worst insulting, and at best unhelpful. A better term
might be cognitive differences or differences in cognition. Just as the differences in belief do
not necessarily mean good or bad, when pushed to extremes, these beliefs can be harmful to
oneself and others. While a topic like religious fundamentalism would be very hard to study,
investigating them in relation to extremes of cognition would be worthy; that being, said, the
work contain in this thesis goes someway to shedding light on what might happen when a
person engages in extremes of thinking or belief.
7.6 Future research
Future  research  should  look at  the  issues  surrounding methodological  problems with  the
current thesis, such as the IAT  (Greenwald et  al.,  1998) and establish clear protocols for
measuring implicit belief. Also, priming paradigm should be honed and explored in more
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depth. The direction between cognition and belief should also be further investigated to see if
biomarkers  (Damasio, 1994) can be established that indicate if the belief is influencing the
cognition  or  the  cognition  is  influencing  the  belief.  The  relationship  between  belief  and
experience requires further study, particularly in light of the unusual experiences subscale of
the schizotypy measure covarying with the latent variable of belief in the model. This might
shed light on sequencing and help us to understand the development of beliefs if we know
which came first;  belief  or  experience.  Furthermore,  this  thesis  discussed  details  of  how
certain beliefs might develop. This should be studied in relation to religious and paranormal
belief and build on the existing research by comparing the differences in how these beliefs are
developed.  This  could  also  help  determine  if  the  cognitions  develop  before  or  after  the
beliefs. This would be interesting particularly with regard to metacognition  (Reeder et al.,
2010).  Furthermore,  a  more  experimental  examination  to  see  if  cognitions  can  actually
‘block’ certain  beliefs  would  be  able  to  demonstrates  if  beliefs  can  be  changed;  either
temporarily,  or for longer  periods of time. While this  thesis  concentrated on supernatural
belief, the wider topic of belief could be studied.
Examining more extreme beliefs such as religious fundamentalism to see if  they are like
traditional  religious  beliefs  or  if  they  are  more  like  paranormal  beliefs  with  regard  to
confidence. This in conjunction with extremes of cognition would also be a worthy avenue of
study; the relationship between extremes in thinking and belief could lead two findings that
tell us how either or both could be tempered. Stepping further away from supernatural belief,
conspiracy theories could also be examined. Particularly, with the advent of Brexit and the
Donald  Trump  in  the  U.S,  further  understanding  of  how  conspiracy  type  beliefs  might
influence political behaviour would be a worthy avenue of research. Research into politics
pertaining  to  if  political  leaning  are  opinions,  ideology  or  belief,  or  something  different
entirely. The notion of positive and negative belief also needs further explanation, with regard
to the possible consequence of positive and negative belief and also, what a negative belief is.
This of course, posits  the question,  can beliefs be changed? As alluded to above, if  it  is
possible to block beliefs, can belief be changed for longer periods of time? Finally, further
investigation of what a belief really is, and how it is viewed by different types of people is
needed.  This  thesis  has  been  mentioned  that  both  spirituality  and  scepticism  might  be





This thesis sought to examine the personality and cognition of different types of believer and
create a model of belief based on such. Initially a new scale was created and evaluated to
measure  different  types  of  supernatural  belief  and followed by exploration  of  cognitions
surrounding  these  beliefs.  Then  personality  was  then  examined  and  both  cognition  and
personality were incorporated into a model with supernatural belief. The intuitive nature of
religious belief indicates the type of thinking a person might engage in, while the personality
of that person indicates what kind of belief the person might hold. Paranormal and religious
belief are different; they are developed differently and maintained in different ways and by
different cognitions.  Religious beliefs seemly cognitively ring fenced off, possibly due to
implicit belief; the religious and the sceptical believers have very similar personalities and
cognitions and all that differs is the belief itself. While paranormal believers however appear
over confident in their cognitive abilities and think they are reflective when they are not, and
religious believers are reflective but are not necessarily confident in their abilities to do it.
The modelling of  personality,  cognition and belief  showed that  schizotypy was the main
element of personality that influenced belief and that belief influenced cognition. However,
the relationship between belief and cognition is more complex with different beliefs having
more  of  an  effect  on  cognition  that  others.  This  thesis  had  the  following aim:  Examine
cognition and personality of people who hold different types of supernatural belief and meet
the two further objectives: create and validate a new scale to measure supernatural belief and
create  and  test  a  new  model  of  supernatural  belief  based  on  cognitive  and  personality
differences. This thesis met the two objectives and therefore achieved the overall aim set out
in  chapter  one.  This  thesis  has  shown that  people  who  believe  in  different  things  have
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Q215 Belief in the Supernatural Survey     INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS   You are
invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr Ian Baker and Mr Malcolm
Schofield  (University  of  Derby).  This  project  is  also  part  of  a  PhD qualification. Ethical
approval  for  this  study was received from the University  of Derby Psychology Research
Ethics  Committee. The  project‘s  aim  is  to  develop  a  scale  to  measure  supernatural
belief. This measure aims to incorporate religious, spiritual and paranormal beliefs and will
attempt to examine how we define and understand these types of belief.   You will be asked to
complete an online survey comprising 71 statements, plus a few basic questions about your
demographic background. The survey statements relate to, religious, spiritual and paranormal
belief. Based on your  responses  to  these statements  a  new scale  to  measure  supernatural
belief will be developed.  You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this project
and your participation is entirely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to
complete  a  short  online  survey.  The  study will  take  approximately  30  minutes.  You can
choose to withdraw from the study during and up until the 1st June 2015.  Please answer all
questions  frankly and honestly.  The integrity  of  our  research  depends upon your  truthful
responses. Your anonymity in this study is guaranteed and your responses cannot be traced
back to you in any way. All results will be treated as confidential. The data will be stored
confidentially (password protected, online) and anonymously by the use of the participant
generated unique ID code. To generate your unique ID code, use the last two letters of your
surname and the last two numbers of your phone number. For example, if your name is Smith
and your phone number ended in 78, your ID code would be th78.  In the unlikely event that
this  research  raises  any  personal  or  upsetting  issues  for  you,  you  would  be  strongly
encouraged  to  visit  a  counsellor  at  your  local  Community  Health  Centre  or  General
Practitioner.  The results of this project may be used in a follow up study. Any studies arising
from this project may later be published in an academic journal. De-identified data collected
will be stored online in a password protected site accessible only to the researchers and will
be destroyed 10 years later. The results of the study can be obtained by contacting Dr Ian
Baker (I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk) or Mr Malcolm Schofield (M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332
591160) after 1st August 2015. If you have any further questions about this project, please
feel free to contact the researchers at the email addresses provided above. 
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Q216 I have read the above and  agree to participate in this project.
 Yes
 No
Q217 Generate your unique ID code by using the last two letters of your surname and the last
two numbers of your phone number. For example, if your name was Smith and your phone
number ended in 78, your ID code would be th78.
Q218 Age:
Q219 Gender:
Q82 Nationality:(this question is optional)
Q220 Current religion or belief: (this question is optional)
Q83 Are you a student?
Q84 What level of eduction have you attained?
Q81 What is your current occupation?
Q85 At what level?
4.1.2 Item Pool
Q214 Belief in the Supernatural Scale  Each statement on this survey is something you may
or may not agree with. Please respond to the statements as honestly as you can. For example,
if you strongly agree with the statement please check that box. Please remember, your answer
should reflect your own belief. You can choose from the following responses:     Strongly
Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Slightly Disagree  Uncertain  Slightly Agree  Moderately
Agree  Strongly Agree
2
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1 My spiritual belief affects absolutely every aspect of my life.
2 I firmly believe that ghosts or spirits do exist.
3 Black magic really exists.
4 The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
5 Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
6 God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which
must be totally followed.
7 Contrary to scientific belief, some people can make contact with the dead.
8 There are individuals who are messengers of God.
9 A Supreme Being exists.
10 I believe that it is possible to send a ‘mental message to another person, or in some way
influence them at a distance, by means other than the normal channels of communication.
11 There exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, loving God.
12 The existence of an afterlife can never be scientifically demonstrated, for it is impossible
to prove ‘a figment of someone's imagination.
13 Every human being is a member of the cosmos and ‘God is the cosmic mind.
14 There must be an afterlife of some sort.
15 I am convinced that thought transference actually does work.
16 There is such a thing as levitation (raising the body through mental power).
17 Every person has an aura (a mysterious energy field, usually invisible, surrounding the
body).
18 There is both a spiritual as well as a natural side to reality.
19 There exist evil, personal spiritual beings, whom we might call demons.
20 In spite of the laws of science, some people can use their psychic powers to make objects
move.
21 It is possible to communicate with the dead.
22 Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
23  Some  people  have  a  mysterious  ability  to  accurately  predict  such  things  as  natural
disasters, election results, political assassinations etc.
24 Some men and women can find missing persons by swinging a pendulum over a map.
25 Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) is an unusual gift that many persons have and should not
be confused with the elaborate trick of entertainers.
26 The events in my life unfold according to a divine or greater plan.
27 During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
28 Reincarnation does occur.
29 It is often possible to make valid personality judgements about people by knowing their
astrological sign.
30 I believe that there is a divine plan and purpose for every living being and thing.
31 Strange occurrences, such as hauntings and ghosts may be attributed to the restless spirits
of people who have died.
32 Things that happen (e.g., divorce, death) in a house or room leave a certain ‘atmosphere
that affects the people that subsequently move in.
33 There is a great deal we have yet to understand about the mind, so it is likely that many
phenomena (such as Extra Sensory Perception (ESP)) will one day be proven to exist.
34 The supernatural spirit or force is a being with a personality and a close intimate personal
relationship is possible.
35 I look to God for strength, support, and guidance.
36 Mind reading is not possible.
37 The experience of ‘'déjà vu', or having vague feelings of relieving a past experience, is
probably a memory of a previous life.
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38 There is such a thing as telepathy (communication directly from mind to mind).
39 Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
40 I am convinced that at least two of the following phenomena occur: dreams reveal what
will happen in the future, one receives premonitions of what is to occur, or there are people
who can ‘see the future.
41 Religion is especially important because it answers many questions about the meaning of
life.
42 In spite of what many people think, card reading, for example tarot cards, can tell a lot
about a person and their future.
43 I believe that a person's deeds are stored in his or her '‘karma'.
44 Religion gives meaning to my life.
45 Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
46 Some buildings are haunted.
47 I believe psychic phenomena are real and should  be studied scientifically.
48 God is constantly with us.
49 Everyone has an immortal soul.
50 God is very real to me.
51 I think about how my life is part of a larger spiritual force.
52 My religious belief is an important part of who I am as a person.
53 I believe in a God who watches over me.
54 Religious belief is better than logic for solving life's important problems.
55 Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
56 I believe in God.
57 There is a spiritual realm besides the physical one.
58 Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the divine being.
59 A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
60 The spirits of people who have died can sometimes communicate with the living.
61 There are some objects or places that have a special spiritual meaning, for instance being
surrounded by a certain type of energy.
62 There is a devil.
63 I believe that mind can control matter.
64  As  a  general  rule,  a  fortune  teller's  predictions  which  come  true  are  the  result  of
coincidence.
65 I believe that once a person dies their spirit may come back from time to time in the form
of ghosts.
66 There exist good personal spiritual beings, whom we might call angels.
67 There are such things as poltergeists (spirits which signal their presence by moving objects
or making noises).
68 Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
69 In my life, I experience the presence of the divine.
70 Some houses are haunted by ghosts.




     Thank you for your participation in this project. The project‘s aim is to develop a scale to
measure supernatural  belief  that  incorporates religious,  spiritual and paranormal belief.    
This initial study will develop a new scale that will accommodate the multi-faceted nature of
people’s beliefs, including that people may hold beliefs that have previously been treated
separately in the literature. This measure aims to look at religious, spiritual and paranormal
beliefs and will attempt to examine how we define and understand these types of belief. The
aim is build a scale that can examine what people believe, for example, one person might
believe in angels but not ghosts.     For further information on how beliefs have been defined
please see here: Lindeman, M., & Svedholm, A. M. (2012). What's in a term? Paranormal,
superstitious,  magical  and  supernatural  beliefs  by  any  other  name  would  mean  the
same. Review of General Psychology, 16(3), 241.     The scale developed in this study will be
tested in a follow up study. Please note that your answers are treated as anonymous and
confidential. If you wish to withdraw your data please contact either of the addresses below
with your unique ID at any time before 1st June 2015.        Many thanks for taking part in this
project,  if  you  require  further  information  please  contact  Dr  Ian  Baker
(I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk) or Malcolm Schofield (M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332 591160).
Q222 If you would like to take part in future studies please enter your email here:
4.2 Instructions for Expert and Novice Reviewers
Instructions for initial reviewers. (Professor David Sheffield, Paul Staples and Dr Ben 
Roberts)
The concepts that are being looked for each item: 
The item should measure the concept of the supernatural. The item will encompass both 
religious and paranormal belief under the term the supernatural, and also incorporate aspects 
of the more loosely defined “spiritual belief”. The items should relate broadly to these three 
concepts. The item should be a measure of a person’s level of belief.
Face validity: 
The item should be a measure of one of the three concepts (religious, spiritual and 
paranormal belief) as you understand them. The emphasis here is that the item needs to be 
measuring belief, rather a direct measure of experience or attribution for example.
Cross cultural validity: 
The item needs to be applicable across different faith groups (Christianity or Judaism for 
example) and people in different societies. However, as long as the item can be understood by
different faith groups and cultures broadly speaking, this should be adequate.
Item modification:
There is still room for modification if an item is deemed important enough.
Measurement:











In the excel sheet provided, in the column next to the item, please put either a Y or an N 
(Yes/No) to indicate if you think the item should be kept.
Please do not discuss the items with the other reviewer or Dr Ian Baker.
Thanks for your help and time,
Malcolm
Instructions for reviewers.
Thanks you for agreeing to review my survey.
This survey is for the first study in my PhD project. The first stage of this project is to 
develop a new scale to measure supernatural belief. I am attempting to establish that the items
I have chosen for a survey I am proposing to develop relate to a person’s general 
understanding of the supernatural. To help to do that I would like you to ‘rate’ the 71 
statements I am proposing for inclusion in my survey.
The concepts that are being looked for each item:
The statement should measure the concept of the supernatural. The statement should relate to 
religious, spiritual or paranormal belief. Each statement should be a measure of a person’s 
level of these beliefs, as you understand them.
Rating the statements:
In the following survey, if you think that the statement is a good measure of the types of 
beliefs discussed above then indicate ‘Yes’. If you do not think it is a good measure then 
indicate ‘No’. There are not right or wrong answers but remember to rate each statement as 
you see fit. Please note, if you feel all of the statements are 'Yes' or all of the statements are 
'No' for example, that is okay.
Remember, you are rating the statements for their usefulness as measurements of the above 
concepts on a scale of 1 to 7 (for example: 1=Strongly Disagree and 7=Strongly Agree).
If you have any questions, please email me at m.schofield@derby.ac.uk
Thanks for your help and time,
Malcolm






Q215  Belief  in  the  Supernatural  Survey  -  Study  Two.      INFORMATION  FOR
PARTICIPANTSPlease note - if you took part in the first study you can still take part in this
study.   You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr Ian Baker
and  Mr Malcolm  Schofield  (University  of  Derby).  This  project  is  also  part  of  a  PhD
qualification. Ethical  approval  for  this  study was  received  from the  University  of  Derby
Psychology Research Ethics Committee. The project‘s aim is to develop a scale to measure
supernatural  belief. This  measure  aims  to  incorporate  religious,  spiritual  and  paranormal
beliefs and will attempt to examine how we define and understand these types of belief. This
is the second part of the research project and will test the validity of the scale proposed by the
first study.   You will be asked to complete an online survey comprising 100 statements, plus
a few basic questions about your demographic background. The survey statements relate to,
religious, spiritual and paranormal belief. Based on your responses to these statements a new
scale to measure supernatural belief will be developed further.  You must be 18 years of age
or  older to  participate  in  this  project  and  your  participation  is  entirely  voluntary.  If  you
choose to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey. The study will take
approximately 30 minutes. You can choose to withdraw from the study during and up until
the 1st September 2015.  Please answer all questions frankly and honestly. The integrity of
our  research  depends  upon  your  truthful  responses.  Your  anonymity  in  this  study  is
guaranteed and your responses cannot be traced back to you in any way. All results will be
treated as confidential. The data will be stored confidentially (password protected, online)
and anonymously by the use of the participant generated unique ID code. To generate your
unique ID code, use the last two letters of your surname and the last two numbers of your
phone number. For example, if your name is Smith and your phone number ended in 78, your
ID code would  be  th78.   In  the  unlikely  event  that  this  research  raises  any personal  or
upsetting issues for you, you would be strongly encouraged to visit a counsellor at your local
Community Health Centre or General Practitioner.  The results of this project may be used in
a follow up study. Any studies arising from this project may later be published in an academic
journal.  De-identified  data  collected  will  be  stored  online  in  a  password  protected  site
accessible only to the researchers and will be destroyed 10 years later. The results of the study
can  be  obtained  by  contacting  Dr  Ian  Baker  (I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk) or  Mr  Malcolm
Schofield (M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332 591160) after 1st August 2015. If you have any
further questions about this project, please feel free to contact the researchers at the email
addresses provided above. 
Q216 I have read the above and  agree to participate in this project.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
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Q217 Generate your unique ID code by using the last two letters of your surname and the last
two numbers of your phone number. For example, if your name was Smith and your phone
number ended in 78, your ID code would be th78.
Q218 Age:




 Prefer not to say (3)
Q82 Nationality:(this question is optional)
Q220 Current religion or belief: (this question is optional)
Q83 Are you a student?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
If Yes Is Selected, Then Skip To At what level?
Q84 What level of eduction have you attained?
Q81 What is your current occupation?
If Occupation: Is Not Empty, Then Skip To End of Block
Q85 At what level?
Q214 Belief in the Supernatural Scale  Each statement on this survey is something you may
or may not agree with. Please respond to the statements as honestly as you can. For example,
if you strongly agree with the statement please check that box. Please remember, your answer
should reflect your own belief. You can choose from the following responses:     Strongly
Disagree  Moderately Disagree  Slightly Disagree  Uncertain  Slightly Agree  Moderately
Agree  Strongly Agree
5.1.2 Belief in the Supernatural Scale
1 My spiritual belief affects absolutely every aspect of my life.
2 I firmly believe that ghosts or spirits do exist.
3 Black magic really exists.
8
Sensitivity: Internal
4 Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
5 God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which
must be totally followed.
6 There are individuals who are messengers of God.
7 A Supreme Being exists.
8 I believe that it is possible to send a ‘mental message to another person, or in some way
influence them at a distance, by means other than the normal channels of communication.
9 Every human being is a member of the cosmos and ‘God is the cosmic mind.
10 I am convinced that thought transference actually does work.
11 There is such a thing as levitation (raising the body through mental power).
12 Every person has an aura (a mysterious energy field, usually invisible, surrounding the
body).
13 There is both a spiritual as well as a natural side to reality.
14 There exist evil, personal spiritual beings, whom we might call demons.
15  Some  people  have  a  mysterious  ability  to  accurately  predict  such  things  as  natural
disasters, election results, political assassinations etc.
16 Some men and women can find missing persons by swinging a pendulum over a map.
17 Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) is an unusual gift that many persons have and should not
be confused with the elaborate trick of entertainers.
18 During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
19 Reincarnation does occur.
20 It is often possible to make valid personality judgements about people by knowing their
astrological sign.
21 I believe that there is a divine plan and purpose for every living being and thing.
22 There is a great deal we have yet to understand about the mind, so it is likely that many
phenomena (such as Extra Sensory Perception (ESP) will one day be proven to exist.
23 There is such a thing as telepathy (communication directly from mind to mind).
24 Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
9
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25 In spite of what many people think, card reading, for example tarot cards, can tell a lot
about a person and their future.
26 I believe that a person's deeds are stored in his or her '‘karma'.
27 Religion gives meaning to my life.
28 Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
29 Some buildings are haunted.
30 I believe psychic phenomena are real and should  be studied scientifically.
31 Everyone has an immortal soul.
32 My religious belief is an important part of who I am as a person.
33 Religious belief is better than logic for solving life's important problems.
34 Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
35 I believe in God.
36 There is a spiritual realm besides the physical one.
37 There are some objects or places that have a special spiritual meaning, for instance being
surrounded by a certain type of energy.
38 There is a devil.
39  As  a  general  rule,  a  fortune  teller's  predictions  which  come  true  are  the  result  of
coincidence.
40 There exist good personal spiritual beings, whom we might call angels.
41 There are such things as poltergeists (spirits which signal their presence by moving objects
or making noises).
42 Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
43 In my life, I experience the presence of the divine.
44 God has given some people the power to heal the sick.
5.1.3 Intrinsic Spirituality Scale
     For the following six questions, spirituality is defined as one’s relationship to God, or
whatever you perceive to be Ultimate Transcendence. Please choose the number along the
continuum that best reflects your initial feeling.
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Q87 In terms of the questions I have about life, my spirituality answers
Q89 Growing spiritually is
Q73 When I am faced with an important decision, my spirituality
Q75 Spirituality is
Q76 When I think of the things that help me to grow and mature as a person, my spirituality
Q77 My spiritual beliefs affect
5.1.4 Revised Religious Life Inventory      
Please check the box to indicate how much you agree or disagree with that item. Use the
numbers as indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers.
1 I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.
2  The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships.
3  I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
4  I pray chiefly because I have been taught to pray.
5  As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
6  Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to protect my
social and economic well-being.
7  It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thought and meditation.
8  Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.
9  The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.
10  If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church.
11  I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and
purpose of my life.
12  The prayers I say when I am alone carry as much meaning and personal emotion as those
said by me during services.
13   A primary reason for  my interest  in  religion is  that  my church is  a  congenial  social
activity.
14  I read literature about my faith or church.
15  The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.
16  My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life.
17  My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
18  If I were to join a church group, I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather than a
social fellowship.
19   Religion  is  especially  important  to  me because  it  answers  many questions  about  the
meaning of life.
20  It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
21  What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike.
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22  I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions
in my world and in my relation to my world.
23  Quite often I have been keenly aware of the presence of God or the Divine Being.
24  There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
5.1.5 Revised Paranormal Belief 
1 The soul continues to exist though the body may die.
2 Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces.
3 Black magic really exists.
4 Black cats can bring bad luck.
5 Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection).
6 The abominable snowman of Tibet exists.
7  Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future.
8  There is a devil.
9  Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist.
10  Witches do exist.
11  If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck.
12  During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body.
13  The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists.
14  The horoscope accurately tells a person's future.
15  I believe in God.
16  A person's thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object.
17  Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons.
18  The number "13" is unlucky.
19  Reincarnation does occur.
20  There is life on other planets.
21  Some psychics can accurately predict the future.
22  There is a heaven and a hell.
23  Mind reading is not possible.
24  There are actual cases of witchcraft.
25  It is possible to communicate with the dead.
26  Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future.
5.1.6 Debriefing Statement     
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Thank you for your participation in the second study of  this project. The project‘s aim is to
develop  a  scale  to  measure  supernatural  belief  that  incorporates  religious,  spiritual  and
paranormal belief.     This initial study will develop a new scale that will accommodate the
multi-faceted nature of people’s  beliefs,  including that  people may hold beliefs that have
previously been treated separately in the literature. This measure aims to look at religious,
spiritual and paranormal beliefs and will attempt to examine how we define and understand
these types of belief. The aim is build a scale that can examine what people believe,  for
example, one person might believe in angels but not ghosts.     For further information on
how beliefs have been defined please see here: Lindeman, M., & Svedholm, A. M. (2012).
What's in a term? Paranormal, superstitious, magical and supernatural beliefs by any other
name  would  mean  the  same. Review  of  General  Psychology, 16(3),  241.      The  scale
developed in this study will be tested in a follow up study. Please note that your answers are
treated as anonymous and confidential.  If you wish to withdraw your data please contact
either of the addresses below with your unique ID at any time before 1st September 2015.      
Many thanks for taking part in this project, if you require further information please contact





> five.model = '
+ Mental and Psychic Phenomena =~ bis4 + bis8 + bis10 + bis12 + bis13 + bis15 + bis17 +
bis18 + bis19 + bis22 + bis23 + bis26 + bis30 + bis31 + bis36 + bis37
+ Religious Belief =~ bis1 + bis5 + bis6 + bis9 + bis27 + bis32 + bis33 + bis35 + bis43 +
bis44
+ Psychokinesis =~ bis11 + bis16 + bis24 + bis42
+ Supernatural Entities =~ bis2 + bis3 + bis7 + bis14 + bis21 + bis38 + bis40
+ Common Paranormal Perceptions =~ bis20 + bis25 + bis28 + bis29+ bis34 + bis39 + bis41
+ '
> 
> #run the models
> 




> semPaths(five.fit, whatLabels = "std", layout = "tree")
> 










                                 Estimate  Std.Err  Z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
  MentalandPsychicPhenomena =~                                                        
    bis4                            1.000                               1.707    0.833
    bis8                            0.953    0.052   18.248    0.000    1.627    0.820
    bis10                           0.921    0.049   18.775    0.000    1.573    0.835
    bis12                           1.027    0.056   18.240    0.000    1.754    0.820
    bis13                           0.942    0.053   17.623    0.000    1.609    0.802
    bis15                           0.953    0.052   18.383    0.000    1.628    0.824
    bis17                           0.993    0.052   19.208    0.000    1.695    0.846
    bis18                           0.991    0.054   18.501    0.000    1.691    0.827
    bis19                           0.836    0.056   14.853    0.000    1.427    0.714
    bis22                           0.914    0.053   17.232    0.000    1.561    0.791
    bis23                           0.995    0.050   20.089    0.000    1.699    0.869
    bis26                           0.800    0.058   13.688    0.000    1.366    0.673
    bis30                           1.034    0.056   18.551    0.000    1.766    0.829
    bis31                           0.943    0.058   16.205    0.000    1.609    0.759
    bis36                           1.042    0.055   18.885    0.000    1.780    0.838
    bis37                           1.014    0.055   18.510    0.000    1.732    0.828
  ReligiousBelief =~                                                                  
    bis1                            1.000                               1.223    0.598
    bis5                            1.062    0.097   10.953    0.000    1.300    0.764
    bis6                            1.320    0.114   11.615    0.000    1.614    0.835
    bis9                            1.164    0.110   10.599    0.000    1.424    0.728
    bis27                           1.326    0.118   11.280    0.000    1.622    0.798
    bis32                           1.378    0.127   10.825    0.000    1.685    0.751
    bis33                           0.931    0.088   10.569    0.000    1.139    0.725
    bis35                           1.649    0.139   11.892    0.000    2.018    0.867
    bis43                           1.319    0.116   11.386    0.000    1.613    0.810
    bis44                           1.341    0.116   11.595    0.000    1.640    0.833
  Psychokinesis =~                                                                    
    bis11                           1.000                               1.509    0.875
    bis16                           0.908    0.051   17.922    0.000    1.371    0.785
    bis24                           1.153    0.047   24.392    0.000    1.739    0.919
    bis42                           1.051    0.042   25.145    0.000    1.586    0.932
  SupernaturalEntities =~                                                             
    bis2                            1.000                               1.650    0.751
    bis3                            0.922    0.068   13.498    0.000    1.522    0.729
    bis7                            1.034    0.071   14.615    0.000    1.707    0.782
    bis14                           1.075    0.067   16.113    0.000    1.774    0.850
    bis21                           1.038    0.072   14.325    0.000    1.714    0.768
    bis38                           0.984    0.068   14.510    0.000    1.624    0.777
    bis40                           1.115    0.066   16.866    0.000    1.840    0.883
  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~                                                      
    bis20                           1.000                               1.295    0.691
    bis25                           1.158    0.087   13.245    0.000    1.500    0.784
    bis28                           1.287    0.091   14.136    0.000    1.667    0.840
    bis29                           1.459    0.101   14.431    0.000    1.890    0.859
    bis34                           0.761    0.070   10.821    0.000    0.986    0.634
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    bis39                           0.717    0.080    8.947    0.000    0.929    0.521
    bis41                           1.393    0.096   14.525    0.000    1.804    0.865
Covariances:
                               Estimate  Std.Err  Z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
  MentalandPsychicPhenomena ~~                                                      
    ReligiousBelif                1.163    0.170    6.850    0.000    0.557    0.557
    Psychokinesis                 2.144    0.217    9.866    0.000    0.832    0.832
    SuperntrlEntts                2.331    0.254    9.173    0.000    0.827    0.827
    CmmnPrnrmlPrcp                2.079    0.226    9.209    0.000    0.940    0.940
  ReligiousBelief ~~                                                                
    Psychokinesis                 0.862    0.139    6.213    0.000    0.467    0.467
    SuperntrlEntts                1.658    0.213    7.778    0.000    0.821    0.821
    CmmnPrnrmlPrcp                0.712    0.124    5.760    0.000    0.449    0.449
  Psychokinesis ~~                                                                  
    SuperntrlEntts                1.730    0.203    8.535    0.000    0.695    0.695
    CmmnPrnrmlPrcp                1.642    0.183    8.965    0.000    0.840    0.840
  SupernaturalEntities ~~                                                           
    CmmnPrnrmlPrcp                1.715    0.207    8.305    0.000    0.802    0.802
Variances:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  Z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
    bis4              1.287    0.108   11.869    0.000    1.287    0.306
    bis8              1.288    0.108   11.938    0.000    1.288    0.327
    bis10             1.077    0.091   11.858    0.000    1.077    0.303
    bis12             1.500    0.126   11.939    0.000    1.500    0.328
    bis13             1.433    0.119   12.019    0.000    1.433    0.356
    bis15             1.253    0.105   11.918    0.000    1.253    0.321
    bis17             1.137    0.096   11.783    0.000    1.137    0.284
    bis18             1.320    0.111   11.901    0.000    1.320    0.316
    bis19             1.956    0.159   12.270    0.000    1.956    0.490
    bis22             1.461    0.121   12.064    0.000    1.461    0.375
    bis23             0.934    0.080   11.598    0.000    0.934    0.244
    bis26             2.257    0.183   12.340    0.000    2.257    0.548
    bis30             1.423    0.120   11.893    0.000    1.423    0.313
    bis31             1.907    0.157   12.166    0.000    1.907    0.424
    bis36             1.346    0.114   11.840    0.000    1.346    0.298
    bis37             1.381    0.116   11.899    0.000    1.381    0.315
    bis1              2.681    0.219   12.237    0.000    2.681    0.642
    bis5              1.206    0.103   11.673    0.000    1.206    0.417
    bis6              1.133    0.102   11.067    0.000    1.133    0.303
    bis9              1.795    0.151   11.855    0.000    1.795    0.470
    bis27             1.501    0.131   11.435    0.000    1.501    0.363
    bis32             2.199    0.187   11.746    0.000    2.199    0.436
    bis33             1.167    0.098   11.868    0.000    1.167    0.474
    bis35             1.347    0.127   10.581    0.000    1.347    0.249
    bis43             1.369    0.121   11.336    0.000    1.369    0.345
    bis44             1.190    0.107   11.094    0.000    1.190    0.307
    bis11             0.695    0.067   10.389    0.000    0.695    0.234
    bis16             1.169    0.101   11.542    0.000    1.169    0.384
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    bis24             0.556    0.063    8.841    0.000    0.556    0.155
    bis42             0.380    0.047    8.057    0.000    0.380    0.131
    bis2              2.100    0.178   11.787    0.000    2.100    0.435
    bis3              2.042    0.172   11.891    0.000    2.042    0.468
    bis7              1.855    0.160   11.611    0.000    1.855    0.389
    bis14             1.208    0.110   10.938    0.000    1.208    0.278
    bis21             2.040    0.174   11.695    0.000    2.040    0.410
    bis38             1.732    0.149   11.642    0.000    1.732    0.397
    bis40             0.953    0.092   10.308    0.000    0.953    0.220
    bis20             1.833    0.152   12.051    0.000    1.833    0.522
    bis25             1.414    0.122   11.627    0.000    1.414    0.386
    bis28             1.157    0.104   11.106    0.000    1.157    0.294
    bis29             1.266    0.117   10.830    0.000    1.266    0.262
    bis34             1.449    0.119   12.202    0.000    1.449    0.598
    bis39             2.324    0.188   12.385    0.000    2.324    0.729
    bis41             1.092    0.102   10.724    0.000    1.092    0.251
    MntlndPsychcPh    2.915    0.319    9.129    0.000    1.000    1.000
    ReligiousBelif    1.497    0.260    5.766    0.000    1.000    1.000
    Psychokinesis     2.277    0.232    9.803    0.000    1.000    1.000
    SuperntrlEntts    2.724    0.350    7.779    0.000    1.000    1.000
    CmmnPrnrmlPrcp    1.678    0.242    6.944    0.000    1.000    1.000
R-Square:
                   Estimate
    bis4              0.694
    bis8              0.673
    bis10             0.697
    bis12             0.672
    bis13             0.644
    bis15             0.679
    bis17             0.716
    bis18             0.684
    bis19             0.510
    bis22             0.625
    bis23             0.756
    bis26             0.452
    bis30             0.687
    bis31             0.576
    bis36             0.702
    bis37             0.685
    bis1              0.358
    bis5              0.583
    bis6              0.697
    bis9              0.530
    bis27             0.637
    bis32             0.564
    bis33             0.526
    bis35             0.751
    bis43             0.655
    bis44             0.693
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    bis11             0.766
    bis16             0.616
    bis24             0.845
    bis42             0.869
    bis2              0.565
    bis3              0.532
    bis7              0.611
    bis14             0.722
    bis21             0.590
    bis38             0.603
    bis40             0.780
    bis20             0.478
    bis25             0.614
    bis28             0.706
    bis29             0.738
    bis34             0.402
    bis39             0.271
    bis41             0.749
> 
> modindices(five.fit, sort. = TRUE, minimum.value = 30.00)
                             lhs op   rhs      mi    epc sepc.lv sepc.all sepc.nox
273  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~  bis2 111.529  1.284   1.663    0.757    0.757
455                        bis13 ~~ bis36  91.609  0.792   0.792    0.186    0.186
118    MentalandPsychicPhenomena =~  bis2  85.388  0.915   1.563    0.712    0.712
323                         bis8 ~~ bis10  82.533  0.639   0.639    0.171    0.171
1222                       bis29 ~~ bis41  77.776  0.724   0.724    0.158    0.158
154              ReligiousBelief =~  bis7  76.690  1.145   1.400    0.641    0.641
145              ReligiousBelief =~ bis31  76.268  0.711   0.869    0.410    0.410
219         SupernaturalEntities =~ bis31  76.100  0.830   1.370    0.646    0.646
791                        bis36 ~~ bis37  69.183  0.680   0.680    0.153    0.153
152              ReligiousBelief =~  bis2  67.860 -1.131  -1.384   -0.630   -0.630
1208                       bis20 ~~ bis34  65.956  0.774   0.774    0.265    0.265
331                         bis8 ~~ bis23  65.494  0.537   0.537    0.139    0.139
284                         bis4 ~~ bis15  58.283  0.580   0.580    0.143    0.143
761                        bis31 ~~ bis36  57.636  0.719   0.719    0.160    0.160
123    MentalandPsychicPhenomena =~ bis38  57.518 -0.690  -1.178   -0.564   -0.564
950                        bis27 ~~ bis32  55.223  0.833   0.833    0.183    0.183
598                        bis19 ~~ bis26  54.661  0.893   0.893    0.220    0.220
779                        bis31 ~~  bis7  53.539  0.816   0.816    0.176    0.176
146              ReligiousBelief =~ bis36  53.376  0.508   0.621    0.292    0.292
372                        bis10 ~~ bis23  52.501  0.442   0.442    0.120    0.120
220         SupernaturalEntities =~ bis36  50.945  0.581   0.959    0.451    0.451
1172                       bis14 ~~ bis38  44.877  0.621   0.621    0.142    0.142
274  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~  bis3  42.933  0.780   1.010    0.484    0.484
1205                       bis20 ~~ bis25  41.603  0.625   0.625    0.174    0.174
275  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~  bis7  41.349 -0.744  -0.964   -0.441   -0.441
1224                       bis34 ~~ bis41  39.878 -0.495  -0.495   -0.153   -0.153
278  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~ bis38  39.680 -0.703  -0.910   -0.436   -0.436
192                Psychokinesis =~  bis2  39.489  0.538   0.812    0.370    0.370
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1135                        bis2 ~~  bis3  36.582  0.754   0.754    0.164    0.164
1213                       bis25 ~~ bis34  35.970  0.512   0.512    0.172    0.172
1144                        bis2 ~~ bis29  35.136  0.602   0.602    0.125    0.125
119    MentalandPsychicPhenomena =~  bis3  34.189  0.567   0.967    0.463    0.463
115    MentalandPsychicPhenomena =~ bis16  33.808  0.442   0.754    0.432    0.432
525                        bis17 ~~ bis22  33.735  0.446   0.446    0.113    0.113
270  CommonParanormalPerceptions =~ bis16  33.651  0.617   0.799    0.458    0.458
193                Psychokinesis =~  bis3  33.608  0.486   0.733    0.351    0.351
1136                        bis2 ~~  bis7  31.041 -0.672  -0.672   -0.140   -0.140
> 
> fitmeasures(five.fit)
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue 
             98.000               5.282            3359.034             892.000               0.000 
     baseline.chisq         baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli 
          15071.485             946.000               0.000               0.825               0.815 
               nnfi                 rfi                 nfi                pnfi                 ifi 
              0.815               0.764               0.777               0.733               0.826 
                rni                logl   unrestricted.logl                 aic                 bic 
              0.825          -23595.810          -21916.293           47387.619           47756.300 
             ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower      rmsea.ci.upper 
            318.000           47445.466               0.093               0.090               0.097 
       rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr        srmr_bentler 
              0.000               0.339               0.339               0.083               0.083 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean 
              0.083               0.083               0.083               0.083               0.083 
              cn_05               cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi 
             92.129              95.025               0.630               0.590               0.568 
                mfi                ecvi 
              0.021              11.179 
5.2.4 Test Retest
data: data$bis3month and data$bistotal
t = 14.942, df = 65, p-value < 2.2e-16
alternative hypothesis: true correlation is not equal to 0













Belief in the Supernatural - Cognitive Differences.              Information for Participants.    
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Dr Ian Baker and Mr
Malcolm  Schofield  (University  of  Derby).  This  project  is  also  part  of  a  PhD
qualification. Ethical  approval  for  this  study  was  received  from the  University  of  Derby
Psychology Research Ethics Committee.     The project‘s aim is to examine cognitive and
personality differences of people who hold different types of supernatural belief.   You are
asked to complete an online survey comprising 44 statements relating to supernatural belief
and a few basic questions about your demographic background. You will also be asked to
complete four other measures looking at cognitive processes of around 25 items/questions.
This will lead to a new model of supernatural belief based on cognitive differences.   You
must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this project and your participation is entirely
voluntary. If you choose to participate, you will be asked to complete an online survey and an
Implicit Association Test. The study will take approximately 30 minutes. You can choose to
withdraw from the study during and up until  the 1st September 2016.  Please answer all
questions  frankly and honestly.  The integrity  of  our  research  depends upon your  truthful
responses. Your anonymity in this study is guaranteed and your responses cannot be traced
back to you in any way. All results will be treated as confidential. The data will be stored
confidentially (password protected, online) and anonymously by the use of the participant
generated unique ID code. To generate your unique ID code, use your birth month and the
last two numbers of your phone number. For example, if your birth month was August and
your phone number ended in 78, your ID code would be 0878.  In the unlikely event that this
research raises any personal or upsetting issues for you, you would be strongly encouraged to
visit a counsellor at your local Community Health Centre or General Practitioner.  The results
of this project may be used in a follow up study. Any studies arising from this project may
later be published in an academic journal. De-identified data collected will be stored online in
a password protected site accessible only to the researchers and will be destroyed 10 years
later.  The  results  of  the  study  can  be  obtained  by  contacting  Dr  Ian  Baker
(I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk) or  Mr  Malcolm  Schofield  (M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk,  01332
591160) within four weeks. If you have any further questions about this project, please feel
free to contact  the researchers at  the email  addresses provided above.     Please note:    
Please read the instructions for each task carefully.  This survey cannot be completed on a
mobile phone or tablet.  Please make a note of your participant ID code, you will need to
input it again at a later stage.  At one point in the study you will be required to download a
small program and run it separately. Please follow the on screen instructions when you do
this.  If you have any problems or are unsure about downloading the program please contact
Malcolm at m.schofield@derby.ac.uk.    Thank you for your participation.                               
IC I have read the above and  agree to participate in this project.
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ID Generate your unique ID code by using  your birth month and the last two numbers of
your phone number. For example, if your birth month was August and your phone number





 Prefer not to say (3)
nation Nationality: (this question is optional)
CRB Current religion or belief: (this question is optional)
student Are you a student?
eduattain What level of eduction have you attained?
job What is your current occupation?
edlevel At what level?
6.1.2 Covariance Detection Test
cdtinst Please read the synopsis below. Look at the data displayed in the table and decide if
the patients got better  or worse.      After  you answer this  question,  please indicate how
confident you are with answer you gave as instructed.  Please take all the time you need to
answer the question.
cond1 Researchers wanted to see if prayer helped people who have been hospitalised recover
faster. There have been previous studies that indicate that prayer can aid recovery. However,
people can get better or worse on their own. This is why further research is needed into the
power of prayer on illness and well being.     Researchers have conducted an experiment on
patients using prayer. In the experiment, one group of patients were prayed for, for two weeks
and the second group were not prayed for.     In each group, the number of people who got
better and the number whose condition got worse are recorded in the table below. Because
patients do not always complete the studies, the total number of patients in each two groups is
not exactly the same, but this does not prevent assessment of the results.     Please indicate
whether the experiment shows that being prayed for is likely to make the patient's condition
better or worse.          What results does the study support?
 People who were prayed for were more likely to get better than those who didn’t. (0)
 People who were prayed for were more likely to get worse than those who didn’t. (1)
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cond2 Researchers wanted to see if prayer helped people who have been hospitalised recover
faster. There have been previous studies that indicate that prayer can aid recovery. However,
people can get better or worse on their own. That is why further research is needed into the
power of prayer on illness and well being.     Researchers have conducted an experiment on
patients using prayer. In the experiment, one group of patients were prayed for, for two weeks
and the second group were not prayed for.     In each group, the number of people who got
better and the number whose condition got worse are recorded in the table below. Because
patients do not always complete the studies, the total number of patients in each two groups is
not exactly the same, but this does not prevent assessment of the results.     Please indicate
whether the experiment shows that being prayed for is likely to make the patient's condition
better or worse.         What results does the study support?
 People who were prayed for were more likely to get better than those who didn’t. (1)
 People who were prayed for were more likely to get worse than those who didn’t. (0)
cond3  Researchers  wanted  to  see  if  a  psychic  healer  helped  people  who  have  been
hospitalised recover faster. There have been previous studies that indicate that psychics can
aid recovery. However,  people can get better  or worse on their own. That is why further
research  is  needed  into  psychic  healing  on  illness  and well  being.      Researchers  have
conducted an experiment on patients using psychic healing. In the experiment, one group of
patients who used a psychic healer for two weeks and the second group did not use a psychic
healer.      In  each  group,  the  number  of  people  who got  better  and the  number  whose
condition got worse are recorded in the table below. Because patients do not always complete
the studies, the total number of patients in each two groups is not exactly the same, but this
does not prevent assessment of the results.     Please indicate whether the experiment shows
that psychic healing is likely to make the patient's condition better or worse.          What
results does the study support?  
 People who visited a psychic healer were more likely to get better than those who didn’t.
(0)




cond4  Researchers  wanted  to  see  if  a  psychic  healer  helped  people  who  have  been
hospitalised recover faster. There have been previous studies that indicate that psychics can
aid recovery. However,  people can get better  or worse on their own. That is why further
research  is  needed  into  psychic  healing  on  illness  and well  being.      Researchers  have
conducted an experiment on patients using psychic healing. In the experiment, one group of
patients who used a psychic healer for two weeks and the second group did not use a psychic
healer.      In  each  group,  the  number  of  people  who got  better  and the  number  whose
condition got worse are recorded in the table below. Because patients do not always complete
the studies, the total number of patients in each two groups is not exactly the same, but this
does not prevent assessment of the results.     Please indicate whether the experiment shows
that psychic healing is likely to make the patient's condition better or worse.          What
results does the study support?  
 People who visited a psychic healer were more likely to get better than those who didn’t.
(1)
 People who visited a psychic healer were more likely to get worse than those who didn’t.
(0)
cdtcon How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
cdtproc Thank you for completing this section, please click on the button to proceed.
6.1.3 BIAT Instructions 
biatinst Please read the following instructions carefully:      In this task any TWO of four
possible  categories  will  appear  on  the  screen,  the  categories  are  Religious,  Paranormal,
Positive and Negative. Another word will then appear on the screen below, press ‘I’ if you
think that the word matches either of the two categories on your screen and press ‘e’ if the
word does not match either category.   The four words (items) within each category are as
follows:   Religious:  God,  Religion,  Worship,  Sacred.  Paranormal:  Paranormal,  Psychic,
Haunting, Poltergeist.  Positive:   Wonderful,  Best,  Superb,  Excellent.  Negative:  Terrible,
Awful, Worst, Horrible.     If you make a mistake a red ‘X’ will appear on the screen, you will
then be allowed to change your answer to the correct response.     The idea of this task is that
you make decisions quickly so don’t think too long about your answer.             The above
picture would require the pressing the ‘i’ button when the a word that matches the category
‘Religious’ or  ‘Positive’ appear,  for  anything  else  ‘e’ would  need  to  be  pressed.     For
example, the above picture would require the ‘i’ to be pressed because the word 'excellent’
matches the positive category.       However, the word ‘Psychic’ does not match either the
‘Religious’ or ‘Positive’ category, so the ‘e’ button would need to be pressed.  You will need
to do eight block of tasks. The tasks are very short.      You will be given a few practice
screens to try before the tests begins.         
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biatlink Please click on the link below to start the test.  This will open in a new window.  
After the short test is completed please remember to return to this survey to continue with the
study.     You will need to input your unique ID again, remember this is your birth month and
the last two numbers of your phone number. For example, if your birth month was August
and your phone number ended in 78, your ID code would be 0878.    Please click on this link:
  http://research.millisecond.com/uodstudent/SupernaturalBriefIATversion7.web     If you are
unsure of how to proceed please email m.schofield@derby.ac.uk
biatcomp Did you complete the Implicit Association Test?
 Yes (1)
biatcomp Thank you for completing this section, please click on the button to proceed.
6.1.4 Critical Thinking Disposition Scale
ctdsinst Each statement on this survey is something you may or may not agree with. Please
respond to the statements as honestly as you can. Remember,  there are no right or wrong
answers. For example, if you strongly agree with the statement please check that box. You
can choose from the five responses ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.   
ctds1 I am often on the lookout for new ideas.
ctds2 I often use new ideas to shape (modify) the way I do things.
ctds3 I use more than one source to find out information for myself.
ctds4 It is important to justify the choices I make.
ctds5 It’s important to understand other people’s viewpoint on an issue.
ctds6 I usually think about the wider implications of a decision before taking action.
ctds7 I usually try to think about the bigger picture during a discussion.
ctds8 I sometimes find a good argument that challenges some of my firmly held beliefs.
ctds9 I usually check the credibility of the source of information before making judgements.
ctds10 I often re-evaluate my experiences so that I can learn from them.
ctds11 I often think about my actions to see whether I could improve them
ctdsproc Thank you for completing this section, please click on the button to proceed.
6.1.5 Cognitive Reflection Test-Long
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crtlinst Please read each question carefully.   After you answer each question, please indicate
how confident you are with answer you gave as instructed.  Please take all the time you need
to answer the questions.
crtl1 A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?   
crtlcon1 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
crtl2 If it takes 5 minutes for five machines to make five widgets, how long would it take for
100 machines to make 100 widgets?   
crtlcon2 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
crtl3 In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to  cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake?   
crtlcon3 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
crtl4 If three elves can wrap six toys in half an hour, how many elves are needed to wrap
twenty toys in one hour?______ elves   
crtlcon4 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
crtl5 Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class?______ students
crtlcon5 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
crtl6 In an athletics team, tall members are three times more likely to win a medal than short
members. This year the team has won 60 medals so far. How many of these have been won
by short athletes?
crtlcon6 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer?     Please type in your
answer below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).




    Thank you for your participation in this project. The project‘s aim is to examine cognitive
differences of people who hold different types of supernatural belief.    We wanted to see if
people who hold different types of belief think in different ways. For example, do people who
hold religious beliefs think in a more critical way than those who believe in the paranormal?
Also, we wanted to see why people might believe in one type of phenomena but not another;
for example why do people believe in angels but not ghosts? and has this something to do
with the way they think ? To help us do this you were asked to  fill in a survey based on
supernatural  belief  and  took cognitive measures  that related to:
cognitive reflection, covariance detection, critical thinking,  implicit  association
and confidence. This will be used to see if a person who hold a particular type of belief, has
a particular thinking  style.  This  will  help  us  understand  how  these  types  of  beliefs
are formed and maintained.    If you would like to read more about this topic, please have a
look at this study:     Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A.
(2012). Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief.Cognition, 123(3),
335-346.     This project overall will develop and test a new model of supernatural belief
based on cognitive differences.    Please note that your answers are treated as anonymous and
confidential. If you wish to withdraw your data please contact either of the addresses below
with your unique ID within four weeks.    The overall purpose of the study was for research
and a PhD project.     Many thanks for  taking part  in  this  project,  if  you require  further
information  please  contact  Dr  Ian  Baker  (I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk)  or  Malcolm Schofield
(M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332 591160).If you are on campus and would like to claim
your free Blends drink, please email m.schofield@derby.ac.uk.
6.2 BIAT Script
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The University of Washington has applied for patent on the BIAT method. The patent 
is managed by Project Implicit. Both the University of Washington and Project Implicit 
authorize free use of the BIAT method and published stimuli for scholarly research, 
provided that reports of the research clearly identify any modifications made to the 
BIAT and appropriately cite the present article. Please contact Project Implicit 
(E-mail: feedback@projectimplicit.net) to request a license for commercial or other 
nonscholarly use of the BIAT.
The brief IAT (BIAT) procedure is explained in detail in:
Sriram, N. & Anthony G. Greenwald, A.G (2009).The Brief Implicit Association Test.
Experimental  Psychology,  56,  283–294.  (see  page.  285,  Table  1  for  an  overview of  the
procedure)
Millisecond Software thanks Dr. Sriram and Dr. Greenwald for providing generous feedback
on this script!
Background Info: IAT and BIAT
The Implicit Association Task (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the brief
IAT (BIAT: Sriram & Greenwald, 2009)
are  widely-used  cognitive-behavioral  paradigms  that  measure  the  strength  of  automatic
(implicit) associations 
between concepts in people’s minds relying on latency measures in simple sorting tasks.
 
The  strength  of  an  association  between  concepts  is  measured  by  the  standardized  mean
difference score of 
the  'hypothesis-inconsistent'  pairings  and  'hypothesis-consistent'  pairings  (d-score)
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
In general,  the higher the d-score the stronger is the association between the 'hypothesis-
consistent' pairings 
(decided  by  researchers).  Negative  d-scores  suggest  a  stronger  association  between  the
'hypothesis-inconsistent' pairings.
Inquisit calculates d scores using the improved scoring algorithm as described in Greenwald
et al (2003). 
Error  trials  are  handled  by  requiring  respondents  to  correct  their  responses  according to
recommendation (p.214).
D-scores obtained with this script:
Positive d-scores: support a stronger association between 'Flowers-Good' than for 'Insects-
Good'
Negative d-scores: support a stronger association between 'Insects-Good' than for 'Flowers-
Good'
References:
Greenwald,  A.  G.,  McGhee,  D.  E.,  &  Schwartz,  J.  K.  L.  (1998).  Measuring  individual
differences in implicit cognition: 
The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480.
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Greenwald,  A.  G.,  Nosek,  B.  A.,  & Banaji,  M. R.  (2003).  Understanding and Using the
Implicit Association Test: 
I. An Improved Scoring Algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197-
216.
Sriram, N. & Anthony G. Greenwald, A.G (2009).The Brief Implicit Association Test.
Experimental  Psychology,  56,  283–294.  (see  page.  285,  Table  1  for  an  overview of  the
procedure)
Adjustable Task Parameters:
The "skipsummary" variable in the values tag can be set to true to skip the final
     summary page or false to display the page.
The "extended" variable in the values tag can be set to true to run a total of four 
     test blocks, or false to run only 2 test blocks. 
<values>
/ skipsummary = false
/ extended = true
</values>
     Stimulus Items:
     The following section defines the labels and stimulus items for attributes and 
     categories. By default, attributes are GOOD and BD words, and categories are
     FLOWERS and INSECTS.  The IAT can be adapted to other domains by simply 








































This script requires Inquisit 4.0.0.0 or greater.
Script Copyright (c) by Millisecond Software, LLC.
http://www.millisecond.com/
Task Copyright (c) by Project Implicit.
http://www.projectimplicit.org/
<defaults>
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 3.5%)
/ screencolor = black
/ txbgcolor = black
/ txcolor = white
/ minimumversion = "4.0.0.0"
</defaults>
     Task Instructions:
     The following section defines the task instructions. 
<item introinstructions>
/ 1 = "In this task, you will be instructed to press the ~"I~" key for words from two specific
categories,  <%item.targetALabel.1%>,   <%item.targetBLabel.1%>,  <
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%item.attributeBLabel.item.1%> or <%item.attributeALabel.item.1%>.~n~nThe ~"E~" key
is used for words that do not match the two categories shown onscreen.~n~nThe first couple
of blocks help you get used to the task format.~n~nClassify items as quickly as you can while
making as few mistakes as possible.Going too slow or making too many mistakes will result
in an uninterpretable score. It is OK to make an occasional mistake. If you press an incorrect
key you will see a red ~"X~". Rapidly correct the error by pressing the other key.~n~nPress
the space bar to continue."
/ 2 = "Press the I key for <%item.attributeALabel.item.1%>~nPress the E key for anything
else~n~n~nGo as fast as you can~n~nPress the space bar to begin."
</item>
<item testinstructions>
/  1  =  "Press  the  I  key  for  <%item.attributeALabel.item.1%>  or  <%values.currentTarget




/ items = testInstructions
/ size = (90%, 50%)
/ position = (50%, 50%)
/ valign = top
/ hjustify = center
/ vjustify = top
</text>
<text introinstructions>
/ items = introinstructions
/ size = (90%, 50%)
/ position = (50%, 40%)
/ select = sequence
/ resetinterval = 20
/ hjustify = center
/ vjustify = top
</text>
<trial testinstructions>
/  stimulustimes  =  [1=testinstructions,  topFocusInstruct,  orInstruct,  bottomFocusInstruct,
progress]
/ correctresponse = (" ")
/ errormessage = false
/ recorddata = false
</trial>
<trial introinstructions>
/  ontrialbegin  =  [if  (  script.currentblock  ==  "attributes"  )  {text.bottomFocusInstruct.1  =
item.attributeAFocusInstruct.1; values.currentTarget = item.attributeAlabel.1;} ]
/ stimulustimes = [1=introinstructions]
/ correctresponse = (" ")
/ errormessage = false
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/ recorddata = false
</trial>
***********************************************************************
Practice block over message.
***********************************************************************
<item practiceblockend>
/  1  =  "This  is  the  end  of  the  two  practice  blocks.~n~nThe  following  blocks  will  be
recorded.~n~nRemember, you will be instructed to press the ~"I~" key for words from two
specific  categories,  <%item.targetALabel.1%>,   <%item.targetBLabel.1%>,  <
%item.attributeBLabel.item.1%> or <%item.attributeALabel.item.1%>.~n~nThe ~"E~" key




/ items = practiceblockend
/ size = (90%, 50%)
/ position = (50%, 50%)
/ hjustify = center
/ vjustify = top
</text>
<trial practiceblockend>
/ stimulustimes = [1=practiceblockend]
/ correctresponse = (" ")
/ errormessage = false






/ ontrialbegin = [values.magnitude = "little to no"]
/ ontrialbegin = [if( abs(expressions.d) > 0.15 ) values.magnitude = "a slight"]
/ ontrialbegin = [if( abs(expressions.d) > 0.35 ) values.magnitude = "a moderate"]
/ ontrialbegin = [if( abs(expressions.d) >= 0.65 ) values.magnitude = "a strong"]
/ ontrialbegin = [if (expressions.d >= 0.0) expressions.preferred = item.targetALabel.1]
/ ontrialbegin = [if (expressions.d < 0.0) expressions.preferred = item.targetBLabel.1]
/ ontrialbegin = [if (expressions.d < 0.0) expressions.notpreferred= item.targetALabel.1]
/ ontrialbegin = [if (expressions.d >= 0.0) expressions.notpreferred= item.targetBLabel.1]
/ stimulustimes = [0=summary]
/ validresponse = (" ")
/ recorddata = false





/ items = ("This is the end of this part of the survey.~n~nPlease remember to click back onto
the screen with the rest of the survey on so you can complete it.~n~nYour IAT score (D) was
<% expressions.d %>, which suggests <% values.magnitude %> automatic preference for <%
expressions.preferred  %>  compared  to  <% expressions.notpreferred  %>.~n~n~nPress  the
spacebar to complete this session.~n~nThen click back to the Qualtrics Survey and continue
with the rest of the study.")  
/ size = (60%, 80%)
/ hjustify = center






/ items = attributeALabel
/ valign = top
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 5%)
/ txcolor = yellow
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 4%)
/ erase = false
</text>
<text targetFocusLabel>
/ items = ("<%values.currentTarget%>")
/ valign = top
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 5%)
/ txcolor = aqua
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 4%)
/ erase = false
</text>
<text orLabel>
/ items = ("or")
/ valign = top
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 10%)
/ txcolor = white
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 3%)
/ erase = false
</text>
<text orAttributeAFocusLabel>
/ items = attributeALabel
/ valign = top
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/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 15%)
/ txcolor = yellow
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 4%)
/ erase = false
</text>
<shape eraseLabels>
/ color = black
/ shape = rectangle
/ size = (50%, 20%)
/ position = (50%,  10%)
</shape>
<text topFocusInstruct>
/ items = ("")
/ valign = bottom
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 15%)
/ size = (100%, 12%)
/ txcolor = aqua
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 5%)
</text>
<text orInstruct>
/ items = ("or")
/ valign = center
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 17.5%)
/ txcolor = white
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 3%)
</text>
<text bottomFocusInstruct>
/ items = attributeAFocusInstruct
/ valign = top
/ halign = center
/ position = (50%, 20%)
/ size = (100%, 12%)
/ txcolor = yellow
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 5%)
</text>
<item attributeAFocusInstruct>














/ stimulusframes = [1=attributeAFocusLabel]
/ response = noresponse
/ recorddata = false
</trial>
<trial showLabels>
/ stimulusframes = [1=targetFocusLabel, orLabel, orAttributeAFocusLabel]
/ response = noresponse
/ recorddata = false
</trial>
<trial eraseLabels>
/ stimulusframes = [1=eraseLabels]
/ response = noresponse






/ items = attributeA
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 10%)
/ txcolor = yellow
</text>
<text attributeB>
/ items = attributeB
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 10%)
/ txcolor = yellow
</text>
<text targetA>
/ items = targetA
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 10%)





/ items = targetB
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 10%)
/ txcolor = aqua
</text>
<text error>
/ position = (50%, 75%)
/ items = ("X")
/ color = red
/ fontstyle = ("Arial", 5%)
</text>
<text progress>
/ position = (50%, 95%)
/ items = ("(Block <%expressions.currentblocknumber%> of <%expressions.totalblockcount
%>)")
/ color = white






/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("I")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = attributeA]
/ posttrialpause = 250
</trial>
<trial attributeB>
/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("E")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = attributeB]
/ posttrialpause = 250
</trial>
<trial targetALeft>
/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("E")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = targetA]
/ posttrialpause = 250
</trial>
<trial targetARight>
/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("I")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = targetA]





/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("E")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = targetB]
/ posttrialpause = 250
</trial>
<trial targetBRight>
/ validresponse = ("E", "I")
/ correctresponse = ("I")
/ stimulusframes = [1 = targetB]









/ trials = [1 = introinstructions]
</block>
************************************
Practice end block Block
************************************
<block practiceend>






Short  Blocks  are  simply shorter  versions  (only 4 prefatory trial  +  8 trials)  of  the longer
Experimental Blocks. 
They are intended as practice blocks as participants tend to be slower 
during the first two blocks of an BIAT. They are not included into further data analyses.
<block short_a>
/  onblockbegin  =  [values.currentTarget  =  item.targetALabel.1;  text.topFocusInstruct.1  =
item.targetAFocusInstruct.1]
/ trials = [1=testInstructions; 2=showLabels;
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  3-6 = noreplace(targetARight, targetBLeft);
  8,10,12,14 = noreplace(targetARight, targetBLeft);
  7,9,11,13 = noreplace(attributeA, attributeB)]
/ errormessage = true(error,200)
/ responsemode = correct
</block>
<block short_b>
/  onblockbegin  =  [values.currentTarget  =  item.targetBLabel.1;  text.topFocusInstruct.1  =
item.targetBFocusInstruct.1]
/ trials = [1=testInstructions; 2=showLabels;
  3-6 = noreplace(targetBRight, targetALeft);
  8,10,12,14 = noreplace(targetBRight, targetALeft);
  7,9,11,13 = noreplace(attributeA, attributeB)]
/ errormessage = true(error,200)






* experimental blocks run 20 trials by default
* the first 4 trials = prefatory trials that are not included into subsequent analyses
<block A>
/ skip = [values.extended == false && block.A.totalcount >=1]
/  onblockbegin  =  [values.currentTarget  =  item.targetALabel.1;  text.topFocusInstruct.1  =
item.targetAFocusInstruct.1]
/ trials = [1=testInstructions; 2=showLabels;
  3-6 = noreplace(targetARight, targetBLeft);
  8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22 = noreplace(targetARight, targetBLeft);
  7,9,11,13,15,17,19,21 = noreplace(attributeA, attributeB)]
/ errormessage = true(error,200)
/ responsemode = correct
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.A.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.A1sum =  values.A1sum + block.A.latency]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.A.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.A1n += 1]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.A.currenttrialnumber  >=  7  )  values.A1ss  =   values.A1ss   +  (block.A.latency  *
block.A.latency)]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.A.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.A2sum =  values.A2sum + block.A.latency]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.A.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.A2n += 1]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.A.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.A.latency   <=  10000  &&








/ skip = [values.extended == false && block.B.totalcount >=1]
/  onblockbegin  =  [values.currentTarget  =  item.targetBLabel.1;  text.topFocusInstruct.1  =
item.targetBFocusInstruct.1]
/ trials = [1=testInstructions;2=showLabels;
  3-6 = noreplace(targetBRight, targetALeft);
  8,10,12,14,16,18,20,22= noreplace(targetBRight, targetALeft);
  7,9,11,13,15,17,19,21= noreplace(attributeA, attributeB)]
/ errormessage = true(error,200)
/ responsemode = correct
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.B1sum =  values.B1sum + block.B.latency]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.B1n +=  1]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  0  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber  >=  7  )  values.B1ss  =   values.B1ss   +  (block.B.latency  *
block.B.latency)]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.B2sum =  values.B2sum + block.B.latency]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber >= 7 ) values.B2n +=  1]
/  ontrialend  =  [if  (block.B.totalcount  ==  1  &&  block.B.latency   <=  10000  &&
block.B.currenttrialnumber  >=  7  )  values.B2ss  =   values.B2ss   +  (block.B.latency  *
block.B.latency)]




/ trials = [1=summary]






* counterbalanced by groupnumber
* if a participant goes through a sequence of BIATs the short blocks 
short_a & short_b only need to be run for the very first BIAT in the sequence
<expt>
/ subjects = (1 of 2)
/  blocks  =  [1  =  intro;  2=  short_a;  3  =  short_b;  4=  practiceend;  5=A;  6=B;  7=A;  8=B;
9=summary]





/ subjects = (2 of 2)
/  blocks  =  [1  =  intro;  2=  short_b;  3  =  short_a;  4=  practiceend;  5=B;  6=A;  7=B;  8=A;
9=summary]








date/time/group/subject: built in variables that track date and time when
script was run with the assigned
subject-  and  group
number
Note:  group1/group2
counterbalance the order in which the pairings are run
blockcode: the name of the current trial
blocknum: the number of the current trial
trialcode: the name of the current trial
trialnum: the number of the current trial
response: the final trial response (scancodes
of the keys pressed)
Note:  script  saves
the final and -by design- correct response
correct: the  accuracy  of  the  initial
response
0  =  initial
response was incorrect and needed to be corrected
1  =  initial
response is correct
latency: the latency of the final  (correct)
response
stimulusnumber: the  number  of  the  current
stimulus
stimulusitem: the currently presented item
expressions.d1: d-score of the first blocks
expressions.d2: d-score of the second blocks
expressions.d: overall d-score
/percentcorrect:       the  overall  percent  correct  score  of  initial





/ columns = [date, time, group, subject, blockcode, blocknum, trialcode, trialnum, response,
correct, latency, 







script.startdate: date script was run
script.starttime: time script was started
script.subjectid: subject id number
script.groupid: group id number
script.elapsedtime: time it took to run script (in ms)
/completed: 0 = script was not completed; 1 =
script was completed (all conditions run)
expressions.d1: d-score of the first blocks
expressions.d2: d-score of the second blocks
expressions.d: overall d-score
/percentcorrect:       the  overall  percent  correct  score  of  initial
responses of test trials of D-score qualifying latencies
<summarydata >
/file = "BriefIAT_summary.iqdat"
/columns = [script.filename, script.startdate, script.starttime, script.subjectid, script.groupid,
script.elapsedtime, values.completed,






/ latencydistribution = normal(500, 100)





/completed: 0 = script was not completed; 1 = script
was completed (all conditions run)
/ A1sum:  tracks the sum of the latencies to correct
responses (latencies <= 10000ms) for the first compatible block A1 (excludes prefatory ones)
Note:  by  design,  all  final  trial
responses are correct (regardless of accuracy of initial response)
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/ A2sum:  tracks the sum of the latencies to correct
responses (latencies <= 10000ms) for the second compatible block A2 (excludes prefatory
ones)
Note:  by  design,  all  final  trial
responses are correct (regardless of accuracy of initial response)
/ B1sum:  tracks the sum of the latencies to correct
responses (latencies <= 10000ms) for the first  incompatible block B1 (excludes prefatory
ones)
Note:  by  design,  all  final  trial
responses are correct (regardless of accuracy of initial response)
/ B2sum:  tracks the sum of the latencies to correct
responses (latencies <= 10000ms) for the second incompatible block B2 (excludes prefatory
ones)
Note:  by  design,  all  final  trial
responses are correct (regardless of accuracy of initial response)
/ A1n: counts  the  number  of  trials  in  first
compatible block A1 (excludes prefatory ones)
/ A2n: counts  the  number  of  trials  in  second
compatible block A2 (excludes prefatory ones)
/ B1n: counts  the  number  of  trials  in  first
incompatible block B1 (excludes prefatory ones)
/ B2n: counts  the  number  of  trials  in  second
incompatible block B2 (excludes prefatory ones)
/ A1ss: tracks the sum of the squared latencies to
correct  responses  (latencies  <=  10000ms)  in  the  first  compatible  block  A1  (excluding
prefatory trials)
/ A2ss: tracks the sum of the squared latencies to
correct  responses  (latencies  <= 10000ms) in  the  second compatible  block A1 (excluding
prefatory trials)
/ B1ss: tracks the sum of the squared latencies to
correct  responses  (latencies  <=  10000ms)  in  the  first  incompatible  block  B1  (excluding
prefatory trials)
/ B2ss: tracks the sum of the squared latencies to
correct responses (latencies <= 10000ms) in the second incompatible block B2 (excluding
prefatory trials)
/ magnitude: stores the magnitude of the implicit preference:
"little to no", "a slight", "a moderate", "a strong"
/ currentTarget: stores the current target stimulus
/ n_correct: counts  all  initial  correct  responses  of  all  trials
that count towards D score
<values>
/completed = 0
/ A1sum = 0
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/ A2sum = 0
/ B1sum = 0
/ B2sum = 0
/ A1n = 0
/ A2n = 0
/ B1n = 0
/ B2n = 0
/ A1ss = 0
/ A2ss = 0
/ B1ss = 0
/ B2ss = 0
/ magnitude = "unknown"
/ currentTarget = ""
/ n_correct = 0
</values>
/ A1m: mean latencies of correct responses in first compatible
block A1
/ A2m: mean  latencies  of  correct  responses  in  second
compatible block A2
/ B1m: mean latencies of correct responses in first incompatible
block B1
/ B2m: mean  latencies  of  correct  responses  in  second
compatible block B2
/ A1sd: standard deviation of latencies of correct responses in
first compatible block A1
/ A2sd: standard deviation of latencies of correct responses in
second compatible block A2
/ B1sd: standard deviation of latencies of correct responses in
first incompatible block B1
/ B2sd: standard deviation of latencies of correct responses in
second compatible block B2
/ sd1: standarddeviation of latencies in first blocks
/ sd2: standarddeviation of latencies in second blocks
/ d1: D-score for first blocks
/ d2: D-score for second blocks
/ d: overall D-score
/ currentblocknumber:stores the current block number
/ preferred: stores the preferred target category
/ notpreferred : stores the non preferred target category
/ totalblockcount: counts the total blocks run
/ percentcorrect:       the overall percent correct score of initial responses of test trials of D-
score qualifying latencies
<expressions>
/ A1m = values.A1sum / values.A1n
/ A2m = values.A2sum / values.A2n
/ B1m = values.B1sum / values.B1n
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/ B2m = values.B2sum / values.B2n
/  A1sd  =  sqrt((values.A1ss  -  (values.A1n*  (expressions.A1m  *  expressions.A1m)))  /
(values.A1n - 1))
/  A2sd  =  sqrt((values.A2ss  -  (values.A2n*  (expressions.A2m  *  expressions.A2m)))  /
(values.A2n - 1))
/  B1sd  =  sqrt((values.B1ss  -  (values.B1n*  (expressions.B1m  *  expressions.B1m)))  /
(values.B1n - 1))
/  B2sd  =  sqrt((values.B2ss  -  (values.B2n*  (expressions.B2m  *  expressions.B2m)))  /
(values.B2n - 1))
/ sd1 = sqrt((((values.A1n - 1) * (expressions.A1sd * expressions.A1sd) + (values.B1n - 1) *
(expressions.B1sd * expressions.B1sd)) + ((values.A1n + values.B1n) * ((expressions.A1m -
expressions.B1m) * (expressions.A1m - expressions.B1m)) / 4) ) / (values.A1n + values.B1n
- 1) )
/ sd2 = sqrt((((values.A2n - 1) * (expressions.A2sd * expressions.A2sd) + (values.B2n - 1) *
(expressions.B2sd * expressions.B2sd)) + ((values.A2n + values.B2n) * ((expressions.A2m -
expressions.B2m) * (expressions.A2m - expressions.B2m)) / 4) ) / (values.A2n + values.B2n
- 1) )
/ d1 = (expressions.B1m - expressions.A1m) / expressions.sd1
/ d2 = (expressions.B2m - expressions.A2m) / expressions.sd2
/ d = if ( values.extended ) { (d1+d2) / 2 } else { d1 }
/ currentblocknumber = max(expt.1.currentblocknumber, expt.2.currentblocknumber)
/ preferred = "unknown"
/ notpreferred = "unknown"
/ totalblockcount = if (values.extended) {expt.1.blockcount} else {expt.1.blockcount-2}






6.3 Cluster Analysis 
Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results appear in Table  6 .31.
Table 6.31. Means (Standard Deviation) of the z Scores ANOVA f Values (and Significance)
for the Four Clusters Derived from the BitSS.
















Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Mental and Psychic Phenomena
-1.20 (.46) .11 (.59) .45 (.54) 1.22 (.42) 171.77 <.001
Religious Belief




-.88 (.18) -.58 (.37) .42 (.73) 1.39 (.93) 104.91 <.001
Supernatural Entities
-1.18 (.28) .71 (.74) .22(.62) 1.12 (.46) 144.48 <.001
Common  Paranormal
Perceptions -1.09 (.35) -.18 (.7) .62 (.73) .85 (.61) 99.85 <.001
Figure 6.25. Graph Showing the Last 10 Agglomeration Distances and the Cluster Merges of
the Five Subscales of the BitsSS.
The scree plot (Figure  6 .25) and dendrogram did not present a clear cluster solution and
based on previous research (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Rice, 2003; Schofield et al., 2016) a
four cluster solution was selected. Levene’s Test was significant (p <.001) for four out of the
five subscales,  with only ‘mental and psychic phenomena’ being non-significant (p=.314)
indicating  a  problem with  equality  of  the  sample.  There  are  differences  in  sample  sizes
between the four group and their variances with Box’s Test was also significant ( p<.001),
however,  due  to  the  sample  size  being  larger  and  Box’s  Test  being  very  sensitive,  the
probability values were accepted and Pillai’s Trace used (Tabachnick et al., 2007).
The accepted four cluster solution was internally validated by a one-way MANOVA (IV1 = 4
×  clusters;  DV1(MPP),  DV2(RB),  DV3(PK),  DV4(SE)  and  DV5(CPP)).  The  MANOVA
showed a significant difference between the scales (F (15) = 61.219, p < .001, Pillai’s Trace V
= 1.721).  Following this, a one-way ANOVA with a post hoc Tukey HSD looked at the
squared Euclidean distance between each of the clusters (see  Table  6 .31). The only non-
significant (p < .136) difference was between the ‘religious believers’ and ‘sceptics’ clusters.
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All other differences in mean z scores were significant. Figure  6 .26 depicts these means in a
graph to give a visible representation of the differences between groups. Once the clusters
were identified and titled based on the means, the descriptive statistics were examined.
Figure  6.26. Graph Showing Mean z Scores for the Five Subscale of the BitSS and their
Respective Membership of the Four Clusters.
The initial analysis revealed a four cluster solution, which was then internally validated and
found to be consistent and was labelled in line with previous research by  Schofield et al.
(2016).





 Belief  in  the  Supernatural  -  Cognitive  and  Personality
Differences.   Information for Participants.  You are invited to participate in a research project
being conducted by Dr Ian Baker and Mr Malcolm Schofield (University of Derby).  This
project  is  also  part  of  a  PhD qualification. Ethical  approval  for  this  study  was  received
from the University of Derby Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee. The project‘s aim
is to examine the thinking styles and personality differences of people who hold different
types of supernatural belief. This study will be conducted in two parts. ·         The first part
will be an online survey comprising three scales (roughly 200 statements in total) relating to
supernatural  belief  and  personality,  and a  few  basic  questions  about  your  demographic
background.  You  will  also  be  asked  to  complete  three  other  measures  looking  at
cognitive processes of around 25 items/questions. This will take around 45 minutes. ·        
You will  then be emailed a second online survey with around 200 statements looking at
personality.  This  will  also  take  around  45  minutes.  This  will  lead  to  improving  our
understanding of how people think and how their type of personality relates to how they
believe in  different  aspects  of  the supernatural.  You must  be 18 years  of  age or older to
participate  in  this  project  and  your  participation  is  entirely  voluntary.  If  you  choose  to
participate,  you  will  be  asked  to  complete  an  online  survey.  The  study  will  take
approximately 45 minutes in total. You can choose to withdraw from the study during and up
until the 1st August 2017.  Please answer all questions frankly and honestly. The integrity of
our  research  depends  upon  your  truthful  responses.  Your  anonymity  in  this  study  is
guaranteed and your responses cannot be traced back to you in any way. All results will be
treated as confidential. The data will be stored confidentially (password protected, online)
and anonymously by the use of the participant generated unique ID code. To generate your
unique ID code, use your birth month and the last two numbers of your phone number. For
example, if your birth month was August and your phone number ended in 78, your ID code
would be 0878.  In the unlikely event that this research raises any personal or upsetting issues
for you, you would be strongly encouraged to visit a counsellor at your local Community
Health Centre or General Practitioner.  The results of this project may be used in a follow up
study. Any studies arising from this project may later be published in an academic journal.
You will not be personally identified by any data that is collected or published; only data for
all participants together (which is anonymous) is used and will be stored online in a password
protected site accessible only to the researchers and will be destroyed after a minimum of 10
years. If you have any further questions about this project, please feel free to contact the
researchers at the email addresses provided above. If you take part and are on campus at the
University of Derby, you are eligible for a free Blends drink for taking part in this study.
Please email m.schofield@derby.ac.uk for further details.  Please note:  ·         Please read the
instructions  for  each task carefully.·         Please  input  your  email  address  correctly.·        
There  are  two  parts  to  this  study,  they  can  be  completed  at  separate  times.
Thank you for your participation. 





ID Generate your unique ID code by using  your birth month and the last two numbers of
your phone number. For example, if your birth month was August and your phone number
ended in 78, your ID code would be 0878.





 Prefer not to say (3)
nation Nationality: (this question is optional)
CRB Current religion or belief: (this question is optional)
student Are you a student?
eduattain What level of eduction have you attained?
job What is your current occupation?
edlevel At what level?
Q304 Each statement on this survey is something you may or may not agree with. Please
respond to the statements as honestly as you can. Remember,  there are no right or wrong
answers. For example, if you strongly agree with the statement please check that box. You
can choose from the nine responses ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Q107 I may be wrong about some of the little things in life, but I am quite certain I am right
about all the BIG issues.
Q109 Someday I will probably think that many of my present ideas were wrong.
Q110 Anyone who is  honestly  and truly  seeking  the  truth  will  end  up believing what  I
believe.
Q111 There are so many things we have not discovered yet, nobody should be absolutely
certain his beliefs are right.
Q112 The things I believe in are so completely true, I could never doubt them.
Q113 I have never discovered a system of beliefs that explains everything to my satisfaction.
Q114 It is best to be open to all possibilities and ready to reevaluate all your beliefs.
Q115 My opinions are right and will stand the test of time.
Q116 Flexibility is a real virtue in thinking, since you may well be wrong.
Q117 My opinions  and beliefs  fit  together  perfectly  to  make a  crystal-clear  “picture”  of
things.
Q118 There are no discoveries or facts that could possibly make me change my mind about
the things that matter most in life.
Q119 I am a long way from reaching final conclusions about the central issues in life.
Q120 The person who is absolutely certain she has the truth will probably never find it.
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Q121 I am absolutely certain that my ideas about the fundamental issues in life are correct.
Q122 The people who disagree with me may well turn out to be right.
Q123 I am so sure I am right about the important things in life, there is no evidence that could
convince me otherwise.
-Q124 If you are “open-minded” about the most important things in life, you will probably
reach the wrong conclusions.
Q125 Twenty years from now, some of my opinions about the important things in life will
probably have changed.
Q126 “Flexibility in thinking” is another name for being “wishy-washy”.
Q127 No one knows all the essential truths about the central issues in life.
Q128 Someday I will probably realize my present ideas about the BIG issues are wrong.
Q129 People who disagree with me are just plain wrong and often evil as well.
Q299 Thank you for completing this section, please click on the button to proceed.
Q247 Please read each question carefully.After you answer each question, please indicate
how confident you are with answer you gave as instructed.Please take all the time you need
to answer the questions.
7.2.2 Cogntive Reflection Test - Two
Q130 If you’re running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you
in?
Q236 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer? Please type in your answer
below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
Q245 A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left?
Q241 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer? Please type in your answer
below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
Q244 Emily’s father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the
third daughter’s name?
Q242 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer? Please type in your answer
below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).
Q246 How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ long?
Q243 How confident are you that you gave the correct answer? Please type in your answer
below between 0 % (totally not sure) and 100 % (totally sure).




Q235 Please Read the Instructions Before Continuing:  This questionnaire contains questions
that may relate to your thoughts, feelings, experiences and preferences.  There are no right or
wrong answers or trick questions so please be as honest as possible. For each question click
either  "YES" or the "NO".  Do not spend too much time deliberating any question but put the
answer closest to your own.  
lease do not discuss the questionnaire with anyone who may also complete it as this may
affect their answer.  It is best completed in private, without the need to hurry.
1 Do you believe in telepathy?
2 Do you ever feel sure that something is about to happen, even though there does not seem
to be any reason for you thinking that?
3 Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are not normally aware of?
4 Do you often have days when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother your eyes?
5 Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong?
6 Have you felt as though your head or limbs were somehow not your own?
7 Have you sometimes sensed an evil presence around you, even though you could not see it?
8 Have you wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living?
9 On occasions, have you seen a person's face in front of you when no one was in fact there?
10 When in the dark do you often see shapes and forms even though there's nothing there?
11 When you look in the mirror does your face sometimes seem quite different from usual?
12 Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear them?
13 Can some people make you aware of them just by thinking about you?
14 Do ideas and insights sometimes come to you so fast that you cannot express them all?
15 Do the people in your daydreams seem so true to life that you sometimes think they are
real?
16 Do you sometimes feel that your accidents are caused by mysterious forces?
17 Do you think you could learn to read other's minds if you wanted to?
18 Does it often happen that nearly every thought immediately and automatically suggests an
enormous number of ideas?
19 Does a passing thought ever seem so real it frightens you?
20 Does your voice ever seem distant or faraway?
21 Have you ever felt that you have special, almost magical powers?
22 Is your hearing sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become uncomfortable?
23 Do you ever have a sense of vague danger or sudden dread for reasons that you do not
understand?
24 Do you feel so good at controlling others that it sometimes scares you?
25 Have you ever thought you heard people talking only to discover that it was in fact some
nondescript noise?
26 Have you felt that you might cause something to happen just by thinking too much about
it?
27 Have you occasionally felt as though your body did not exist?
28 Have you sometimes had the feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people look
at you or touch you?
29 Are the sounds you hear in your daydreams really clear and distinct?
30 Do your thoughts sometimes seem as real as actual events in your life?
31 Are you easily distracted when you read or talk to someone?
32 Do you ever feel that your speech is difficult to understand because the words are all
mixed up and don't make sense?
33 Do you often experience an overwhelming sense of emptiness?
34 Do you often feel lonely?
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35 Is it hard for you to make decisions?
36 Are you a person whose mood goes up and down easily?
37 Are you easily hurt when people find fault with you or the work you do?
38 Are you sometimes so nervous that you are blocked?
39 Do you dread going into a room by yourself where other people have already gathered and
are talking?
40 Do you easily lose your courage when criticised or failing in something?
41 Do you find it difficult to keep interested in the same thing for a long time?
42 Do you frequently have difficulty in starting to do things?
43 Do you often feel that there is no purpose to life?
44 Do you often have difficulties in controlling your thoughts?
45 Do you often worry about things you should not have done or said?
46 Do you worry about awful things that might happen?
47 No matter how hard you try to concentrate do unrelated thoughts creep into your mind?
48 When in a crowded room, do you often have difficulty in following a conversation?
49 Are you easily confused if too much happens at the same time?
50 Are you easily distracted from work by daydreams?
51 Do you often feel ‘fed up?
52 Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience?
53 Would you call yourself a nervous person?
54 Do you often hesitate when you are going to say something in a group of people whom
you more or less know?
55 Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?
56 Do people who try to get to know you better usually give up after a while?
57 Do you feel that making new friends isn't worth the energy it takes?
58 Do you find the bright lights of a city exciting to look at?
59 Do you like going out a lot?
60 Do you prefer watching television to going out with other people?
61 Do you usually have very little desire to buy new kinds of food?
63 Are people usually better off if they stay aloof from emotional involvements with people?
64 Are there very few things that you have ever really enjoyed doing?
65 Are you much too independent to really get involved with other people?
66 Are you rather lively?
67 Can just being with friends make you feel really good?
68 Do you have many friends?
69 Do you like mixing with people?
70 Do you think having close friends is not as important as some people say?
71 Does it often feel good to massage your muscles when they are tired or sore?
72 Has dancing or the idea of it always seemed dull to you?
73 Have you often felt uncomfortable when your friends touch you?
74 Is trying new foods something you have always enjoyed?
75 On seeing a soft thick carpet have you sometimes had the impulse to take off your shoes
and walk barefoot on it? 
76 When things are bothering you do you like to talk to other people about it?
77 Do you feel very close to your friends? 
78 Do you love having your back massaged? 
79 Have you had very little fun from physical activities like walking swimming, or sports?
80 Do you enjoy many different kinds of play and recreation? 
82 Do people who drive carefully annoy you?
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83 Do you often feel like doing the opposite of what other people suggest, even though you
know they are right?
84 Do you often feel the impulse to spend money which you know you can't afford?
85 Do you often have an urge to hit someone?
86 Do you sometimes talk about things you know nothing about?
87 Are you usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low? 
88 Do you at times have an urge to do something harmful or shocking?
89 Do you ever have the urge to break or smash things?
90 Do you often change between intense liking and disliking of the same person?
91 Do you stop to think things over before doing anything? 
92 Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding their  future with savings and
insurance?
93 Have you ever blamed someone for doing something you know was really your fault?
94 Have you ever cheated at a game?
95 Have you ever felt the urge to injure yourself?
96 When in a group of people do you usually prefer to let someone else be the centre of
attention? 
97 When you catch a train do you often arrive at the last minute?
98 Would being in debt worry you?
99 Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects?
100 Do you consider yourself to be pretty much an average kind of person?
101 Have you ever taken advantage of someone?
102 Would you like other people to be afraid of you?
103 Do you often overindulge in alcohol or food?
104 Would it make you nervous to play the clown in front of other people?
Q301 Thank you for completing this section, please click on the button to proceed.
7.2.4 Debriefing Statement
 for part one of the study.     Thank you for your participation in the first part of this project.   
Please note you will be emailed a link to part two of the survey for you to complete as soon
as possible.If you do not receive this within two days please check your spam folder.     The
project‘s aim is to examine cognitive and personality differences of people who hold different
types of supernatural belief.     Please note that your answers are treated as anonymous and
confidential. If you wish to withdraw your data please contact either of the addresses below
with your unique ID by 1st August 2017. It is important that you complete part two of the
survey as soon as possible, however, if you do not complete part two of the survey your data
will not be used.     The overall purpose of the study was for research and a PhD project.   
Many thanks for taking part in the first part this project, if you require further information
please  contact  Dr  Ian  Baker  (I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk)  or  Malcolm  Schofield
(M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332 591160). 
Debrief 2 
(to be email to the participant after completion of the 15FQ+)
Debriefing  statement
 
Thank you for your participation in this project. 
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The project‘s aim is to examine cognitive and personality differences of people who hold
different  types  of  supernatural  belief.
 
We wanted to see if people who hold different types of belief think in different ways and if
this  links  with  a particular personality.  For  example,  do people  who hold religious beliefs
think in a more critical way than those who believe in the paranormal? And might they be
more dogmatic or extroverted? Also, we wanted to see why people might believe in one type
of phenomena but not another; for example why do people believe in angels but not ghosts?
And has this something to do with the way they think or their personality? To help us do this
you  were  asked  to fill  in  a  survey  based  on  supernatural  belief  and  took cognitive
and personality measures  that relate to:  cognitive reflection, detecting  how  numbers
vary, critical thinking, confidence, dogmatism scale, O Life Scale and the 15 FQ+ personality
scale.  This  will  be  used  to  see  if  a  person  who  holds  a particular type  of  belief,  has
a particular thinking style or particular personality. This will help us understand how these
types of beliefs are formed and maintained. This will also inform the building of a model
of supernatural belief, cognition and personality.
 
If  you  would  like  to  read  more  about  this  topic,  please  have  a  look  at  this  study:
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012). Analytic
cognitive  style  predicts  religious  and  paranormal  belief.Cognition, 123(3),  335-346.
This  project  overall  will  develop and  test  a  new  model  of  supernatural  belief  based  on
cognitive  and  personality  differences.
 
Please note that your answers are treated as anonymous and confidential.  If  you wish to
withdraw your data please contact either of the addresses below with your unique ID (the last
two letters of your surname and the last two numbers of your phone number) before the 1 st
Febraury  2017.
 
The  overall  purpose  of  the  study  was  for  research  and  a  PhD  project.
 
Many thanks for taking part in this project, if you require further information please contact
Dr  Ian  Baker  (I.S.Baker@derby.ac.uk)  or  Malcolm  Schofield
(M.Schofield@derby.ac.uk, 01332 591160).  
7.3 Cluster Analysis 
For descriptive statistics and ANOVA results see Table  7 .32.
Table 7.32. Means (SD) of the z Scores ANOVA F Values (and Significance) for the Four 
Clusters Derived from the BitSS.





 (n =10, 6.6%)
Paranormal Believers







Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Mental and Psychic Phenomena
-1.13 (0.17)  -0.30(0.51) 0.01 (0.42) 1.15 (0.41) 340.00 <.001
Religious Belief
-0.72(0.27) 1.88 (0.71) -0.58 (0.32) 0.80 (0.78) 125.01 <.001
Psychokinesis
-0.79 (0.10)  -0.61(0.55) -0.26 (0.55) 1.10 (0.88) 93.50 <.001
Supernatural Entities
-0.97 (0.23) 1.17 (0.60) -0.31 (0.52) 0.97 (0.66) 143.15 <.001
Common Paranormal Perceptions
-0.95 (0.24) -0.55 (0.59) -0.07 (0.58) 1.10 (0.66) 133.09 <.001
Figure 7.27. Graph Showing the Last Ten Agglomeration Distances and the Cluster Merges
of the Five Subscales of the BitSS.
The scree plot (Figure  7 .27) and dendrogram indicated a two cluster solution, but for the
purpose of these analyses, the consistency of the groups throughout this thesis and based on
previous research (Schofield et al., 2016), a four cluster solution was forced. Levene’s Test
was significant (p < .001) for all the subscales and Box’s Test was also significant (p <.001).
This indicated a problem with the sample but due to sample size (Tabachnick et al., 2007) and
Box’s Test being sensitive (Tabachnick et al., 2007) and the cluster analysis not being equal
by nature the values were accepted and Pillai’s Trace was used (Tabachnick et al., 2007).
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A one-way MANOVA (IV1 = 4 × clusters; DV1 (MPP), DV2 (RB), DV3 (PK),  DV4 (SE)  and DV5 (CPP))
was used to internally validate the four cluster solution. There was a significant difference
between the scales (67% of the variance accounted for) (F (15) = 397.92, p < .001, V = 1.695).
A post hoc  Tukey HSD showed the majority of clusters had significantly different squared
Euclidean  differences  apart  from  ‘paranormal  believers’ and  ‘religious  believers’ on  the
Mental and Psychic Phenomena subscale (p=.073); ‘Paranormal believers’ and ‘sceptics’ on
the  Religious  Belief  subscale  (p=.572);  ‘Sceptics’  and  ‘religious  believers’   on  the
Psychokinesis subscale (p=.837); Clusters ‘religious believers’  and ‘believers’ (p=.052) and
‘sceptics’ and ‘paranormal believers’ (p=.117) on the Supernatural Entities subscale (p=.644)
and ‘paranormal believers’ and ‘religious believers’ on the Common Paranormal Perceptions
subscale. For a graphical representation of the mean z score see Figure  7 .28. Based on these
scores, the clusters were titled appropriately (see Table  7 .32).
Figure 7.28. Graph Showing Mean z Scores for the Five Subscales of the BitSS and their 
Respective Membership of the Four Clusters.
The Cluster Analysis was problematic in identifying the four clusters that had previously
been arrived at. While the MANOVA indicated some area of concern regarding significance,
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the four cluster model was accepted based on previous research, however, the results of the
following Discriminant Functions Analysis should be treated with caution. Furthermore, the
results of the cluster Analysis will not affect the Structural Equation Modelling analysis.
7.4 R Output
7.4.1 Structural Equation Model
7.4.1.1 Model One
> fitmeasures (model.fit) ##fit indices
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             54.000               1.234             375.044             156.000               0.000
1791.684 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
            190.000               0.000               0.863               0.833               0.833               0.745 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.791               0.649               0.866               0.863           -6352.889           -6165.367
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
          12813.777           12977.067             152.000           12806.158               0.096
0.084 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.109               0.000               1.148               1.148               0.118               0.118 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
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              0.118               0.117               0.117               0.117               0.117              76.442 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 
             82.060               0.802               0.733               0.596               0.486               3.178 
> modificationindices(model.fit, sort = TRUE) ##mod indices and they are sorted
7.4.1.2 Model Two
> fitmeasures (model.fit) ##fit indices
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             54.000               1.110             337.385             156.000               0.000
1791.684 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
            190.000               0.000               0.887               0.862               0.862               0.771 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.812               0.666               0.889               0.887           -6334.059           -6165.367
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
          12776.118           12939.408             152.000           12768.499               0.087
0.075 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.100               0.000               1.087               1.087               0.111               0.111 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.111               0.111               0.111               0.111               0.111              84.863 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 




> fitmeasures (model.fit) ##fit indices
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             56.000               1.144             347.742             154.000               0.000
1791.684 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
            190.000               0.000               0.879               0.851               0.851               0.761 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.806               0.653               0.882               0.879           -6339.238           -6165.367
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
          12790.475           12959.812             152.000           12782.573               0.091
0.078 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.104               0.000               1.063               1.063               0.109               0.109 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.109               0.109               0.109               0.109               0.109              81.409 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 
             87.434               0.811               0.742               0.595               0.529               3.025 




> fitmeasures (model.fit) ##fit indices
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             29.000               0.235              71.580              49.000               0.019            1123.804 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
             66.000               0.000               0.979               0.971               0.971               0.914 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.936               0.695               0.979               0.979           -3908.910           -3873.120
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
           7875.820            7963.513             152.000            7871.728               0.055
0.023 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.081               0.360               1.062               1.062               0.055               0.055 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055             141.870 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 




> fitmeasures (model.fit) ##fit indices
               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             28.000               0.236              71.806              50.000               0.023            1123.804 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
             66.000               0.000               0.979               0.973               0.973               0.916 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.936               0.709               0.980               0.979           -3909.023           -3873.120
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
           7874.047            7958.715             152.000            7870.096               0.054
0.021 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.080               0.394               1.194               1.194               0.055               0.055 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055             143.895 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 




               npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             29.000               0.235              71.580              49.000               0.019            1123.804 
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
             66.000               0.000               0.979               0.971               0.971               0.914 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.936               0.695               0.979               0.979           -3908.910           -3873.120
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
           7875.820            7963.513             152.000            7871.728               0.055
0.023 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.081               0.360               1.062               1.062               0.055               0.055 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055               0.055             141.870 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 




          npar                fmin               chisq                  df              pvalue      baseline.chisq 
             37.000               0.581             176.585              83.000               0.000            1354.978
        baseline.df     baseline.pvalue                 cfi                 tli                nnfi                 rfi 
            105.000               0.000               0.925               0.905               0.905               0.835 
                nfi                pnfi                 ifi                 rni                logl   unrestricted.logl 
              0.870               0.687               0.926               0.925           -4808.434           -4720.142
                aic                 bic              ntotal                bic2               rmsea      rmsea.ci.lower 
           9690.869            9802.752             152.000            9685.648               0.086
0.068 
     rmsea.ci.upper        rmsea.pvalue                 rmr          rmr_nomean                srmr
srmr_bentler 
              0.104               0.001               1.939               1.939               0.083               0.083 
srmr_bentler_nomean          srmr_bollen   srmr_bollen_nomean           srmr_mplus
srmr_mplus_nomean               cn_05 
              0.083               0.083               0.083               0.083               0.083              91.611 
              cn_01                 gfi                agfi                pgfi                 mfi                ecvi 
            100.743               0.865               0.806               0.599               0.735               1.64
61
Sensitivity: Internal
